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Abstract	  
	  
Since	  1948,	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN)	  has	  launched	  83	  peace	  missions	  across	  the	  globe.	  After	  
the	   end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War,	   the	  nature	  of	  UN	  peace	  missions	   changed	  and	   the	  UN	  began	   to	  
mandate	  its	  peace	  soldiers	  to	  perform	  a	  greater	  variety	  of	  tasks.	  One	  of	  these	  tasks	  was	  the	  
protection	  of	  civilians	  (POC).	  While	  much	  work	  has	  been	  done	  on	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  civilian	  
protection	  agenda	  and	  the	  role	  that	  peacekeepers	  play	  in	  protecting	  civilians	  during	  armed	  
conflict,	   these	   works	   have	   been	   descriptive	   narratives	   that	   lack	   any	   sort	   of	   theoretical	  
component	   that	  conceptualizes	  POC	  as	  a	  norm.	  This	   thesis	  conceptualizes	  POC	  as	  a	  norm	  
and	   utilizes	   a	   Constructivist	   framework	   based	   on	   Martha	   Finnemore’s	   and	   Kathryn	  
Sikkink’s	   norm	   life-­‐cycle	   in	   order	   to	   identify	   how	   the	   norm	   of	   civilian	   protection	   during	  
conflict	   in	  Africa	  evolved	  at	  the	  UN,	  beginning	   in	  1992	  and	  ending	   in	  2011.	   It	  argues	  that	  
the	  greatest	   impetus	   for	   the	  evolution	  of	   the	  POC	  norm	  came	   from	  actors	  within	   the	  UN,	  
who	   were	   motivated	   by	   organizational	   survival,	   even	   though	   the	   institutionalization	   of	  
normative	  evolution	  at	  the	  UN	  did	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  the	  demonstration	  of	  POC	  by	  UN	  
peace	   soldiers	   on	   the	   ground.	   This	   thesis	   aims	   to	   prove	   this	   assertion	   by	   applying	   a	  
Constructivist	   framework	   to	   a	   case	   study,	   which	   consists	   of	   UN	   peace	   missions	   in	   four	  
different	  African	  nations:	  Somalia,	  Rwanda,	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  Sudan.	  This	  thesis	  also	  aims	  
















1.1 Background	  and	  Problem	  Statement	  	  
	  
Concern	   for	   vulnerable	   populations	   in	   areas	   of	   conflict	   has	   grown	   beyond	   the	  
human	  rights	  and	  relief	  communities,	  “emerging	  as	  a	  political	  and	  normative	  force	  among	  
international	  leaders.”1	  The	  United	  Nations	  (UN)	  has	  more	  recently	  been	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  
recognizing	   and	   articulating	   the	   need	   to	   protect	   civilians	   during	   conflict.	   Thus,	   the	   UN	  
Security	   Council	   (UNSC)	   has	   begun	   to	   authorize	   some	   of	   its	   peace	   missions	   to	   protect	  
civilian	  populations	   in	  conflict.	  The	  UN	   includes	   this	  goal	  particularly	   in	   its	  African	  peace	  
missions,	  where	  predation	  of	  civilians	  during	  conflict	   is	  common.	  Nearly	  600,000	  African	  
civilians	   have	   been	  massacred	   in	   the	   past	   two	   decades,	   and	   “tens	   of	  millions	  more	   have	  
been	  killed	   in	  battles,	  displaced,	  or	  perished	   from	  indirect	  causes	  of	  such	  attacks	  and	  the	  
continent’s	  armed	  conflicts.”2	  Out	  of	  the	  fourteen	  different	  UN-­‐led	  missions	  with	  mandates	  
that	  include	  the	  protection	  of	  civilians	  (POC),	  twelve	  were	  conducted	  in	  Africa.3	  
	  
But	  how	  have	  the	  UN’s	  goals	  to	  protect	  civilians	  during	  its	  peace	  missions	  in	  Africa	  
evolved	  over	  time?	  This	  is	  the	  problem	  addressed	  by	  my	  thesis.	  
	  
For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   thesis,	   POC	   is	   conceptualized	   as	   a	   norm.	  Recently,	   in	   the	  
field	  of	  international	  relations,	  increasing	  attention	  has	  been	  given	  to	  normative	  forces,	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Victoria	  Holt,	  The	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect:	  Considering	  the	  Operational	  Capacity	  for	  Civilian	  Protection	  
(Washington,	  D.C.:	  The	  Henry	  L.	  Stimson	  Center,	  2005),	  4.	  
2	  Paul	  Williams,	  Enhancing	  Civilian	  Protection	  in	  Peace	  Operations:	  Insights	  from	  Africa	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  
National	  Defense	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  1.	  
3	  United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  the	  Central	  African	  Republic	  and	  Chad	  (MINURCAT),	  United	  Nations	  Stabilization	  
Mission	  in	  Mali	  (MINUSMA),	  United	  Nations	  Organization	  Mission	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  
(MONUC),	  United	  Nations	  Organization	  Stabilization	  Mission	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  
(MONUSCO),	  United	  Nations	  Operation	  in	  Burundi	  (ONUB),	  AU/UN	  Hybrid	  Operation	  in	  Darfur	  (UNAMID),	  
United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  (UNAMSIL),	  United	  Nations	  Interim	  Security	  Force	  for	  Abyei	  
(UNIFSA),	  United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  Liberia	  (UNMIL),	  and	  United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  Sudan	  (UNMIS)	  and	  the	  
United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  South	  Sudan	  (UNMISS),	  United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  Cote	  d’Ivoire	  (UNOCI).	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norms.	   Norms	   are	   collective	   expectations,	   understandings	   or	   standards	   of	   appropriate	  
behavior	  for	  actors	  with	  a	  given	  identity.4	  Norms	  guide	  the	  behavior	  of	  actors,	  sometimes	  
by	   constraining	   their	   self-­‐interests.	   The	   notion	   that	   normative	   factors	   shape	   human	  
concerns	  and	  social	  interactions	  as	  much	  as	  material	  or	  power-­‐maximizing	  factors	  directly	  
challenges	   Neorealist	   and	   Neoliberal	   political	   theories.5	   As	   such,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  
investigate	   how	   norms	   evolve	   and	   whether	   normative	   change	   brings	   about	   behavioral	  
change.	  	  
The	   POC	   norm	   has	   its	   origins	   in	   the	   non-­‐combatant	   immunity	   norm.	   Non-­‐
combatants,	  or	  civilians,	  are	  those	  who	  do	  not	  play	  active	  military	  roles	  in	  a	  conflict.6	  This	  
disengagement	   from	  hostilities	  grants	   civilians	   immunity	   from	  direct	  military	  attack.	  The	  
non-­‐combatant	   immunity	  norm	  has	   long	  been	  a	  norm	  of	  military	  conduct	  and	  customary	  
international	   law.	   Though	   the	   rules	   of	  war	   vary	   across	   time	   and	   space,	   these	   rules	   have	  
persisted	   “toward	   the	   general	   conception	   of	   war	   as	   a	   combat	   between	   combatants,	   a	  
conception	   that	   turns	  up	  again	   and	  again	   in	   anthropological	   and	  historical	   accounts.”7	   In	  
the	  13th	   century,	  Christian	  writers	  began	   to	   include	   the	  norm	   in	   the	   “just	  war”	  doctrine.8	  
This	   doctrine	   had	   “considerable	   influence	   on	   the	   formation	   of	   certain	   principles	   of	   the	  
international	   law	   of	   war,	   among	   which	   is	   the	   principle	   of	   noncombatant	   immunity.”9	  
Codification	   of	   non-­‐combatant	   immunity	   began	   with	   the	   Geneva	   Conventions	   of	   1949,	  
specifically	  the	  Geneva	  Convention	  Relative	  to	  the	  Protection	  of	  Civilian	  Persons	  in	  Time	  of	  
War.	   The	   Geneva	   Conventions,	   along	   with	   the	   subsequent	   Protocols	   of	   1977,	   are	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Martha	  Finnemore	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  “International	  Norm	  Dynamics	  and	  Political	  Change,”	  International	  
Organization	  52,	  4	  (Autumn	  1998);	  Peter	  Katzenstein,	  “Introduction:	  Alternative	  Perspectives	  on	  National	  
Security,”	  in	  The	  Culture	  of	  National	  Security:	  Norms	  and	  Identity	  in	  World	  Politics,	  ed.	  Peter	  J.	  Katzenstein	  
(New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Martha	  Finnemore,	  National	  Interests	  in	  International	  Society	  
(Ithaca,	  N.Y.:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Jeffrey	  Checkel,	  “The	  Constructivist	  Turn	  in	  International	  
Relations	  Theory,”	  World	  Politics	  50,	  2	  (January	  1998).	  	  
5	  Martha	  Finnemore	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  “Taking	  Stock:	  The	  Constructivist	  Research	  Program	  in	  
International	  Relations	  and	  Comparative	  Politics,”	  Annual	  Reviews	  Political	  Science	  4	  (2001),	  393;	  Checkel,	  
“The	  Constructivist	  Turn	  in	  International	  Relations	  Theory,”	  325.	  
6	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  (ICRC),	  Geneva	  Convention	  Relative	  to	  the	  Protection	  of	  Civilian	  
Persons	  in	  Time	  of	  War	  (Fourth	  Geneva	  Convention),	  12	  August	  1949.	  
7	  Michael	  Walzer,	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars:	  A	  Moral	  Argument	  with	  Historical	  Illustrations	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  
1977),	  42.	  Original	  emphasis.	  	  
8	  James	  Turner	  Johnson,	  Ideology,	  Reason	  and	  Limitation:	  Religious	  and	  Secular	  Concepts	  1200-­1740	  
(Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1975),	  42-­‐44.	  
9	  Richard	  Shelly	  Hartigan,	  “Noncombatant	  Immunity:	  Reflections	  on	  its	  Origins	  and	  Present	  Status,”	  The	  
Review	  of	  Politics	  29,	  2	  (1967),	  207.	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foundation	   of	   International	   Humanitarian	   Law	   (IHL).	   These	   treaties	   solidified	   in	  
international	  law	  the	  civilian’s	  right	  to	  immunity	  from	  direct	  military	  attack.	  
Over	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  the	  POC	  norm	  has	  strengthened	  as	  one	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  set	  
of	  military	  and	  humanitarian	  norms	  and	  has	  distinguished	   itself	   from	  the	  non-­‐combatant	  
immunity	  norm.	  Non-­‐combatant	   immunity	  entails	  negative	  or	  passive	  protection	  outlined	  
by	   traditional	   military	   approaches,	   such	   as	   those	   in	   the	   Geneva	   Conventions,	   which	  
stipulate	   that	   soldiers	  must	   avoid	   targeting	   civilians.	   In	   contrast,	   POC	   entails	   a	  duty	   that	  
stems	  from	  the	  civilian’s	  right	  to	  protection.	  This	  duty	  justifies	  the	  use	  of	  force	  beyond	  self-­‐
defense	  in	  order	  to	  actively	  protect	  civilians	  from	  harm	  during	  conflict.	  The	  POC	  norm	  has	  
continued	  to	  grow	  and	  evolve	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  and	  some	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  has	  
become	   “the	  pre-­‐eminent	  norm	   in	   the	   international	   legal	   regime.”10	  But	   compliance	  with	  
the	  norm	  in	  practice	  is	  far	  from	  unanimous	  and	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  difficult	  within	  the	  
context	  of	  modern	  warfare.	  	  
The	  UN	   is	  at	   the	   forefront	  of	  developing	  POC	  as	  a	  concept	  and	  creating	  guidelines	  
and	   training	   tools	   for	   its	   implementation	   in	  practice.11	  Originally,	   the	  UN	  (specifically	   the	  
UNSC)	   dealt	   with	   matters	   of	   collective	   security	   between	   states.	   Chapter	   VI	   of	   the	   UN	  
Charter	   authorizes	   the	   UN	   to	   conduct	   peacemaking	   activities	   upon	   invitation,	   while	  
Chapter	   VII	   of	   the	   UN	   Charter	   authorizes	   the	   UN	   to	   enforce	   peace	   during	   instances	   of	  
deliberate	  aggression.	  During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  veto	  powers	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (US)	  and	  
former	  Soviet	  Union	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  the	  UN	  to	  play	  a	  military	  role	  in	  conflict	  resolution.	  
Since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	  War,	   however,	   the	   international	   community	   has	   approved	   UN	  
involvement	   in	   conflicts	   across	   the	   globe.	   Thus,	   the	   frequency	   of	   UN	  peace	  missions	   has	  
increased	  considerably;	  the	  UN	  launched	  fifty-­‐two	  peace	  missions	  between	  1989	  and	  2012,	  
as	   opposed	   to	   just	   fifteen	   between	   its	   birth	   and	   1988.12	   In	   addition,	   the	   UN’s	   focus	   has	  
moved	  beyond	  matters	  of	  collective	  security	  between	  states	   to	   include	  matters	  of	  human	  
rights	  within	  states,	  and	  the	  duties	  of	  UN	  peacekeepers	  have	  expanded	  to	  include	  POC.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Edwin	  Bikundo,	  “The	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  Civilians	  from	  Political	  Violence:	  Locating	  Necessity	  between	  
the	  Rule	  and	  its	  Exception,”	  in	  Norms	  of	  Protection:	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect,	  Protection	  of	  Civilians	  and	  their	  
Interaction,	  eds.	  Angus	  Francis,	  Vesselin	  Popovski	  and	  Charles	  Sampford	  (United	  Nations	  University,	  2012),	  7.	  
11	  Stian	  Kjeksrud	  et	  al,	  “Protection	  of	  civilians	  in	  armed	  conflict—comparing	  organisational	  approaches,”	  
Norwegian	  Defence	  Research	  Establishment	  (FFI),	  FFI-­‐rapport	  2011/01888,	  1	  November	  2011,	  3.	  
12	  “List	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Operations:	  1945-­‐2013,”	  United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping	  website,	  accessed	  26	  June	  
2013,	  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf.	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Recently,	  the	  UN	  has	  begun	  to	  evoke	  its	  powers	  under	  Chapter	  VI	  and	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  
its	   Charter	   to	   enforce	   the	   POC	   norm	   on	   the	   ground	   during	   African	   conflicts.	   In	   fact,	   the	  
majority	  of	  UN	  peace	  missions	  with	  mandates	  to	  protect	  civilians	  have	  occurred	  in	  Africa.	  
Thus,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  how	  African	  conflicts	  have	  influenced	  the	  development	  of	  
the	  POC	  norm	  as	  a	  concept	  and	  how	  the	  POC	  norm	  has	  been	  implemented	  during	  UN	  peace	  
missions	  in	  Africa	  in	  practice.	  	  
	  
	  
1.2 Research	  Aims	  
	  
Using	   a	   Constructivist	   theoretical	   framework,	   this	   thesis	   aims	   to	   explain	   how	   the	  
norm	   of	   civilian	   protection	   during	   conflict	   in	   Africa	   has	   evolved	   at	   the	   UN,	   beginning	   in	  
1992	   with	   the	   UN	   peace	   mission	   in	   Somalia.	   It	   also	   aims	   to	   build	   upon	   existing	  
Constructivist	  theory.	  	  
	  
	  
1.3	  Defining	  Key	  Terms	  
	  
Norms:	   Norms	   are	   collective	   expectations,	   understandings	   or	   standards	   of	   appropriate	  
behavior	  for	  actors	  with	  a	  given	  identity.13	  
	  
Peace	  missions:	  Because	  peace	  missions	  can	  now	  perform	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  tasks	  in	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	  circumstances,	  efforts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  create	  typologies	  of	  peace	  missions.	  For	  
example,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Department	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Operations	  (DPKO)	  distinguishes	  
between	   conflict	   prevention,	   peacemaking,	   peacekeeping,	   peace	   enforcement	   and	   post-­‐
conflict	  peace-­‐building:14	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  See	  note	  4.	  	  
14	  Despite	  efforts	  to	  create	  typologies,	  it	  is	  often	  not	  entirely	  clear	  which	  category	  a	  UN	  peace	  operation	  falls	  
into.	  Moreover,	  peace	  missions	  since	  the	  1990s	  are	  wont	  to	  oscillate	  between	  types.	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Conflict	   prevention	   entails	   preventive	   diplomacy	   or	   the	  preventive	   deployment	   of	  
troops	   before	   a	   conflict	   begins	   in	   order	   to	   “to	   prevent	   disputes	   from	   arising	   between	  
parties.”15	  	  
Peacemaking	  refers	  to	  the	  diplomatic	  processes	  of	  brokering	  a	  negotiated	  end	  to	  a	  
conflict	  once	  the	  conflict	  has	  begun,	  as	  foreseen	  under	  Chapter	  VI	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter.16	  	  
Peacekeeping	   entails	  military	   activities	   aimed	   at	   conflict	   control	   once	   a	   cease-­‐fire	  
has	  been	  signed	  between	  warring	  factions.	  It	  “involves	  a	  UN	  presence	  in	  the	  field…with	  the	  
consent	   of	   the	   parties,	   to	   implement	   or	   monitor	   the	   implementation	   of	   arrangements	  
relating	   to	   the	   control	   of	   conflicts…and	   their	   resolution”	   under	   Chapter	   VI	   of	   the	   UN	  
Charter.17	  	  
Peace	  enforcement	  occurs	  without	   the	   consent	  of	   the	  warring	  parties.	   It	   “involves	  
the	   application	   of	   a	   range	   of	   coercive	   [military]	  measures…used	   to	   restore	   international	  
peace	  and	  security”	  or	  compel	  a	  cease-­‐fire	  by	  UN	  soldiers,	  as	  foreseen	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  
the	  UN	  Charter.18	  	  
Post-­‐conflict	   peace-­‐building	   refers	   to	   “identifying	   and	   supporting	   measures	   and	  
structures	  which	  will	  solidify	  peace	  and	  build	  trust	  and	  interaction	  among	  former	  enemies,	  
in	  order	  to	  avoid	  a	  relapse	  into	  conflict”	  once	  the	  conflict	  has	  ended,	   including	  organizing	  
and	   supervising	   elections,	   rebuilding	   infrastructure	   and	   institutions,	   and	   reconstructing	  
the	  economy.19	  	  	  
For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   thesis,	   the	   term	   ‘peace	   missions’	   refers	   to	   activities	  
performed	   by	   UN	   military	   personnel	   encompassed	   in	   the	   DPKO’s	   definitions	   of	  
peacekeeping,	   peace	   enforcement	   and	   peace-­‐building.	   Thus,	   ‘peace	   missions’	   entail:	   the	  
deployment	  of	  UN	  soldiers	  to	  implement	  or	  monitor	  an	  existing	  cease-­‐fire	  with	  the	  consent	  
of	  the	  warring	  factions	  under	  Chapter	  VI	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter;	  the	  deployment	  of	  UN	  soldiers	  
to	   forcibly	   compel	   a	   cease-­‐fire	   between	   warring	   factions	   without	   their	   consent	   under	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  “Glossary	  of	  UN	  Peacekeeping	  Terms,”	  United	  Nations	  Department	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Operations	  Training	  
Unit	  website,	  accessed	  11	  September	  2013,	  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/glossary/.	  	  
16	  Ibid.	  	  
17	  Ibid.	  	  
18	  “Peace	  and	  Security,”	  United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping	  website,	  accessed	  11	  September	  2013.	  
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml.	  
19	  “Glossary	  of	  UN	  Peacekeeping	  Terms,”	  United	  Nations	  Department	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Operations	  Training	  
Unit	  website,	  accessed	  11	  September	  2013,	  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/glossary/.	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Chapter	  VII	  of	   the	  UN	  Charter;	  and	  the	  use	  of	  UN	  military	  personnel	   to	  conduct	  activities	  
aimed	  at	  avoiding	  a	  relapse	  into	  conflict.	  This	  definition	  excludes	  activities	  encompassed	  in	  
conflict	  prevention	  and	  peacemaking.	  	  	  
	  
Protection	  of	  Civilians	  (POC):	  There	  is	  no	  consensus	  within	  the	  UN	  as	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  
POC.	   POC	   objectives	   can	   “range	   from	   physical	   protection	   from	   imminent	   violence	   to	  
provision	  of	  basic	  necessities	  through	  establishing	  a	  protective	  environment	  that	  enhances	  
the	  safety	  and	  supports	  the	  rights	  of	  civilians.”20	  Each	  UN	  peace	  mission	  utilizes	  a	  different	  
understanding	   of	   POC	   based	   on	   the	   context	   of	   the	   conflict,	   furthering	   the	   difficulty	   of	  
articulating	  a	  unified	  definition	  within	  the	  organization.	  	  	  
For	   the	  purposes	  of	   this	   thesis,	  POC	  entails	  any	  activity	  performed	  by	  UN	  military	  
actors	   (primarily	   peace	   soldiers)	   that	   enhances	   the	   security	   of	   civilians	   on	   the	   ground	  
during	   a	  UN	  peace	  mission.21	   Civilians	   are	  defined	   as	  non-­‐combatants,	   those	  who	  do	  not	  
play	  active	  military	  roles	  in	  a	  conflict.	  	  
	  
	  
1.4	  Theoretical	  Framework	  
	  
1.4.1	  Constructivism	  Literature	  Review	  
	  
Much	  work	  has	  been	  done	  on	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  civilian	  protection	  agenda	  and	  the	  
role	  that	  peacekeepers	  play	  in	  protecting	  civilians	  during	  armed	  conflict.22	  However,	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Helen	  Durham	  and	  Eve	  Massingham,	  “Who	  is	  Protected	  Under	  International	  Humanitarian	  Law?	  Finding	  a	  
Definition	  for	  ‘Direct	  Participation	  in	  Hostilities’,”	  in	  Protecting	  Civilians	  During	  Violent	  Conflict:	  Theoretical	  
and	  Practical	  Issues	  for	  the	  21st	  Century,	  ed.	  David	  Lowell	  and	  Igor	  Primoratz	  (Burlington,	  VT:	  Ashgate	  
Publishing	  Company,	  2012),	  106.	  
21	  This	  definition	  bears	  resemblance	  to	  Hugh	  Breaky’s	  concept	  of	  “peacekeeping	  POC.”	  Breaky	  conceptualizes	  
POC	  as	  four	  separate	  concepts,	  reflective	  of	  the	  four	  types	  of	  actors	  who	  are	  most	  commonly	  deal	  with	  POC:	  
combatant	  POC,	  peacekeeping	  POC,	  Security	  Council	  POC	  and	  humanitarian	  POC.	  Peacekeeping	  POC	  “is	  a	  
conditional	  duty	  that	  falls	  upon	  peacekeepers	  when	  they	  undertake	  peace	  support	  operations	  in	  a	  region,	  
requiring	  that	  they	  fulfill	  basic	  security	  and	  rights	  protection	  for	  local	  civilians”	  (Hugh	  Breaky,	  “POC	  in	  Armed	  
Conflict:	  Four	  Concepts,”	  in	  Norms	  of	  Protection:	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  ,	  Protection	  of	  Civilians	  and	  their	  
Interaction,	  eds.	  Angus	  Francis,	  Vesselin	  Popovski	  and	  Charles	  Sampford	  (Tokyo:	  United	  Nations	  University	  
Press,	  2012),	  50.)	  
22	  Alex	  Bellamy	  and	  Paul	  Williams,	  Protecting	  Civilians	  in	  Uncivil	  War	  (Queensland:	  The	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  Centre	  for	  
the	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect,	  2009);	  Francis,	  Popovski	  and	  Sampford	  (eds.),	  Norms	  of	  Protection:	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works	   are	   descriptive	   narratives	   that	   lack	   any	   sort	   of	   theoretical	   component	   that	  
conceptualizes	   POC	   as	   a	   norm.	   The	   theory	   that	   deals	   most	   extensively	   with	   norms	   is	  
Constructivism.	   Constructivism	   is	   a	   theoretically	   informed	   approach	   to	   the	   study	   of	  
international	   relations	   that	   seeks	   to	   explain	   the	   normative	   and	   ideational	   concerns	   that	  
exist	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  It	  posits	  that	  norms,	  or	  standards	  of	  appropriate	  behavior,	  
influence	   the	   behavior	   of	   actors	   as	  much	   as	   self-­‐interest.	  While	   ideas	   are	   individualistic,	  
norms	   are	   collective	   expectations	   of	   appropriateness	   given	   an	   actor’s	   identity.23	  
Constructivism	   seeks	   to	   explain	   how	   norms	   emerge,	   diffuse	   and	   become	   internalized,	   a	  
process	  referred	  to	  as	  “norm	  dynamics.”24	  	  
The	   most	   seminal	   work	   on	   norms	   in	   the	   field	   of	   Constructivism	   is	   Martha	  
Finnemore’s	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink’s	  concept	  of	  the	  norm	  life-­‐cycle.25	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink	  
describe	   the	   norm	   life-­‐cycle	   as	   a	   three-­‐stage	   process.	   First,	   norm	   entrepreneurs	   use	   an	  
organizational	   platform	   to	   call	   attention	   to	   altruistic	   issues,	   empathetic	   concerns	   or	  
ideational	  commitments.	  These	  entrepreneurs	  persuade	  the	  international	  community	  that	  
these	  issues	  merit	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  norm	  or	  the	  transformation	  of	  an	  existing	  one.	  If	  
that	   norm	   becomes	   generally	   accepted,	   usually	   through	   codification,	   then	   it	   reaches	   a	  
tipping	  point	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  second	  stage.	  The	  second	  stage,	  called	  a	  norm	  cascade,	  refers	  
to	  the	  process	  of	  international	  socialization	  where	  actors26	  are	  persuaded	  to	  become	  norm	  
followers.	  During	  this	  stage,	  the	  number	  of	  norm	  supporters	  increases	  rapidly.	  In	  the	  third	  
(and	   last)	   stage,	   international	   actors	   internalize	   norms,	   making	   conformance	   to	   them	  
nearly	  automatic.	  See	  Table	  1.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Responsibility	  to	  Protect,	  Protection	  of	  Civilians	  and	  their	  Interaction;	  Victoria	  Holt	  and	  Glyn	  Taylor,	  Protecting	  
Civilians	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  Peace	  Operations	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  The	  Henry	  L.	  Stimson	  Center,	  2009);	  Erin	  Weir,	  
Greater	  Expectations:	  UN	  Peacekeeping	  &	  Civilian	  Protection	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Refugees	  International,	  2009);	  
Williams,	  Enhancing	  Civilian	  Protection	  in	  Peace	  Operations:	  Insights	  from	  Africa;	  Siobhan	  Wills,	  Protecting	  
Civilians:	  The	  Obligations	  of	  Peacekeepers	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009).	  
23	  Thomas	  Risse	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  “”The	  socialization	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  norms	  into	  domestic	  
practices:	  introduction,”	  in	  The	  Power	  of	  Human	  Rights:	  International	  Norms	  and	  Domestic	  Change,	  eds.	  
Thomas	  Risse,	  Stephen	  Ropp	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  7.	  
24	  Carmen	  Wunderlich,	  “Theoretical	  Approaches	  to	  Norm	  Dynamics,”	  in	  Norm	  Dynamics	  in	  Multilateral	  Arms	  
Control:	  Interests,	  Conflict	  and	  Justice,	  ed.	  Harald	  Muller	  and	  Carmen	  Wunderlich	  (Athens,	  GA:	  University	  of	  
Georgia	  Press,	  2013),	  20.	  
25	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink,	  “International	  Norm	  Dynamics	  and	  Political	  Change.”	  
26	  Even	  norm	  breakers.	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Table	  1:	  Stages	  of	  Norms27	  
	   Stage	  1:	  Norm	  
Emergence	  















Motives	   Altruism,	  empathy,	  
ideational	  












Constructivist	   research	   over	   the	   past	   two	   decades	   on	   norms	   dynamics	   has	  
proceeded	  in	  two	  “waves”:28	  	  
During	  the	  first	  wave,	  Constructivist	  research	  on	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  norm	  life-­‐
cycle	   focused	  almost	  exclusively	  on	   the	  norm	  cascade	  and	   the	  process	  of	  norm	  diffusion,	  
specifically	   the	   processes	   of	   socialization	   that	   induce	   norm	   breakers	   to	   become	   norm	  
followers.	   For	   example,	   Finnemore	   and	   Sikkink	   describe	   the	   norm	   cascade	   as	   a	   process	  
whereby	  actors	  are	  persuaded	  to	  adopt	  norms	  because	  other	  actors	  with	  similar	  identities	  
have	  already	  adopted	   the	  norm.29	   Legitimacy,	   conformity,	   reputation	  and	  esteem	  are	   the	  
significant	  motives	  that	  drive	  socialization	  and	  the	  norm	  cascade.30	  Thomas	  Risse,	  Stephen	  
Ropp	   and	   Sikkink	   argue	   that	   diffusion	   follows	   a	   “spiral	   model.”31	   The	   spiral	   model	  
emphasizes	  the	  interplay	  between	  society,	  state	  and	  international/transnational	  networks	  
and	   suggests	   that	   diffusion	   occurs	   when	   transnational	   actors	   put	   pressure	   on	   domestic	  
governments	  to	  comply	  through	  “naming	  and	  shaming	  strategies.”32	  Finally,	  Margaret	  Keck	  
and	  Sikkink	  argue	  that	  the	  norm	  cascade	  follows	  a	  “boomerang”	  pattern	  whereby	  domestic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink,	  “International	  Norm	  Dynamics	  and	  Political	  Change,”	  898.	  
28	  Wunderlich,	  “Theoretical	  Approaches	  to	  Norm	  Dynamics,”	  23.	  
29	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink,	  “International	  Norm	  Dynamics	  and	  Political	  Change,”	  902.	  
30	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink,	  “International	  Norm	  Dynamics	  and	  Political	  Change,”	  902-­‐904.	  
31	  Risse,	  Ropp	  and	  Sikkink	  (eds.),	  The	  Power	  of	  Human	  Rights:	  International	  Norms	  and	  Domestic	  Change,	  20.	  
32	  Wunderlich,	  “Theoretical	  Approaches	  to	  Norm	  Dynamics,”	  25.	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groups	  bypass	  the	  state	  and	  reach	  out	  directly	  to	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks.33	  These	  
transnational	   advocacy	  networks	  are	   then	  able	   to	  enforce	   state	   compliance	  with	  a	  norm.	  
Each	  model	  of	  cascade	  and	  diffusion	  conceptualizes	  norms	  as	  static	  phenomena,	  and	  thus	  
they	  failed	  to	  adequately	  explain	  processes	  of	  change	  in	  normative	  content.34	  	  	  
During	   the	   second	   wave,	   Constructivists	   began	   to	   move	   away	   from	   “linear,	  
unidirectional”	  understandings	  of	  norm	  diffusion,	  focusing	  instead	  on	  “feedback	  loops”	  and	  
other	   dynamic	   mechanisms	   that	   occur	   during	   the	   second	   stage	   of	   the	   life-­‐cycle.35	   For	  
example,	   Ole	   Elgstrom	   argues	   that	   norms	   are	   sometimes	   negotiated	   during	   the	   second	  
stage	   of	   the	   life-­‐cycle,	   for	   instance	   when	   they	   enter	   a	   new	   organizational	   context.36	  
Negotiations	  between	  norm	  entrepreneurs	  and	  norm	  challengers	  often	  lead	  to	  revision	  of	  
the	  norm	  before	  the	  norm	  is	  internalized.	  However,	  most	  research	  during	  the	  second	  wave	  
conceptualized	  normative	  change	  as	  the	  replacement	  of	  existing	  norms	  with	  new	  ones,	  not	  
as	   the	   revision	  or	   redefinition	  of	   existing	  norms.37	   For	   example,	   Constructivists	   explored	  
how	  the	  rules	  against	  wartime	  plunder	  replaced	  the	  norm	  of	  “to	  the	  victor	  go	  the	  spoils.”38	  
Thus,	  the	  second	  wave	  also	  largely	  ignored	  developments	  that	  occur	  to	  a	  norm	  during	  the	  
second	  stage	  of	  its	  life-­‐cycle.	  
Thus,	  Constructivism	  does	  not	   adequately	   explain	  how	  norms	   change	  over	   time,39	  
particularly	  after	  emergence	  but	  before	  internalization	  (during	  the	  second	  stage).	  	  
	  
1.4.2	  The	  POC	  Norm	  and	  Constructivist	  Framework	  
	  
If	   one	   considers	   the	   POC	   norm,	   it	   is	   apparent	   that	   normative	   change	   does	   occur	  
during	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  Finnemore’s	  and	  Sikkink’s	  norm	  life-­‐cycle.	  The	  non-­‐combatant	  
immunity	  norm,	  from	  which	  the	  POC	  norm	  stems,	  has	  been	  codified	  in	  IHL;	  the	  POC	  norm	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Margaret	  Keck	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  “Transnational	  Advocacy	  Networks	  in	  International	  and	  Regional	  
Politics,”	  International	  Social	  Science	  Journal	  51,	  159	  (1999),	  93.	  	  	  
34	  Wunderlich,	  “Theoretical	  Approaches	  to	  Norm	  Dynamics,”	  24.	  
35	  Wunderlich,	  “Theoretical	  Approaches	  to	  Norm	  Dynamics,”	  24-­‐25.	  
36	  Ole	  Elgstrom,	  “Norm	  negotiations.	  The	  construction	  of	  new	  norms	  regarding	  gender	  and	  development	  in	  EU	  
foreign	  aid	  policy,”	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy	  7,	  3	  (2000).	  
37	  Wunderlich,	  “Theoretical	  Approaches	  to	  Norm	  Dynamics,”	  27.	  
38	  Wayne	  Sandholtz,	  “Dynamics	  of	  International	  Norm	  Change:	  Rules	  against	  Wartime	  Plunder,”	  European	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Relations	  14,	  1	  (2008),	  122.	  
39	  Checkel,	  “The	  Constructivist	  Turn	  in	  International	  Relations	  Theory,”	  340.	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has	   been	   codified	   in	   organizational	   goals,	   suggested	   by	   the	   increasing	   number	   of	   non-­‐
governmental	   organizations	   (NGOs)	   committed	   to	   advancing	   human	   security	   and	   the	  
adoption	  of	  thematic	  resolutions	  on	  POC	  by	  the	  UNSC.	  Codification	  signals	  the	  completion	  
of	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  POC	  norm’s	  life-­‐cycle.	  But	  compliance	  with	  the	  POC	  norm	  today	  is	  
far	  from	  habitual,	  indicating	  that	  the	  norm,	  although	  codified,	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  internalized.	  
The	   inevitable	   conclusion	   is	   that	   the	  POC	  norm	  remains	   in	   the	   second	   stage	  of	   the	  norm	  
life-­‐cycle,	  where	  it	  continues	  to	  evolve.	  
Normative	   evolution	   is	   evident	   in	   the	   articulation	   of	   new	   institutional	   goals	  
regarding	  POC	  and	  subsequent	  efforts	   to	   implement	  these	   incrementally	  added	  measures	  
on	   the	   ground.	   Over	   the	   past	   two	   decades	   especially,	   the	   UN	   has	   contributed	   to	   the	  
evolution	  of	   the	  POC	  norm,	  steadily	  adding	   institutional	  goals	  regarding	  POC	  and	  thereby	  
increasing	  the	  tasks	  peace	  soldiers	  are	  responsible	  for	  performing	  on	  the	  ground	  during	  UN	  
peace	  missions.	  For	  example,	  the	  norm	  initially	  entailed	  protecting	  humanitarian	  workers	  
and	  providing	  safe	  access	  for	  humanitarian	  aid	  to	  vulnerable	  populations.	  Starting	  in	  1999,	  
the	  POC	  norm	  additionally	   tasked	  peace	  soldiers	  with	  protecting	  civilians	   from	  imminent	  
physical	   attack	   and	   stipulated	   that	   the	   UNSC	   could	   grant	   peace	   soldiers	   enforcement	  
powers	   to	   do	   so.	   Since	   both	   the	   first	   and	   second	  waves	   of	   Constructivist	   research	   have	  
struggled	   to	   adequately	   explain	   processes	   of	   norm	   revision	   and	   evolution,	   a	   new	  
Constructivist	   framework	   is	   needed	   to	   understand	   how	  norms	   evolve	   during	   the	   second	  
stage	  of	  the	  norm	  life-­‐cycle:	  
This	   thesis	   conceptualizes	   norm	   evolution	   using	   Finnemore	   and	   Sikkink’s	  
Constructivist	   framework	   of	   the	   norm	   life-­‐cycle,	   which	   posits	   that	   “[c]hange	   at	   each	  
stage…is	   characterized	   by	   different	   actors,	  motives	   and	  mechanisms	   of	   influence.”40	   The	  
case	   study	   will	   be	   utilized	   to	   explore	   which	   actors,	   motives	   and	   mechanisms	   are	   most	  
significant	   in	   the	   processes	   of	   norm	   evolution	   that	   occur	   during	   the	   second	   stage	   of	   the	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink,	  “International	  Norm	  Dynamics	  and	  Political	  Change,”	  895.	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Table	  2:	  Norm	  Evolution	  during	  the	  Second	  Stage	  of	  the	  Norm	  Life-­‐Cycle	  
Actors	   UN	  
Motives	   Ideational	   influences	   and	   praxis-­‐
challenges	  
Dominant	  Mechanisms	   Institutionalization	  and	  demonstration	  
	  
The	  principal	   actor	   in	   the	   case	   study	   is	   the	  UN	  precisely	  because	   the	  UN	   is	   at	   the	  
forefront	  of	  developing	  POC	  as	  a	  concept	  and	  creating	  guidelines	  and	  training	  tools	  for	  its	  
implementation	  in	  practice.41	  Methodologically,	  the	  UN	  will	  not	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  single	  actor.	  
Instead,	  it	  will	  be	  analyzed	  as	  an	  organization	  composed	  of	  different	  organs	  and	  agencies,	  
such	  as	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  and	  the	  UNSC.	  Little	  empirical	  research	  exists	  that	  seeks	  to	  
understand	   how	   international	   organizations	   (IOs)	   such	   as	   the	  UN	  work	   internally,42	   and	  
therefore	  little	  is	  actually	  known	  about	  which	  organs,	  agencies,	  nation-­‐states	  or	  individuals	  
within	   the	   UN	   (or	   outside	   the	   UN)	   play	   important	   roles	   in	   norm	   evolution	   at	   the	  
organization.	  Thus,	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  actors,	   including	  NGOs	  and	  transnational	  advocacy	  
networks	  (TANs),	  will	  also	  be	  considered.	  
Steven	  Ratner’s	  concept	  of	  a	  “normative	  intermediary”	  is	  helpful	  here.43	  A	  normative	  
intermediary	   is	  a	   “party,	  authorized	  by	  states	  or	  an	   international	  organization	  seeking	   to	  
promote	   observance	   of	   a	   norm,	   who…seeks	   to	   induce	   compliance	   through	   a	   hands-­‐on	  
process	  of	  communication	  and	  persuasion	  with	  relevant	  decision-­‐makers.”44	  A	  normative	  
intermediary	   differs	   from	   a	   norm	   entrepreneur,	   who	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	   norm’s	  
emergence	   and	   codification.	   For	   example,	   as	   the	   UN	   representative	   on	   international	  
displacement,	   Francis	   Deng	   has	   been	   considered	   a	   normative	   intermediary	   for	   his	  work	  
promoting	   compliance	   with	   the	   UN	   Guiding	   Principles	   on	   Internal	   Displacement.45	   This	  
thesis	   will	   consider	   the	   actors	   most	   responsible	   for	   defining	   and	   promoting	   normative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Stian	  Kjeksrud	  et	  al,	  “Protection	  of	  civilians	  in	  armed	  conflict—comparing	  organisational	  approaches,”	  3.	  
42	  Barnett	  and	  Finnemore,	  Rules	  for	  the	  World:	  International	  Organizations	  in	  Global	  Politics,	  (Ithaca,	  NY:	  
Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  ix.	  
43	  Steven	  Ratner,	  “Does	  International	  Law	  Matter	  in	  Preventing	  Ethnic	  Conflict?”	  New	  York	  University	  Journal	  
of	  International	  Law	  &	  Politics	  32,	  91	  (2000).	  	  
44	  Ratner,	  “Does	  International	  Law	  Matter	  in	  Preventing	  Ethnic	  Conflict?”	  668.	  
45	  Hannah	  Entwisle,	  “Tracing	  Cascades:	  The	  Normative	  Development	  of	  the	  UN	  Guiding	  Principles	  on	  Internal	  
Displacement,”	  Georgetown	  Immigration	  Law	  Journal	  19	  (2004-­‐2005).	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evolution	  within	   the	  UN	  to	  be	   ‘normative	   intermediaries,’	  who	  may	  be	  different	   from	  the	  
actors	  most	  capable	  of	  demonstrating	  normative	  evolution	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  
In	   this	   thesis,	   I	   focus	   on	   two	   principal	  motives	   behind	   norm	   evolution:	   ideational	  
influences	   and	   praxis-­‐challenges.46	   Ideational	   influences	   are	   defined	   here	   as	   ideas	  
concerning	   appropriate	   behavior	   that	   are	   geared	   toward	   changing	   existing	   policy	   or	  
practice.	  It	   is	  well	  documented	  that	  ideas	  concerning	  appropriate	  behavior	  are	  constantly	  
evolving.47	  According	   to	   the	  Constructivist	   ‘logic	   of	   appropriateness,’	   as	   ideas	   and	  norms	  
concerning	  appropriate	  behavior	  change,	  they	  can	  also	  promote	  change	  in	  other	  norms.	  
Praxis-­‐challenges	   are	   defined	   here	   as	   challenges	   that	   occur	   when	   implementing	  
goals.	   Actors	  may	   be	  motivated	   to	   promote	   normative	   evolution	   when	   challenges	   occur	  
during	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	   norm	  on	   the	   ground.	   In	   fact,	   some	  Constructivists	   argue	  
that	   the	   Rationalists’	   ‘logic	   of	   consequences’	   is	   as	   much	   a	   predictor	   of	   behavior	   as	   the	  
Constructivists’	  logic	  of	  appropriateness.48	  
Finally,	  the	  dominant	  mechanisms	  of	  normative	  evolution	  considered	  in	  this	  thesis	  
include	   the	   institutionalization	   of	   normative	   change	   in	   policy	   and	   the	   demonstration	   of	  
normative	   change	   in	   practice.	   Institutionalization	   in	   policy	   refers	   to	   the	   documented	  
rhetoric	  of	  the	  POC	  norm	  within	  the	  UN.	  It	  includes	  speeches,	  reports	  produced	  by	  internal	  
inquiries,	   reports	   produced	   by	   panels	   and	   UNSC	   Resolutions.	   Discourse	   analysis,	   which	  
traces	  changes	  in	  rhetoric	  in	  the	  speeches	  and	  policies	  of	  actors,	  will	  be	  helpful	  in	  tracing	  
the	   institutionalization	   of	   the	   POC	   norm	   in	   policy.	   Institutionalization	   also	   refers	   to	  
expanding	  organizational	  capacity	   in	  response	  to	  normative	  development.	  Demonstration	  
refers	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  POC	  norm	  on	  the	  ground	  by	  peace	  soldiers.	  	  
	   In	  summation,	  the	  Constructivist	  framework	  employed	  in	  this	  thesis	  aims	  to	  identify	  
the	  main	  actors,	  motives	  and	  mechanisms	  responsible	  for	  normative	  evolution	  during	  the	  
second	  stage	  of	  the	  POC	  norm’s	  life-­‐cycle.	  It	  also	  aims	  to	  build	  upon	  existing	  Constructivist	  
theory.	  Specifically,	  it	  will	  seek	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  questions:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  These	  motives	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  
47	  Jean-­‐Philippe	  Therien,	  “Human	  Security:	  The	  Making	  of	  a	  UN	  Ideology,”	  Global	  Society	  26,	  2	  (2012),	  193.	  
48	  Martha	  Finnemore,	  The	  Purpose	  of	  Intervention:	  Changing	  Beliefs	  about	  the	  Use	  of	  Force	  (Ithaca,	  N.Y.:	  Cornell	  
University	  Press,	  2003);	  Scott	  Fitzsimmons,	  “A	  Rational-­‐constructivist	  Explanation	  for	  the	  Evolution	  and	  
Decline	  of	  the	  Norm	  against	  Mercenarism,”	  Journal	  of	  Military	  and	  Strategic	  Studies	  11,	  4	  (2009).	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Who	  are	   the	  main	  actors	   that	  define	  and	  promote	  normative	  evolution	  within	   the	  
UN?	  Who	  are	  the	  main	  actors	  that	  are	  capable	  of	  demonstrating	  normative	  evolution	  on	  the	  
ground?	  Is	  normative	  evolution	  at	  the	  UN	  motivated	  primarily	  by	  ideational	   influences	  or	  
praxis-­‐challenges?	   Finally,	   does	   normative	   evolution	   occur	   primarily	   through	  
institutionalization	  or	  demonstration?	  
How	   does	   the	   evidence	   from	   this	   thesis’	   case	   study	   help	   build	   upon	   existing	  
Constructivist	  theory?	  	  Do	  the	  norm	  dynamics	  in	  the	  case	  study	  confirm	  or	  contradict	  those	  
put	  forth	  by	  Finnemore’s	  and	  Sikkink’s	  Constructivist	  framework,	  specifically	  with	  regard	  
to	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  norm	  life-­‐cycle?	  
	  
	  
1.5	  Research	  Methodology	  
	  
	   In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  question,	  I	  will	  use	  qualitative	  methods	  and	  engage	  
with	   both	   primary	   and	   secondary	   literary	   sources.	   Primary	   sources	   include,	   but	   are	   not	  
limited	   to,	   UN	   documents	   and	   international	   conventions	   concerning	   POC.	   Secondary	  
sources	  include	  books,	  journal	  articles,	  newspaper	  articles	  and	  working	  papers.	  	  
This	   is	   a	   theory-­‐building	   thesis.49	   I	   will	   utilize	   the	   case	   study	   method,	   which	   is	  
closely	  connected	  to	  the	  comparative	  method.50	  The	  case	  studies	  are	  hypothesis-­‐generating	  
case	  studies,	  which	  “start	  out	  with	  a	  more	  or	  less	  vague	  notion	  of	  possible	  hypotheses,	  and	  
attempt	  to	  formulate	  definite	  hypotheses	  to	  be	  tested	  subsequently	  among	  a	  larger	  number	  
of	   cases.”51	   The	   objective	   is	   to	   generate	   “theoretical	   generalizations	   in	   areas	   where	   no	  
theory	   exists	   yet,”52	   in	   this	   case	   to	   generate	   theoretical	   generalizations	   about	   normative	  
evolution	  during	   the	  second	  stage	  of	   the	  norm’s	   life-­‐cycle	   in	  order	   to	  build	  upon	  existing	  
Constructivist	  theory.	  The	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  Constructivism	  utilized	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  
outlined	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  The	  Constructivist	  framework	  relates	  only	  to	  the	  actors,	  motives	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  It	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  Constructivists	  need	  to	  engage	  more	  with	  theory	  development	  (Checkel,	  “The	  
Constructivist	  Turn	  in	  International	  Relations	  Theory,”	  342).	  	  
50	  Arend	  Lijphart,	  “Comparative	  Politics	  and	  the	  Comparative	  Method,”	  The	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review	  
65,	  3	  (Sep.,	  1971),	  691.	  	  
51	  Lijphart,	  “Comparative	  Politics	  and	  the	  Comparative	  Method,”	  692.	  
52	  Ibid.	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mechanisms	   that	   have	   been	   most	   responsible	   for	   normative	   change	   during	   the	   second	  
stage	  of	  the	  norm’s	  life-­‐cycle.	  	  
In	  Chapters	  2-­‐5,	  the	  Constructivist	  framework	  will	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  case	  study.	  The	  
protection	  of	  civilians	  during	  UN	  peace	  missions	  is	  the	  case	  study.	  The	  case	  study	  is	  broken	  
down	  into	  four	  different	  UN	  peace	  missions	   in	  Africa:	  Somalia,	  Rwanda,	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  
the	  Sudan.	  My	  analysis	  starts	  with	  Somalia	  because	  Somalia	  represents	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
UN’s	   involvement	   in	   POC	   during	   its	   peace	   missions	   in	   Africa.	   The	   UN’s	   inability	   to	  
accomplish	  broader,	  more	  complex	  tasks	  related	  to	  POC	  in	  Somalia	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  
on	  POC	  in	  subsequent	  missions,	  including	  Rwanda.	  The	  UN	  mission	  in	  Rwanda	  is	  significant	  
to	  this	  thesis	  because	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide	  indicated	  a	  massive	  failure	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
UN	   to	   protect	   civilians	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   ongoing	   conflict,	   though	   this	   failure	   ultimately	  
became	   a	   catalyst	   within	   the	   international	   community	   to	   create	   greater	   safeguards	   for	  
civilians	  during	  conflicts.	  The	  UN	  mission	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  was	  the	  first	  peace	  mission	  that	  
the	   UN	   explicitly	   mandated	   to	   protect	   civilians.	   Afterwards,	   it	   would	   become	   standard	  
practice	  for	  the	  UN	  to	  explicitly	  include	  POC	  in	  the	  mandates	  of	  its	  peace	  missions.	  Finally,	  
the	   UN	   mission	   in	   Sudan	   is	   significant	   to	   this	   thesis	   not	   only	   because	   it	   was	   explicitly	  
mandated	   to	   protect	   civilians,	   but	   also	   because	   the	   mission	   occurred	   after	   most	   of	   the	  
significant	  growth	  of	  the	  POC	  norm	  had	  already	  occurred.	  In	  Chapter	  6,	   I	  will	  present	  the	  
cumulative	  findings	  on	  the	  research.	  The	  conclusions	  will	  contribute	  to	  both	  the	  literature	  
on	  POC	  during	  UN	  peace	  missions	  in	  Africa	  and	  to	  Constructivist	  theory.	  
	  
	   	  	  
1.6	  Chapter	  Outline	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  adequately	  answer	  the	  research	  questions,	  the	  thesis	  will	  be	  structured	  
into	  six	  chapters.	  	  
	  
Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  
This	  introductory	  chapter	  contains	  the	  background,	  problem	  statement,	  research	  aims,	  key	  
definitions,	   Constructivist	   literature	   review	   and	   framework,	   research	   methodology	   and	  
chapter	  outline.	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Chapter	  2:	  Somalia	  
Missions:	  United	  Nations	  Operation	  in	  Somalia	  I	  (UNOSOM	  I),	  United	  Task	  Force	  (UNITAF)	  
and	  United	  Nations	  Operation	  in	  Somalia	  II	  (UNOSOM	  II).	  
	  
Chapter	  3:	  Rwanda	  
Missions:	   United	   Nations	   Assistance	   Mission	   for	   Rwanda	   (UNAMIR)	   and	   United	   Nations	  
Assistance	  Mission	  for	  Rwanda	  II	  (UNAMIR	  II).	  
	   	  	  
Chapter	  4:	  Sierra	  Leone	  
Mission:	  United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  (UNAMSIL).	  	  
	   	  	  
Chapter	  5:	  Sudan	  
Mission:	  United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  the	  Sudan	  (UNMIS).	  	  
	   	   	  
Chapter	  6:	  Normative	  Evolution	  and	  Constructivist	  Theory	  
The	   final	   chapter	   contains	   the	   cumulative	   findings	   of	   the	   research	   undertaken	   in	   accord	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Chapter	  2	  




2.1	  Introduction	  	  
	  
	   From	  April	  1992	  to	  March	  1995,	  the	  UN	  conducted	  a	  peace	  mission	  in	  Somalia.	  The	  
mission	  was	   composed	   of	   three	   parts:	   UNOSOM	   I	   (April	   1992-­‐December	   1992),	   UNITAF	  
(December	  1992-­‐March	  1993)	  and	  UNOSOM	  II	  (March	  1993-­‐March	  1995).	  The	  purpose	  of	  
this	  chapter	  is	  to	  explore	  how	  the	  POC	  norm	  evolved	  during	  the	  course	  of	  UNOSOM	  (April	  
1992-­‐March	  1995)	  using	  the	  Constructivist	  framework	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  The	  objective	  
is	   to	   determine	   the	   main	   actors,	   motives	   and	   mechanisms	   responsible	   for	   normative	  
evolution.	   First,	   I	   provide	   background	   information	   that	   outlines	   the	   national	   and	  
international	  context	  and	  explains	  the	  state	  of	  the	  POC	  norm	  at	  the	  start	  of	  UNOSOM.	  Then,	  
I	  employ	  the	  following	  questions	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  stated	  objective:	  	  
Who	  were	   the	  main	  actors	   that	  defined	  and	  promoted	  normative	  evolution	  within	  
the	  UN	  during	  UNOSOM?	  Who	  were	   the	  main	  actors	   that	  were	   capable	  of	  demonstrating	  
normative	  evolution	  on	  the	  ground?	  Was	  normative	  evolution	  at	   the	  UN	  during	  UNOSOM	  
motivated	  primarily	   by	   ideational	   influences	   or	  praxis-­‐challenges?	   Finally,	   did	  normative	  
evolution	  occur	  during	  UNOSOM	  through	  institutionalization	  or	  demonstration?	  
	   	   	  
	  
2.2	  Background:	  The	  POC	  Norm	  Prior	  to	  UNOSOM	  	  
	  
2.2.1	  National	  Context	  	  
	  
	   In	  early	  1991,	  a	  coalition	  of	  clan-­‐based	  opposition	  groups	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  the	  
United	  Somali	  Congress	  (USC)	  stormed	  Somalia’s	  capital,	  Mogadishu,	  and	  forced	  the	  ruling	  
military	  dictator,	  General	  Mohammed	  Siad	  Barre,	  out	  of	  the	  city.	  Somalia	  then	  plunged	  into	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intrastate	  war53	  and	  virtual	  anarchy	  as	  the	  USC	  split	  and	  Somalia’s	  opposition	  groups	  began	  
vying	   for	   control	   in	   the	   subsequent	   power	   vacuum.	   By	   late	   1991,	   every	   government	  
institution	   had	   collapsed	   along	   with	   at	   least	   sixty	   percent	   of	   the	   country’s	   basic	  
infrastructure.54	   In	   the	   absence	  of	   an	  official	   government,	  warlords	   effectively	   controlled	  
Somalia’s	  political	  economy.	  	  
In	   this	   context	   of	   inter-­‐communal	  warfare,	   the	   Somali	  warlords	   and	   their	  militias	  
deliberately	  attacked	  civilians.	  But	  more	  civilians	  died	  as	  an	  indirect	  result	  of	  the	  warlords’	  
efforts	  to	  siphon	  off	  humanitarian	  aid	  flowing	  into	  the	  country.	  In	  1991,	  severe	  drought,	  in	  
combination	  with	   the	  ensuing	  conflict	  and	  state	  disintegration,	  had	  created	  a	  devastating	  
humanitarian	  crisis	  in	  Somalia.	  Relief	  agencies	  began	  distributing	  food	  and	  medical	  relief	  to	  
the	  starving	  Somalis.	  Many	  armed	  factions	  under	  the	  warlords’	  control	  began	  to	  steal	  food	  
and	   other	   supplies	   from	   the	   relief	   agencies	   that	   they	  would	   then	   use	   to	   recruit	   soldiers.	  
This	  only	  further	  exacerbated	  the	  humanitarian	  crisis.	  By	  1992,	  350,000	  Somalis	  had	  died	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  conflict,	  famine	  and	  disease,55	  and	  nearly	  four	  and	  a	  half	  million	  people,	  more	  
than	  half	  of	  Somalia’s	  total	  population,	  were	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  starvation.56	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Each	  conflict	  considered	  in	  this	  thesis	  meets	  the	  criteria	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  “civil	  war,”	  an	  “internal	  conflict	  
in	  which	  at	  least	  1000	  battle	  related	  deaths	  (civilian	  and	  military)	  occurred	  per	  year”	  (Paul	  Collier	  and	  Anke	  
Hoeffler,	  “Greed	  and	  Grievance	  in	  Civil	  War,”	  World	  Bank	  Policy	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  2355,	  May	  2000,	  15).	  For	  
the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  however,	  internal	  conflicts	  in	  which	  at	  least	  1000	  battle	  related	  deaths	  (civilian	  
and	  military)	  occurred	  per	  year	  will	  be	  considered	  intrastate	  wars.	  This	  classification	  allows	  for	  greater	  
contextualization	  to	  be	  made	  regarding	  the	  war’s	  main	  aggressor	  and	  the	  main	  perpetrator	  of	  violations	  
against	  civilians.	  In	  a	  civil	  war,	  the	  national	  government	  and	  the	  rebel	  groups	  can	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  mutually	  
antagonistic.	  But	  an	  intrastate	  conflict	  may	  refer	  to:	  inter-­‐communal	  wars	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  official	  
government	  (state	  collapse),	  during	  which	  non-­‐governmental	  groups	  within	  a	  state	  vie	  for	  power	  and	  are	  the	  
main	  perpetrators	  of	  violations	  against	  civilians	  (Somalia);	  government	  repression	  of	  a	  civilian	  population,	  
where	  the	  government	  leads	  an	  organized,	  efficient	  campaign	  against	  its	  own	  people	  and	  is	  the	  main	  
perpetrator	  of	  violations	  against	  civilians	  (Rwanda);	  revolutions	  led	  by	  rebel	  groups	  against	  government,	  
where	  the	  rebel	  groups	  are	  the	  main	  perpetrators	  of	  violations	  against	  civilians	  (Sierra	  Leone);	  and	  civil	  wars,	  
where	  the	  government	  and	  rebel	  groups	  (either	  vying	  for	  a	  regime	  change	  or	  leading	  	  a	  separatist	  movement)	  
are	  mutually	  antagonistic	  and	  both	  responsible	  for	  violations	  against	  civilians,	  though	  one	  may	  be	  more	  
responsible	  than	  the	  other	  (Sudan)	  (Meredith	  Reid	  Sarkees	  and	  Phil	  Schafer,	  “The	  Correlates	  of	  War	  Data	  on	  
War:	  an	  Update	  to	  1997,”	  Conflict	  Management	  and	  Peace	  Science	  18,1	  (2000);	  Halvard	  Buhaug,	  “Relative	  
Capability	  and	  Rebel	  Objective	  in	  Civil	  War,”	  Journal	  of	  Peace	  Research	  43,6	  (2006)).	  	  
54	  “United	  Nations	  Operation	  in	  Somali	  I,”	  United	  Nations	  website,	  accessed	  29	  October	  2012,	  
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosomi.htm.	  
55	  Milton	  Leitenburg,	  “Deaths	  in	  Wars	  and	  Conflicts	  in	  the	  20th	  Century,”	  Cornell	  University	  Peace	  
Studies	  Program	  Occasional	  Paper	  No.	  29,	  2006	  (3rd	  edition),	  8.	  
56	  “United	  Nations	  Operation	  in	  Somali	  I,”	  United	  Nations	  website,	  accessed	  29	  October	  2012,	  
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosomi.htm.	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2.2.2	  International	  Context	  	  
	  
	   During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  UN	  preached	  that	  using	  force	  for	  anything	  other	  than	  self-­‐
defense	  was	  a	  violation	  of	   the	  UN	  Charter,	   including	  using	   force	   to	  protect	   civilians	   from	  
gross	  human	  rights	  abuses.57	  Institutionally,	  the	  UN	  conceived	  of	  POC	  as	  the	  avoidance	  of	  
targeting	   civilians	   during	   conflict.	   It	   implemented	   POC	   during	   its	   peace	   missions	  
throughout	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  
	   The	   conclusion	   of	   the	   Cold	  War	   altered	   the	   existing	   global	   power	   structure.	   The	  
triumph	  of	  democracy	  over	  communism	  ushered	  in	  a	  new	  world	  order	  with	  the	  US	  on	  top.	  
This	   new	  world	  order	   led	   to	   considerable	  US	  hubris	   and	  had	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	   the	  
UNSC,	  specifically	  on	  the	  UNSC’s	  ability	  to	  authorize	  peace	  missions	  and	  its	  willingness	  to	  
authorize	  force	  to	  protect	  civilians	  during	  intrastate	  wars.	  Two	  things	  in	  particular	  altered	  
the	  UN’s	  stance	  on	  POC	  leading	  up	  to	  and	  during	  UNOSOM:	  Operation	  Provide	  Comfort	  and	  
the	  UN	  Protection	  Force	  in	  Former	  Yugoslavia	  (UNPROFOR).	  	  
In	   the	   immediate	  aftermath	  of	   the	  Gulf	  War	  (1990-­‐1991),	  as	  many	  as	  1,000	  Kurds	  
were	   dying	   every	   day	   as	   they	   fled	   into	   the	  mountains	   near	   Turkey	   and	   Iran	   in	   order	   to	  
escape	  persecution.58	  The	  UN	  had	  previously	  authorized	  its	  member	  states	  to	  use	  force	  in	  
order	  to	  restore	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  in	  the	  area,59	  but	  it	  refused	  to	  authorize	  
the	  use	  of	  force	  in	  order	  to	  physically	  protect	  the	  Kurds	  fleeing	  persecution.	  Some	  members	  
of	  the	  Security	  Council	  feared	  that	  authorizing	  the	  use	  of	  force	  to	  protect	  civilians	  would	  set	  
a	   dangerous	   precedent	   for	   intervention,	   one	   that	   would	   put	   state	   sovereignty	   at	   risk.	  
However,	  the	  UN’s	  conceptions	  about	  POC	  were	  challenged	  by	  a	  US-­‐led	  coalition	  of	  states	  
led	  that	  took	  a	  more	  aggressive	  stance	  with	  Operation	  Provide	  Comfort,	  launched	  in	  April	  
1991.	  The	  coalition	  set	  up	  a	  no-­‐fly	  zone	  over	  Northern	  Iraq	  while	  Western	  military	  forces	  
on	  the	  ground	  organized	  ‘safe	  havens’	  to	  protect	  the	  Kurds.	  Operation	  Provide	  Comfort	  was	  
considered	  a	   great	   success,	   as	   thousands	  of	  Kurds	  who	  otherwise	  would	  have	  died	  were	  
saved.60	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Nick	  Wheeler,	  Saving	  Strangers	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  1.	  
58	  Wheeler,	  Saving	  Strangers,	  140.	  	  
59	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/678,	  29	  November	  1990.	  
60	  Wheeler,	  Saving	  Strangers,	  158.	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   Operation	  Provide	  Comfort’s	  success	  made	  the	   international	  community,	   including	  
the	  UN,	  optimistic	  about	  its	  ability	  to	  protect	  civilians.	  Within	  months	  of	  Operation	  Provide	  
Comfort,	  UN	  rhetoric	  on	  POC	  began	  to	  change.	  At	  the	  Security	  Council’s	   first	  ever	  summit	  
meeting	  with	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government	  in	  January	  1992,	  several	  references	  to	  human	  
rights	  as	  an	  integral	  component	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  were	  made.61	  Internal	  
affairs	   of	   states	   that	   were	   previously	   shielded	   by	   the	   UN’s	   respect	   of	   state	   sovereignty	  
became	   matters	   of	   international	   peace	   and	   security.	   The	   UN	   believed	   it	   now	   had	  
jurisdiction	   over	   violations	   of	   human	   rights,	   humanitarian	   disasters	   and	   civil	   wars	   and	  
could	  respond	  to	  such	  incidents	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter.	  	  
Newly	   confident	   in	   its	   ability	   to	   tackle	   these	   issues,	   the	   UN	   began	   to	   expand	   the	  
scope	   and	   capabilities	   of	   the	   mandates	   and	   Rules	   of	   Engagement	   (ROE)	   for	   its	   peace	  
missions	  to	  include	  broader	  elements	  of	  POC.	  In	  February	  1992,	  the	  UN	  authorized	  the	  UN	  
Protection	   Force	   in	   Former	   Yugoslavia	   (UNPROFOR).	   The	   conflict	   in	   Yugoslavia	   was	  
characterized	   in	   part	   by	   its	   shocking	   disregard	   for	   non-­‐combatant	   immunity,	   and	   the	  
UNPROFOR	  made	  efforts	  to	  protect	  civilians	  trapped	  amidst	  the	  fighting.	  For	  example,	  the	  
UN	   authorized	   UNPROFOR	   under	   Chapter	   VII	   to	   use	   “all	   necessary	   means”	   to	   deliver	  
humanitarian	   aid62	   and	   protect	   civilians	   residing	   in	   demilitarized	   zones	   in	   Bosnia	   and	  
Croatia,	   known	   as	   ‘safe	   areas’.63	   However,	   the	   UN	   experienced	   difficulties	   in	   procuring	  
additional	   troops	   from	   its	   member	   states	   to	   guard	   these	   safe	   areas	   effectively,	   and	  
UNPROFOR’s	   consistent	   failure	   to	   act	   upon	   its	   Chapter	   VII	   authorizations	   prompted	  
international	   media	   and	   NGOs	   to	   criticize	   the	   UN.	   UNPROFOR	   ran	   concurrently	   with	  
UNOSOM,	  and	  difficulties	  regarding	  POC	  experienced	  in	  former	  Yugoslavia	  would	  have	  an	  
impact	  on	  the	  UN’s	  POC	  decisions	  regarding	  UNOSOM.	  	  
In	   summation,	   the	   new	  world	   order,	   Operation	   Provide	   Comfort	   and	   UNPROFOR	  
each	   had	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	   the	   POC	   norm	   during	   UNOSOM.	   Whereas	   the	   UN	   had	  
previously	  hesitated	  to	  use	  force	  to	  achieve	  humanitarian	  objectives,	  it	  approached	  Somalia	  
optimistic	   that	   force	   could	  be	  used	   to	  protect	   civilians	   and	   restore	  peace	  and	   security	   to	  
Somalia.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Wills,	  Protecting	  Civilians:	  The	  Obligations	  of	  Peacekeepers,	  23.	  
62	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/770,	  13	  August	  1992.	  
63	  United	  Nations	  Security	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   This	   section	   explores	   which	   actors	   were	   most	   responsible	   normative	   evolution	  
during	   UNOSOM.	   Who	   were	   the	   main	   actors	   that	   defined	   and	   promoted	   normative	  
evolution	  within	   the	  UN?	  Who	  were	   the	  main	  actors	   that	  were	   capable	  of	  demonstrating	  
normative	  evolution	  on	  the	  ground?	  
	   In	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s,	  changes	  in	  global	  politics	  and	  the	  rapid	  escalation	  
of	  globalization	  altered	  the	  landscape	  of	  the	  UN,	  expanding	  the	  number	  of	  actors	  with	  the	  
potential	  to	  be	  normative	  intermediaries	  there.	  Most	  notably,	  interactions	  between	  the	  UN	  
and	   NGOs	   dramatically	   increased	   beginning	   in	   1990,	   specifically	   between	   the	   UNSC	   and	  
NGOs.64	   As	   Cold	   War	   tensions	   thawed	   and	   the	   Security	   Council	   began	   to	   take	  
“unprecedented	  action	  in	  the	  area	  of	  sanctions,	  peacekeeping,	  election	  monitoring,	  policing,	  
and	  post-­‐conflict	  peace-­‐building,”	  NGOs	  with	   interests	   in	   international	  peace	  and	  security	  
began	   to	   follow	   the	   work	   of	   the	   Security	   Council	   much	   more	   closely.65	   Some	   Council	  
members,	  overwhelmed	  by	   the	  work	  of	  managing	   their	  new	  responsibilities	   in	  dozens	  of	  
crisis	   areas,	  welcomed	   this	   new	   relationship	  with	   NGOs.	  Many	  NGOs	   remained	   active	   in	  
conflict	  areas	  after	  UN	  agencies	  left,	  and	  thus	  they	  were	  relied	  upon	  to	  provide	  information,	  
expertise	  and	  policy	  ideas.66	  	  
In	  Somalia,	  NGOs	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  1991	  helped	  convince	  the	  UN	  to	  muster	  a	  greater	  
humanitarian	   response.	   Initially,	   the	   UN	   dealt	   with	   Somalia’s	   deepening	   humanitarian	  
crisis	  and	  ensuing	  civil	  war	  separately.	  In	  late	  1991,	  the	  UN	  and	  most	  foreign	  governments	  
had	   decided	   that	   it	  was	   too	   dangerous	   to	   remain	   in	   Somalia	   and	   fled	   to	   Nairobi,	   Kenya.	  
Some	  NGOs,	  notably	  the	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  (ICRC),	  maintained	  their	  
presence	   in	   Somalia.	   In	  Mogadishu,	   an	  NGO	   called	   SOS	   ran	   the	  only	   functioning	  hospital,	  
and	  Medicins	  sans	  Frontieres	  (MSF)	  provided	  80	  percent	  of	  all	  medical	  supplies	  and	  drugs	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  James	  Paul.	  “Working	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  Nongovernmental	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  in	  The	  UN	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  Council:	  From	  the	  Cold	  
War	  to	  the	  21st	  Century,	  ed.	  David	  Malone	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Lynne	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  Publishers,	  2004),	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used	  by	   the	  remaining	  health	  care	   facilities.67	  Due	  to	   the	  efforts	  of	   the	  NGOs,	   the	  Somalis	  
gradually	   began	   to	   return	   to	   Mogadishu	   in	   March	   1992.68	   In	   contrast,	   the	   UN’s	   initial	  
humanitarian	   assistance	   to	   Somalia	   was	   “so	   slowly	   and	   inadequately	   delivered	   that	   it	  
became	   counterproductive.”69	   The	   NGOs	   became	   deeply	   critical	   of	   the	   UN	   for	   not	   doing	  
more.	  As	   its	  work	  shifted	   from	  addressing	   interstate	  wars	   to	   issues	  of	   internal	   strife,	   the	  
UNSC	  had	  come	  to	  rely	  upon	  on	  the	  expertise	  and	  action	  of	  NGOs,70	  and	  thus	  this	  criticism	  
from	  the	  NGOs	  helped	  generate	  a	  greater	  humanitarian	  response	  from	  the	  UN.	  
With	   regard	   to	   the	   civil	   war,	   the	   Security	   Council	   unanimously	   authorized	   a	  
peacekeeping	  force	  for	  Somalia	  after	  the	  leaders	  of	  Somalia’s	  two	  principal	  warring	  factions	  
signed	   a	   cease-­‐fire	   agreement	   on	   3	   March	   1992.	   Under	   Chapter	   VI	   of	   the	   UN	   Charter,	  
Resolution	   751	   approved	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   UNOSOM	   I,	   which	   would	   consist	   of	   a	   50-­‐
member	  observer	  mission	  and	  500	  lightly-­‐armed	  peace	  soldiers	  to	  monitor	  the	  cease-­‐fire.71	  
Resolution	  751	  did	  not	  represent	  a	  break	  with	  the	  UN’s	  Cold	  War-­‐approach	  to	  POC.	  NGOs,	  
along	   with	   the	   humanitarian	   organs	   of	   the	   UN,	   worked	   to	   improve	   civilian	   security	   by	  
administering	   emergency	   relief	   and	   creating	   safe	   space.	  Militarily,	   the	  UN’s	   goals	   related	  
only	  to	  the	  cease-­‐fire.	  
Almost	   immediately	   after	   the	   passing	   of	   Resolution	   751,	   however,	   the	   UN	  
Secretariat	  and	  UNSC	  began	  to	  envision	  a	  larger	  role	  for	  its	  peace	  soldiers	  on	  the	  ground.72	  
In	   August	   1992,	   Boutros-­‐Ghali	   stated	   that	   the	   UN	   needed	   to	   employ	   a	   comprehensive	  
strategy	   that	   covered	   both	   humanitarian	   relief	   and	   the	   cessation	   of	   hostilities,73	   and	   the	  
Security	   Council	   unanimously	   decided	   to	   increase	   the	   strength	   of	   UNOSOM	   I	   in	   order	   to	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  peace	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greatly	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  humanitarian	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  significantly.	  Not	  
enough	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  the	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  Sahnoun	  lamented	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needed,	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  less	  than	  half	  that	  amount	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  Moreover,	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  into	  the	  country	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  getting	  to	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  in	  need	  because	  the	  warring	  factions	  had	  begun	  to	  systematically	  loot	  supplies	  from	  the	  
UN	  and	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  NGOs	  (Sahnoun,	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  24	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provide	  security	  for	  the	  UN	  humanitarian	  staff	  and	  other	  NGOs	  attempting	  to	  deliver	  aid	  to	  
the	  starving	  Somalis.74	  UNOSOM	  I	  was	  not	  authorized	  the	  use	  force,	  and	  it	  was	  hoped	  that	  
the	  presence	  of	  peace	  soldiers	  alone	  would	  deter	  attacks.	  UNOSOM	  I	  became	  the	   first	  UN	  
peace	  mission	  with	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  making	  possible	  the	  delivery	  of	  emergency	  aid	  
to	  civilians.75	  	  
At	   this	   point,	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   suggested	   to	   the	   Security	  Council	   that	   the	  UN	  
carry	  out	  a	  country-­‐wide	  enforcement	  operation.76	   It	  was	  clear,	  however,	   that	  the	  UN	  did	  
not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  pull	  off	  an	  enforcement	  operation.	  Instead,	  the	  US	  offered	  to	  lead	  
an	   enforcement	   operation.	   The	   entire	   military	   force,	   called	   the	   United	   Task	   Force	  
(UNITAF),	  would	  be	  under	  US	  control,	  authorized	  by	  the	  Security	  Council	  in	  Resolution	  794	  
under	   Chapter	   VII	   of	   the	   UN	   Charter.77	   UNITAF	   marked	   the	   first	   time	   that	   the	   UN	   had	  
authorized	  peace	  soldiers	  to	  use	  of	  force	  for	  humanitarian	  ends.78	  The	  US	  field	  commander,	  
US	  Marine	  Lieutenant	  General	  Robert	  Johnston,	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  American	  President	  
George	  Bush	   and	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Joint	   Chiefs	   of	   Staff	   Colin	   Powell,	   determined	   that	   the	  
deployment	   of	   the	   US	   Marine	   Corps	   would	   be	   “strictly	   humanitarian”	   and	   the	   soldiers	  
would	  “use	  only	  whatever	  force	  was	  necessary	  to	  protect	  themselves	  and	  food	  convoys.”79	  	  
Thus,	  from	  the	  start,	  the	  United	  Task	  Force	  (UNITAF)	  was	  conceived	  as	  a	  short-­‐term,	  
high-­‐intensity	   operation	   designed	   to	   establish	   a	   secure	   environment	   for	   humanitarian	  
relief	   operations.	   Once	   the	   worst	   of	   the	   humanitarian	   crisis	   had	   subsided,	   a	   UN-­‐led	  
operation	  would	  take	  over.	  As	  early	  as	  December	  1992,	  both	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  US	  argued	  that	  
the	  UN-­‐led	  follow-­‐up	  mission	  would	  need	  to	  have	  a	  broad	  mandate	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  use	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  his	  defeat	  in	  
November	  1992,	  however,	  he	  began	  to	  consider	  US	  military	  intervention	  more	  seriously.	  Growing	  support	  
from	  Congress,	  increasing	  concern	  from	  the	  American	  public,	  and	  mounting	  pressure	  from	  media	  and	  NGOs	  
eventually	  convinced	  Bush	  “that	  the	  United	  States	  had	  a	  moral	  obligation	  to	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  in	  some	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  to	  the	  
humanitarian	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  Boulden,	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  Nations	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force	   in	   order	   to	   permanently	   restore	   peace	   in	   Somalia	   and	   prevent	   famine	   from	  
reoccurring	  there.	  According	  to	  Boutros-­‐Ghali:	  
	  
Indeed,	  United	  States	  officials	  had	  proposed	  this	  change	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  follow-­‐up	  
force—from	  peace-­‐keeping	  to	  peace	  enforcement—as	  early	  as	  18	  December	  1992	  in	  
consultations	  with	  senior	  United	  Nations	  officials	  about	  the	  transition	  from	  UNITAF.	  
This	   implied…a	   peace-­‐enforcement	   mission	   under	   the	   command	   of	   the	   United	  
Nations—an	  endeavor	  which	  the	  Organization	  had	  never	  before	  undertaken.80	  	  
	  
Boutros-­‐Ghali	   understood	   that	   the	   UN	   was	   likely	   to	   struggle	   with	   a	   peace	  
enforcement	  operation,	  and	  he	  implored	  the	  US	  to	  take	  on	  disarmament	  duties,	  at	  the	  very	  
least.	   Bush,	   however,	   was	   adamant	   that	   UNITAF	  would	  work	   in	   Somalia	   no	   longer	   than	  
necessary.	  UNITAF,	  37,000	  strong,	  was	  able	  to	  create	  a	  safe	  enough	  environment	  for	  the	  UN	  
to	   carry	   out	   its	   100-­‐Day	  Action	  Programme	   in	   coordination	  with	  NGOs.	   Rates	   of	   looting,	  
extortion	  and	  attacks	  dropped	  sharply	  throughout	  central	  and	  southern	  Somalia.81	  	  
UNITAF	  withdrew	  from	  Somalia	  in	  May	  1993.	  UNOSOM	  II	  marked	  the	  first	  Chapter	  
VII	  military	  operation	  under	  command	  and	  control	  of	  the	  UN.	  The	  US,	  however,	  kept	  strong	  
control	   over	   the	   scope	   and	   strategy	  of	  UNOSOM	   II.	   The	  US	   employed	   a	   Joint	  Task	  Force,	  
Quick	  Reaction	  Force,	  US	  Rangers	  and	  Delta	  commandos	  to	  fight	  alongside	  the	  UNOSOM	  II	  
forces,	  and	  these	  forces	  took	  orders	  from	  US	  commanders	  and	  were	  guided	  by	  US	  Central	  
Command	   (CENTCOM)	   in	   Florida.	   Boutros-­‐Ghali	  made	  Admiral	   Jonathan	  Howe,	  who	   had	  
been	   Deputy	   National	   Security	   Adviser	   in	   the	   Bush	   administration,	   his	   Special	  
Representative	   to	   Somalia.	   The	   first	   draft	   of	   Security	   Council	   Resolution	   814,	   which	  
authorized	  UNOSOM	  II,	  was	  written	  in	  the	  Pentagon.82	  	  
During	   UNOSOM	   II,	   tasks	   traditionally	   undertaken	   by	   the	   UN’s	   Department	   of	  
Political	  Affairs	  (DPA)	  came	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  peace	  soldiers.	  UNOSOM	  II	  soldiers	  
were	   tasked	   with	   promoting	   political	   reconciliation	   between	   Somalia’s	   warring	   factions	  
and	   building	   Somalia’s	   national	   institutions	   because	   both	   the	   UN	   and	   US	   felt	   that	   the	  
Somalia	  would	  remain	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  humanitarian	  crisis	  if	  the	  national	  government	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  The	  United	  Nations	  and	  Somalia	  1992-­1996,	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  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  The	  United	  Nations	  and	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  1992-­1996,	  35	  
82	  Walter	  Clarke,	  “Failed	  Visions	  and	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  in	  Somalia,”	  in	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  eds.	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the	   national	   infrastructure	   were	   not	   rebuilt.	   In	   addition	   to	   rebuilding	   the	   national	  
infrastructure	  and	  reconstituting	  local	  and	  national	  governments,	  UNOSOM	  II	  soldiers	  were	  
tasked	   with	   implementing	   disarmament	   programs,	   facilitating	   mine	   clearance,	   and	  
reconstituting	   administrative	   structures,	   police	   forces	   and	   judiciaries.	   They	   also	  
coordinated	  humanitarian	  efforts83	  to	  improve	  health	  care,	  restore	  food	  security,	  facilitate	  
the	  return	  of	  thousands	  of	  Somalis	  to	  their	  homes	  and	  provide	  access	  to	  schools,	  water	  and	  
electricity.	  As	  of	  May	  1993,	  it	  was	  the	  UN’s	  most	  ambitious	  POC	  approach.	  
General	  Mohamed	   Farah	   Aideed,	   the	   leader	   of	   one	   of	   Somalia’s	   principal	  warring	  
factions,	  reacted	  violently	  to	  the	  UN’s	  more	  aggressive	  stance	  on	  disarmament	  and	  political	  
reconciliation.	   On	   5	   June	   1993,	   Pakistani	   forces	   under	   UNOSOM	   II	   were	   attacked	   while	  
conducting	   a	   search	   of	   a	   weapons	   repository	   by	   Aideed’s	   forces.	   Twenty-­‐four	   peace	  
soldiers	  died,	  prompting	  the	  UN	  to	  pass	  Resolution	  837,	  authorizing	  the	  UNOSOM	  II	  to	  use	  
force	   against	   those	   responsible	   for	   the	   armed	   attacks.84	   On	   3	   October	   1993,	   US	   soldiers	  
outside	  the	  formal	  command	  of	   the	  UN	  led	  an	  operation	   in	  Mogadishu	  to	  capture	  Aideed.	  
The	   operation	   was	   approved	   by	   the	   national	   command	   authorities	   in	   the	   US	   and	  
commanded	  by	  a	  US	  Special	  Forces	  officer,	  Major	  General	  William	  Garrison,	  who	  reported	  
directly	  to	  CENTCOM.85	  The	  operation	  failed,	  and	  eighteen	  American	  Rangers	  died.	  	  
In	  response	   to	   the	  deaths	  of	   the	  eighteen	  American	  soldiers,	   the	  US	  announced	   its	  
decision	   to	  withdraw	   its	   troops	   from	  Somalia	   in	  March	  1994.	  The	  US’	  decision	  prompted	  
other	  nations	  to	  withdraw	  their	  troops	  as	  well.	  UNOSOM	  II	  was	  effectively	  reduced	  to	  two-­‐
thirds	  of	  its	  initial	  size.	  In	  February	  1994,	  the	  Security	  Council	  reduced	  the	  size	  of	  UNOSOM	  
II	   and	   took	   away	   the	  mission’s	   enforcement	   powers	   to	   achieve	   disarmament,	   procure	   a	  
cease-­‐fire	  and	  protect	  humanitarian	  supplies.86	  Without	  enforcement	  powers,	  UNOSOM	  II	  
struggled	  to	  meet	  its	  objectives.	  The	  Security	  Council	  decided	  that,	  without	  the	  consent	  and	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  United	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  Security	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  Herbst,	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  in	  Learning	  from	  
Somalia:	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  Intervention,	  eds.	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cooperation	  of	  Somalia’s	  political	  factions,	  it	  would	  be	  better	  to	  end	  the	  mission.	  UNOSOM	  
II	  troops	  withdrew	  from	  Somalia	  in	  March	  1995.	  
In	  summation,	  between	  April	  1992	  and	  March	  1995,	  many	  actors	  helped	  define	  and	  
promote	   changes	   to	   the	   POC	   norm.	   Initially,	   NGOs	   helped	   convince	   the	   UN	   Secretariat,	  
UNSC	  and	  the	  US	  to	  make	  stronger	  humanitarian	  efforts	  in	  Somalia.	  By	  August	  1992,	  there	  
was	  consensus	  within	   the	  UN	  on	  enhancing	  UNOSOM’s	  role	   in	  POC;	  all	  UNSC	  Resolutions	  
dealing	  with	  Somalia	  between	  1992	  and	  1995	  were	  voted	  on	  unanimously.	  Together,	   the	  
UN	   and	   the	  US	   broadened	  UNOSOM’s	   POC	   objectives	   to	   include	   peace-­‐building	   activities	  
traditionally	  taken	  on	  by	  the	  DPA.	  However,	  the	  UN	  was	  only	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  new	  
POC	   commitments	   with	   the	   help	   of	   the	   US,	   and	   very	   quickly	   the	   US	   took	   over	   the	  
implementation	  of	  POC	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  Somalia.	  When	  the	  US	  withdrew	  its	  troops	  from	  





	   This	   section	   explores	   which	   motives	   best	   explain	   normative	   evolution	   during	  
UNOSOM.	   Was	   normative	   evolution	   at	   the	   UN	   during	   UNOSOM	   motivated	   primarily	   by	  
ideational	  influences	  or	  praxis-­‐challenges?	  
	   Boutros-­‐Ghali	  was	  convinced	  that	  UN	  peace	  missions	  could	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  
post-­‐Cold	   War	   era.	   In	   January	   1992,	   he	   presented	   his	   report	   An	   Agenda	   for	   Peace,	  
Preventive	  Diplomacy,	   Peacemaking	   and	  Peace-­keeping	   at	   the	   Security	   Council’s	   first	   ever	  
summit	  meeting	  with	  Heads	   of	   State	   and	   Government.	   In	  An	   Agenda	   for	   Peace,	  Boutros-­‐
Ghali	   addressed	   the	   future	   of	   UN	   peace	   missions	   in	   light	   Operation	   Provide	   Comfort’s	  
success.	  He	  wrote:	  	  	  
	  
In	  these	  past	  months	  a	  conviction	  has	  grown,	  among	  nations	  large	  and	  small,	  that	  an	  
opportunity	   has	   been	   regained	   to	   achieve	   the	   great	   objectives	   of	   the	   Charter—a	  
United	  Nations	  capable	  of	  maintaining	   international	  peace	  and	  security,	  of	   securing	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justice	  and	  human	  rights…The	  Organization	  must	  never	  again	  be	  crippled	  as	  it	  was	  in	  
the	  era	  that	  has	  now	  passed.87	  
	  
The	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Somalia	  government	  and	  the	  subsequent	  humanitarian	  crisis	  
in	  that	  nation	  provided	  the	  UN	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  fulfill	  its	  newly	  articulated	  promise.	  
The	  UN	  believed	   that	   the	  creation	  of	  UNOSOM	  was	   “consistent	  with	   the	  expansion	  of	   the	  
organization’s	  role	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  international	  peace	  and	  security,	  which	  had	  been	  
made	  possible	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.”88	  	  
Boutros-­‐Ghali,	   with	   full	   support	   from	   the	   Security	   Council,	   pushed	   for	   a	   broader	  
conception	   of	   POC	   for	   UNOSOM	   based	   on	   these	   ideational	   influences.	   From	   the	   start,	  
however,	   challenges	   in	   Somalia	   made	   nation-­‐building	   and	   political	   reconciliation	   nearly	  
impossible.89	   For	   example,	   there	   were	   virtually	   no	   political	   leaders	   with	   international	  
credibility	   for	   mediators	   to	   engage	   in	   peace-­‐making.	   Most	   of	   the	   warlords	   used	  
internationally	  sponsored	  peace	  conferences	   to	  enhance	   their	  status,	  not	   to	  work	   toward	  
reconciliation.90	  At	  the	  local	  level,	  clan	  elders	  were	  being	  systematically	  undermined	  by	  the	  
destructive	   forces	   of	   the	   civil	   war.	   They	   were	   “demoralized	   by	   the	   violence,	   eclipsed	   in	  
authority	  by	  the	  warlords,	  separated	  from	  the	  communities	  they	  led	  by	  massive	  population	  
displacement,”	  and	  ultimately	  of	  little	  help	  to	  the	  UN.91	  Yet,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  these	  severe	  
operational	   challenges,	   the	   UN,	   under	   the	   auspices	   of	   the	   US,	   continued	   to	   believe	   that	  
using	   force	   to	   accomplish	   political	   goals	   would	   work.	   UNOSOM	   II	   was	   meant	   to	   be	   “an	  
expression	  of	  the	  international	  community’s	  determination	  not	  to	  remain	  a	  silent	  spectator	  
to	  the	  sufferings	  of	  an	  entire	  people	  for	  no	  fault	  of	  their	  own.”92	  
It	  was	  only	  after	  the	  US	  announced	  its	  intention	  to	  withdraw	  its	  forces	  from	  Somalia	  
that	  the	  UN	  began	  to	  change	  its	  POC	  approach	  in	  response	  to	  operational	  challenges	  on	  the	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  Armed	  Humanitarian	  Intervention,	  eds.	  Walter	  Clarke	  and	  Jeffrey	  Herbst	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  
Westview	  Press,	  1997),	  86.	  
91	  Ibid.	  
92	  United	  Nations	  Secretary-­‐General,	  S/25254,	  3	  March	  1993.	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ground.	  The	  Security	  Council	  took	  away	  UNOSOM’s	  authorization	  to	  use	  force,	  returning	  to	  
its	  Cold	  War-­‐approach	   to	  POC.	  This	   response	   ignored	   the	   fact	   that,	  while	   the	  UN	  had	  not	  
been	   successful	   at	   enforcing	   peace,	   it	   had	   been	   successful	   at	   using	   force	   to	   deliver	  
humanitarian	   aid.	   At	   the	   famine’s	  worst,	   it	  was	   estimated	   that	   approximately	   four	   and	   a	  
half	  million	  Somalis	  required	  emergency	  assistance.	  Nearly	  one	  and	  a	  half	  million	  Somalis	  
were	   on	   the	   verge	   of	   starvation,	   including	   one	  million	   children.93	   Together,	   UNITAF	   and	  
UNOSOM	  were	  able	  to	  restore	  food	  security,	  return	  crop	  production	  to	  pre-­‐civil	  war	  levels,	  
and	  eradicate	  the	  famine	  by	  1993,	  saving	  at	  least	  250,000	  people.94	  	  
Despite	   its	   successes,	   the	   UN	   decided	   to	   abandon	   its	   broader	   strategies	   of	   POC	  
altogether	  in	  Somalia.	  This	  retreat	  was	  not	  only	  in	  response	  to	  operational	  challenges,	  but	  
also	  to	  harsh	  criticism	  from	  the	  international	  community,	  Americans	  in	  particular,	  over	  the	  
deaths	  of	  the	  peace	  soldiers	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  peace	  process.	  The	  UN	  largely	  took	  the	  
blame	  for	  American	  mistakes,	  and	  many	  believed	  the	  opinion	  of	  one	  American	  Senator	  who	  
wrote	   that	   American	   lives	   were	   lost	   because	   the	   US	   surrendered	   its	   interests	   and	  
leadership	   to	   the	  UN.95	  The	  UN	  worried	   that	   its	   ‘failure’	   in	  Somalia	  would	  mean	  a	   loss	  of	  
legitimacy	  and	  credibility,	  and	  so	  it	  retreated	  to	  its	  traditional	  approach	  to	  POC,	  where	  POC	  
was	  not	  enforced	  but	  rather	  based	  on	  the	  consent	  and	  cooperation	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  host	  
nation.	  	  
Thus,	   the	  evolution	  of	   the	  POC	  norm	  during	   the	  UN	  peace	  mission	   in	  Somalia	  was	  
motivated	  by	   ideational	  commitments	  to	  becoming	  a	  stronger,	  more	   influential	  UN	  in	  the	  
post-­‐Cold	   War	   era.	   The	   subsequent	   retreat	   from	   militarizing	   humanitarian	   and	  
development	   objectives	   was	   motivated	   by	   the	   praxis-­‐challenges	   presented	   during	   the	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  The	  United	  Nations	  and	  Somalia	  1992-­1996,	  6.	  
94	  Ibid.	  	  
95	  Mitch	  McConnell,	  “Multilateralism’s	  Obituary	  Was	  Written	  in	  Mogadishu,”	  Christian	  Science	  Monitor,	  27	  
October	  1993,	  19.	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2.5	  Mechanisms	  	  
	  
	   This	  section	  explores	  the	  mechanisms	  behind	  normative	  evolution	  during	  UNOSOM.	  
Did	   normative	   evolution	   occur	   during	  UNOSOM	  primarily	   through	   institutionalization	   or	  
demonstration?	  
	   During	  UNOSOM,	   there	  was	   large-­‐scale	   institutionalization	   of	   normative	   evolution	  
within	  the	  UN	  in	  rhetoric,	  organizational	  capacity	  and	  Security	  Council	  resolutions.	  The	  UN	  
articulated	   its	  new	  strategy	  of	  using	  peace	  missions	   to	  achieve	  POC	  objectives	  previously	  
taken	  on	  by	  humanitarian	  and	  development	  actors	  in	  An	  Agenda	  for	  Peace.	  In	  An	  Agenda	  for	  
Peace,	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  preached	  that	  the	  UN	  could	  breach	  state	  sovereignty	  if	  a	  state	  violated	  
a	  new	  set	  of	  threats	  to	  peace	  and	  security,	  “including	  violations	  of	  human	  rights,	  genocide,	  
civil	   war,	   humanitarian	   disasters,	   and	   other	   crises	   internal	   to	   states.”96	   Boutros-­‐Ghali	  
envisaged	  an	  expanded	  role	  of	  UN	  peace	  soldiers	  in	  this	  new	  world	  order,	  and	  both	  he	  and	  
the	   Security	   Council	   “welcome[d]	   the	   increase	   and	   broadening	   of	   the	   tasks	   of	   peace-­‐
keeping	   operations,”97	   including	   peace-­‐making	   and	   peace-­‐building	   objectives.	   He	   even	  
urged	  member	  states	   to	  make	  a	  standing	  military	   force	  of	  peace	  soldiers	  available	   to	   the	  
Security	  Council.	  	  
The	  standing	  military	  force	  of	  peace	  soldiers	  never	  materialized,	  but	  under	  Boutros-­‐
Ghali’s	  influence	  the	  UN	  did	  create	  the	  Department	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Operations	  (DPKO)	  to	  
manage	  and	  coordinate	  its	  expanding	  peace	  missions	  in	  early	  1992.	  Before	  the	  creation	  of	  
the	  DPKO,	  UN	  peace	  missions	  were	   created	   and	  managed	  on	   an	  ad	  hoc	   basis.	   The	  DPKO	  
resulted	  from	  Boutros-­‐Ghali’s	  suggestion	  in	  An	  Agenda	  for	  Peace,	  where	  he	  wrote	  that	  the	  
expansion	   of	   UN	   peacekeeping	   activities98	   meant	   that	   “fundamental	   decisions	   must	   be	  
taken	   to	   enhance	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   Organization	   in	   this	   innovative	   and	   productive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Adam	  Branch,	  “American	  Morality	  over	  International	  Law:	  Origins	  in	  UN	  Military	  Interventions,	  1991-­‐
1995,”	  Constellations	  12,	  1	  (2005),	  108.	  	  
97	  Boutros	  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  An	  Agenda	  for	  Peace,	  Preventive	  Diplomacy,	  Peacemaking	  and	  Peace-­keeping,	  
paragraph	  49.	  
98	  Thirteen	  UN	  peace-­‐keeping	  operations	  had	  been	  established	  between	  1988	  and	  1982	  alone—the	  same	  
amount	  that	  had	  been	  established	  between	  the	  organization’s	  inception	  and	  1987.	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exercise	   of	   its	   function.”99	   The	   creation	   of	   the	   DPKO	   reflected	   the	   UN’s	   intentions	   to	  
continue	  expanding	  the	  scope	  and	  capabilities	  of	  its	  peace	  missions.	  	  
	   Finally,	  the	  Security	  Council	  institutionalized	  normative	  evolution	  in	  the	  Resolutions	  
for	  UNOSOM.	  Resolution	  775	  made	  UNOSOM	  I	  became	  the	  first	  UN	  peace	  mission	  with	  the	  
primary	  purpose	  of	  making	  possible	  the	  delivery	  of	  emergency	  aid	  to	  civilians.	  Resolution	  
794	  marked	   the	   first	   time	   that	   the	  UN	   had	   authorized	   peace	   soldiers	   to	   use	   of	   force	   for	  
humanitarian	  ends.	  Resolution	  814	  made	  UNOSOM	  II	  the	  first	  peace	  mission	  fully	  under	  UN	  
command	   authorized	   to	   use	   force	   to	   accomplish	   peace-­‐building	   objectives,	   such	   as	  
providing	   “assistance	   to	   help	   the	   people	   of	   Somalia	   to	   promote	   and	   advance	   political	  
reconciliation,	   through	  broad	  participation	  by	  all	   sectors	  of	  Somali	  society,”	  and	  assisting	  
with	  “the	  re-­‐establishment	  of	  national	  and	  regional	  institutions	  and	  civil	  administration	  in	  
the	  entire	  country.”100	  	  
	   Despite	   large-­‐scale	   institutionalization	   of	   broad	   POC	   objectives,	   the	   UN	   was	   only	  
able	   to	   demonstrate	   these	   objectives	   with	   help	   from	   the	   US.	   During	   UNOSOM	   II,	   peace	  
soldiers	  struggled	  to	  demonstrate	  POC	  objectives	  for	  several	  reasons.	  First,	  the	  DPKO	  was	  
still	   very	   young.	   Though	   the	   frequency	   and	   scope	   of	   UN	   peace	   missions	   had	   increased	  
immensely,101	   the	   DPKO	   had	   “almost	   no	   permanent	   logistical	   and	   contingency	   planning	  
infrastructure	  to	  support	  its	  multiplying	  commitments.”102	  Understaffed,	  it	  was	  barely	  able	  
to	   cope	   with	   the	   workload	   presented	   by	   the	   concurrent	   peace	   missions	   in	   Somalia,	  
Cambodia	  and	  Bosnia.	  Thus,	  it	  lacked	  the	  operational	  capacity	  to	  organize	  an	  enforcement	  
operation	  of	  such	  size,	   complexity	  and	  urgency	   in	  Somalia	  without	  military	  support	   from	  
the	  US.	  
	   Second,	  lack	  of	  consent	  from	  some	  of	  Somalia’s	  warring	  parties	  made	  enforcing	  POC	  
more	  difficult.	  In	  fact,	  the	  UN’s	  decision	  to	  persecute	  Aideed	  led	  to	  higher	  civilian	  casualties.	  
Throughout	   the	   summer	   of	   1993,	   during	  UNOSOM’s	  man-­‐hunt	   for	  Aideed,	   civilians	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  Boutros	  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  An	  Agenda	  for	  Peace,	  Preventive	  Diplomacy,	  Peacemaking	  and	  Peace-­keeping,	  
paragraph	  48.	  
100	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/814,	  23	  March	  1993.	  	  
101	  The	  UN	  had	  already	  launched	  two	  large,	  expensive	  peace	  missions	  in	  1992	  to	  Cambodia	  and	  the	  former	  
Yugoslavia,	  and	  it	  was	  preparing	  to	  launch	  another	  in	  Mozambique.	  
102	  United	  Nations	  Secretary-­‐General,	  S/24868.	  
	   38	  
directly	  targetted	  by	  Aideeds	  soldiers	  and	  “an	  untold	  number	  of	  Somali	  civilians	  were	  killed	  
in	  raid	  after	  aid	  by	  US	  forces,	  under	  US	  command.”103	  
Third,	  member	  states	  were	  not	  prepared	  to	  contribute	  to	  UNOSOM	  II.	  The	  UN	  has	  no	  
troops	   of	   its	   own	   and	   little	   military	   equipment.	   It	   relies	   solely	   on	   the	   voluntary	  
contributions	   of	  member	   states.	   Boutros-­‐Ghali	   wrote	   to	   42	  member	   states	   in	   November	  
1993,	  “urging	  them	  to	  contribute	  additional	  troops	  to	  UNOSOM	  II,	  but	  not	  a	  single	  positive	  
response	   had	   been	   received	   by	   the	   beginning	   of	   1994.”104	   UNOSOM	   II	   never	   reached	   its	  
authorized	  strength,	  and	  thus	  it	  struggled	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  POC	  objectives.	  
Unfortunately,	  UNOSOM	  was	  also	  a	  “prime	  exemplar	  of	  abuse	  of	  human	  rights.”105	  In	  
July	  1993,	  African	  Rights	  published	  a	  report	  based	  on	  evidence	  gathered	  during	  two	  five-­‐
week	  missions	  to	  Somalia.	  It	  reported	  that	  the	  UN	  troops	  violated	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions,	  
including	   instances	   where	   UN	   troops	   attacked	   a	   hospital,	   fired	   upon	   unarmed	  
demonstrators,	   and	   killed	   unarmed	   civilians.106	   At	   the	   time,	   it	  was	   nearly	   impossible	   for	  
Somalis	   to	   obtain	   any	   recourse	   for	   these	   abuses	   because	   UNOSOM	   had	   no	   internal	  
mechanism	  for	  addressing	  complaints	  and	  disputes.107	   It	  was	  only	   in	  August	  of	  1993	  that	  
the	  UN	  agreed	   to	   set	   up	   the	  UNOSOM	  Office	  of	  Human	  Rights,	   staffed	  only	  by	   six	  people	  
tasked	   with	   investigating	   and	   facilitating	   the	   prosecution	   of	   serious	   violations	   of	  
international	   humanitarian	   law.108	   Investigations	   included	   “mass	   murders	   of	   Somali	  
citizens,	   murder,	   attempted	   murder	   and	   threats	   of	   bodily	   harm	   against	   international	  
assistance	  workers	  and	  UNOSOM	  employees,”109	  but	  not	  violations	  committed	  by	  UNOSOM	  
employees.	  	  
Thus,	   both	   mechanisms	   of	   normative	   evolution	   were	   utilized	   during	   UNOSOM.	  
However,	   while	   the	   UN’s	   ideational	   commitments	   to	   broader	   POC	   approaches	   were	  
institutionalized,	  UNOSOM	  II,	  with	  less	  help	  from	  the	  US,	  was	  unable	  to	  wholly	  demonstrate	  
these	  broader	  objectives.	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  Melvern,	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  Ultimate	  Crime:	  Who	  Betrayed	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  and	  Why	  (London:	  Allison	  &	  Busby,	  1995),	  325.	  
104	  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  The	  United	  Nations	  and	  Somalia	  1992-­1996,	  62.	  
105	  Agostinho	  Zacarias,	  The	  United	  Nations	  and	  International	  Peacekeeping	  (London:	  Tauris	  Academic	  Studies,	  
1996),	  162.	  
106	  African	  Rights,	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To	  summarize,	  the	  articulation	  of	  new	  institutional	  goals	  regarding	  POC	  by	  the	  UN	  
Secretariat	   and	   Security	   Council	   and	   the	   subsequent	   efforts	   of	   UNOSOM	   soldiers	   to	  
implement	   these	  new	  POC	  goals	   on	   the	   ground	  are	   evidence	  of	   the	   evolution	  of	   the	  POC	  
norm	  during	  UNOSOM.	  At	   the	  start	  of	  UNOSOM	  I,	   the	  UN	  left	  POC	  to	  humanitarian	  actors	  
and	  used	  UNOSOM	  soldiers	  to	  monitor	  the	  cease-­‐fire.	  The	  evolution	  of	  the	  POC	  norm	  began	  
with	   Resolution	   775,	   which	   mandated	   UNOSOM	   I	   to	   perform	   the	   additional	   tasks	   of	  
protecting	  humanitarian	  staff	  and	  ensuring	  the	  safe	  delivery	  of	  humanitarian	  aid.	  Evolution	  
continued	   with	   Resolution	   794,	   which	   authorized	   UNITAF	   under	   Chapter	   VII	   of	   the	   UN	  
Charter	  to	  use	  “all	  necessary	  means	  to	  establish	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  a	  secure	  environment	  
for	   humanitarian	   relief	   operations	   in	   Somalia.”110	   Finally,	   Resolution	   814	   assigned	  
UNOSOM	  troops	  to	  use	  force	  to	  achieve	  POC	  objectives	  previously	  taken	  on	  by	  development	  
actors.	  	  
The	  UN,	  specifically	  the	  Secretariat	  and	  the	  UNSC,	  along	  with	  the	  US	  and	  NGOs,	  each	  
played	   a	   role	   in	   defining	   and	   promoting	   these	   broader	   POC	   objectives.	   However,	   the	   US	  
proved	  to	  be	  the	  only	  actor	  capable	  of	  fulfilling	  these	  broader	  POC	  objectives.	  Without	  the	  
support	  from	  the	  US	  in	  the	  UNSC	  or	  from	  the	  US	  military	  on	  the	  ground,	  the	  UN	  was	  forced	  
to	  relieve	  UNOSOM	  of	  its	  POC	  tasks.	  As	  such,	  the	  US	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  most	  significant	  actor	  
behind	  normative	  evolution	  during	  UNOSOM.	  
The	  UN	  was	  motivated	  by	  ideational	  influences	  to	  broaden	  its	  POC	  objectives.	  With	  
the	   Cold	   War	   over,	   the	   UN	   believed	   that	   it	   could	   expand	   its	   role	   in	   promoting	   and	  
maintaining	   international	   peace	   and	   security,	   fulfilling	   its	   promise	   as	   an	   organization	  
designed	   to	   save	   humanity	   from	   the	   scourge	   of	   war.	   However,	   UNOSOM	   experienced	  
operational	   difficulties	   implementing	   its	   POC	   objectives,	   and	   the	   UN	   subsequently	  
experienced	  harsh	  criticism	  from	  the	  international	  community	  for	  its	  failure	  to	  implement	  
its	  broader	  POC	  objectives.	  Subsequently,	  the	  UN	  was	  motivated	  by	  these	  praxis-­‐challenges	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/794,	  3	  December	  1992.	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to	  strip	  UNOSOM	  of	  its	  enforcement	  powers,	  even	  though	  UNOSOM	  had	  experienced	  great	  
success	  in	  enforcing	  certain	  POC	  objectives,	  such	  as	  the	  delivery	  of	  humanitarian	  aid.	  	  
Finally,	   the	   dominant	   mechanism	   behind	   normative	   evolution	   in	   the	   UN	   was	  
institutionalization.	  The	  UN	  experienced	  large-­‐scale	  institutionalization	  of	  its	  broadest	  POC	  
objectives	  for	  peace	  missions,	  but	  it	  was	  only	  partially	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  those	  objectives	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Chapter	  3	  






	   From	  October	   1993	   to	  April	   1996,	   the	  UN	   conducted	   a	   peace	  mission	   in	  Rwanda.	  
The	  mission	  was	  composed	  of	  two	  parts:	  UNAMIR	  I	  (October	  1993-­‐May	  1994)	  and	  UNAMIR	  
II	   (May	   1994-­‐April	   1996).	   The	   purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   explore	   how	   the	   POC	   norm	  
evolved	  during	  the	  course	  of	  UNAMIR	  (October	  1993-­‐April	  1996)	  using	  the	  Constructivist	  
framework	  outlined	   in	  Chapter	  1.	  The	  objective	   is	   to	  determine	   the	  main	  actors,	  motives	  
and	   mechanisms	   responsible	   for	   normative	   evolution.	   First,	   I	   provide	   background	  
information	   that	  outlines	   the	  national	  and	   international	   context	  and	  explains	   the	  state	  of	  
the	  POC	  norm	  at	  the	  start	  of	  UNAMIR.	  Then,	  I	  employ	  the	  following	  questions	  in	  order	  to	  
achieve	  the	  stated	  objective:	  	  
Who	  were	   the	  main	  actors	   that	  defined	  and	  promoted	  normative	  evolution	  within	  
the	  UN	  during	  UNAMIR?	  Who	  were	   the	  main	   actors	   that	  were	   capable	   of	   demonstrating	  
normative	  evolution	  on	   the	  ground?	  Was	  normative	  evolution	  at	   the	  UN	  during	  UNAMIR	  
motivated	  primarily	   by	   ideational	   influences	   or	  praxis-­‐challenges?	   Finally,	   did	  normative	  
evolution	  occur	  during	  UNAMIR	  through	  institutionalization	  or	  demonstration?	  
	  
	  
3.2	  Background:	  The	  POC	  Norm	  Prior	  to	  UNAMIR	  
	  
3.2.1	  National	  Context	  	  
	  
	  Intrastate	  war	  erupted	  in	  Rwanda	  on	  1	  October	  1990,	  when	  the	  Rwandan	  Patriotic	  
Front	   (RPF)	   invaded	  Rwanda	   from	  neighboring	  Uganda.	  The	  RPF	  was	   almost	   exclusively	  
comprised	   of	   exiled	   Tutsis,	   Rwanda’s	   minority	   ethnic	   group.	   The	   colonial	   powers	  
(specifically	   Belgium)	   had	   favored	   the	   Tutsis	   over	   Rwanda’s	   majority	   ethnic	   group,	   the	  
Hutus.	   The	   Belgians	   gave	   the	   Tutsis	   privileged	   positions	   in	   the	   government	   and	   on	   the	  
social	  strata.	  After	  decades	  of	  this	  exploitative	  system,	  ethnic	  identities	  in	  Rwanda	  became	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fixed,	  whereas	  before	  ethnic	  identities	  were	  more	  fluid	  and	  social	  mobility	  was	  possible.	  By	  
the	  time	  Rwanda	  gained	  its	  independence	  in	  1962,	  nearly	  120,000	  Tutsis	  had	  already	  fled	  
the	   central	   African	   nation,	   fearing	   violent	   reprisals	   by	   the	   Hutus.111	   By	   the	   late	   1980s,	  
“some	  480,000	  Rwandans—approximately	  7	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total	  population,	  and	  roughly	  
half	   of	   the	  Tutsi	   community—had	  become	   refugees,”	   but	   the	  Hutu	   leadership	  of	  Rwanda	  
refused	  their	  right	  to	  repatriation.112	  War	  began	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  diplomatic	  efforts	  to	  secure	  
repatriation	  and	  create	  a	  multi-­‐party	  governance	  system	  in	  Rwanda.	  	  
After	  nearly	   three	  years	  of	  war,	   the	  President	  of	  Rwanda	  and	   the	  Chairman	  of	   the	  
RPF	  signed	  the	  Arusha	  Peace	  Agreement.	  But	  the	  agreement	  crumbled	  in	  April	  1994	  when	  
Hutu	   extremists	   from	   the	   Rwandan	   government	   initiated	   an	   organized,	   devastating	  
genocide	   against	   the	   Tutsis	   and	   moderate	   Hutus.	   During	   this	   government-­‐led	   campaign	  
against	  civilians,	  an	  estimated	  800,000	  Tutsis	  and	  moderate	  Hutus	  would	  die	  over	  a	  period	  
of	  100	  days.	  	  
	  
3.2.2	  International	  Context	  
	  
	   From	   14-­‐25	   June	   1993,	   the	   UN	   held	   the	   world	   conference	   on	   human	   rights	   in	  
Vienna,	   Austria.	   The	   resulting	   document,	   the	   Vienna	  Declaration	   and	   Program	   of	   Action,	  
articulated	   the	  beliefs	   of	   the	  UN	  and	  171	  of	   its	  member	   states	   concerning	  human	   rights.	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  rights	  of	  civilians	  during	  conflict,	  the	  Vienna	  Declaration	  of	  Program	  and	  
Action	   argued	   that	   the	   UN	   should	   assume	   “a	   more	   active	   role	   in	   the	   promotion	   and	  
protection	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  ensuring	  full	  respect	  for	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  in	  all	  
situations	   of	   armed	   conflict,	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   purposes	   and	   principles	   of	   the	  
Charter.”113	  It	  called	  upon	  its	  member	  states	  to	  observe	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  as	  
set	   forth	   by	   the	   Geneva	   Conventions	   of	   1949	   and	   to	   assist	   the	   UN	   in	   strengthening	  
mechanisms	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  children114	  and	  women115	  during	  armed	  conflict.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Boutros	  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  The	  United	  Nations	  and	  Rwanda	  1993-­1996	  (New	  York:	  United	  Nations	  Department	  
of	  Public	  Information,	  1996),	  9.	  	  
112	  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  The	  United	  Nations	  and	  Rwanda	  1993-­1996,	  11.	  	  
113	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly,	  Vienna	  Declaration	  of	  Program	  and	  Action,	  A/CONF.157/23,	  12	  July	  
1993,	  paragraph	  96.	  
114	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly,	  Vienna	  Declaration	  of	  Program	  and	  Action,	  Paragraph	  21.	  
115	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly,	  Vienna	  Declaration	  of	  Program	  and	  Action,	  Paragraph	  38.	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   The	   US	   was	   one	   of	   the	   171	   member	   states	   to	   sign	   the	   Vienna	   Declaration	   and	  
Program	  of	  Action.	  By	  mid-­‐1993,	  however,	  American	  enthusiasm	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  force	  
to	  protect	  civilians	  had	  actually	  begun	  to	  wane.	  The	  US	  (who	  was	  footing	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  
UN’s	   bills	   and	   owed	   half	   a	   billion	   dollars	   to	   the	   UN	   in	   dues	   and	   peacekeeping	   costs116)	  
began	   to	   recalibrate	   its	   expectations	   from	   peace	   missions	   after	   UN	   peace	   soldiers	  
experienced	  difficulties	  implementing	  POC	  objectives	  in	  Somalia.	  The	  US	  not	  only	  believed	  
that	  it	  should	  limit	  its	  own	  involvement	  in	  UN	  peace	  missions,	  but	  also	  that	  the	  UN	  should	  
scale	   back	   the	   number	   of	   peace	   missions	   it	   deployed	   each	   year.	   In	   his	   first	   speech	   as	  
American	   President	   to	   the	   UN	   General	   Assembly	   on	   28	   September	   1993,	   Bill	   Clinton	  
argued,	  “The	  UN	  simply	  cannot	  become	  engaged	  in	  every	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  conflicts…If	  the	  
American	  people	  are	  to	  say	  yes	  to	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  the	  UN	  must	  know	  when	  to	  say	  no.”117	  
The	  US	  began	  to	  actively	  lobby	  other	  nations	  to	  lessen	  their	  support	  for	  UN	  peace	  missions,	  
particularly	  the	  nations	  on	  the	  Security	  Council.	  The	  decisions	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  after	  
1989	   remained	   strongly	   influenced	  by	   the	  US,	  despite	   evidence	   that	   the	  Security	  Council	  
was	  becoming	  a	  more	  democratic	  organ.118	  	  
	   Without	  military	  support	  from	  the	  US,	  the	  UN	  had	  to	  admit	  that	  its	  peace	  soldiers	  in	  
the	  field	  would	  be	  able	  to	  accomplish	  few	  tasks	  beyond	  monitoring	  cease-­‐fires.	  Moreover,	  
after	  its	  failures	  in	  Somalia,	  the	  UN	  began	  to	  espouse	  a	  new	  mentality	  concerning	  the	  use	  of	  
force	  during	  peace	  missions.	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  argued,	  “To	  use	  force	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  failure.	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  Samantha	  Power,	  A	  Problem	  from	  Hell:	  America	  and	  the	  Age	  of	  Genocide	  (New	  York:	  HarperCollins	  
Publishers,	  2002),	  341.	  
117	  Melvern,	  The	  Ultimate	  Crime:	  Who	  Betrayed	  the	  UN	  and	  Why,	  326-­‐327.	  	  
118	  After	  the	  thawing	  of	  Cold	  War	  tensions,	  the	  Security	  Council	  met	  more	  frequently.	  For	  example,	  “from	  
1988	  to	  1993,	  the	  Council’s	  total	  number	  of	  meetings	  and	  consultations	  grew	  nearly	  fourfold	  while	  its	  total	  
resolutions	  and	  presidential	  statements	  increased	  more	  than	  sixfold”	  (Paul,	  “Working	  with	  Nongovernmental	  
Organizations,”	  374).	  It	  also	  met	  concerning	  broader	  thematic	  issues	  of	  international	  peace	  and	  security.	  It	  
became	  more	  cooperative,	  indicated	  by	  the	  sharp	  decline	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  veto	  by	  the	  P-­‐5	  and	  marked	  
increase	  in	  Chapter	  VII	  authorizations	  after	  1989.	  “Only	  12	  substantive	  vetoes	  were	  invoked	  from	  January	  
1990	  to	  June	  2003,	  compared	  to	  193	  during	  the	  first	  forty-­‐five	  years	  of	  the	  UN’s	  history”	  (David	  Malone,	  
“Introduction,”	  in	  The	  UN	  Security	  Council:	  From	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  the	  21st	  Century,	  ed.	  David	  Malone	  
(Boulder,	  CO:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  2004),	  7).	  And,	  beginning	  in	  May	  1990,	  the	  Security	  Council	  avoided	  
the	  use	  of	  the	  veto	  for	  three	  entire	  years	  (Thomas	  Weiss,	  David	  Forsythe	  and	  Roger	  Coate,	  The	  United	  Nations	  
and	  Changing	  World	  Politics	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Westview	  Press,	  1994),	  93.	  Thus,	  the	  Security	  Council	  became	  a	  
forum	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  UN	  policies	  and	  agendas	  (Peter	  Wallenstein	  and	  Patrik	  Johansson,	  “Security	  
Council	  Decisions	  in	  Perspective,”	  in	  The	  UN	  Security	  Council:	  From	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  the	  21st	  Century,	  ed.	  David	  
Malone	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  2004),	  30).	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Our	   job	   is	   diplomacy,	   the	  peaceful	   resolution	  of	   disputes.”119	  The	   importance	  of	   consent,	  
impartiality	  and	  neutrality	  during	  peace	  missions	  was	  reaffirmed	  by	  the	  UN.	  	  	  
	   	  In	  summation,	  challenges	  in	  implementing	  broader	  POC	  objectives	  during	  UN	  peace	  
missions	  in	  Somalia	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  US’	  and	  UN’s	  enthusiasm	  regarding	  the	  
use	  of	  force	  to	  protect	  civilians	  during	  conflict.	  	  The	  return	  to	  the	  belief	  in	  non-­‐use	  of	  force	  
expect	  in	  self-­‐defense	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  POC	  norm	  leading	  up	  to	  UNAMIR.	  The	  
following	  sections	  explore	  which	  actors,	  motives	  and	  mechanisms	  were	  most	  responsible	  





	   This	  section	  explores	  which	  actors	  were	  most	  responsible	   for	  normative	  evolution	  
during	   UNAMIR.	   Who	   were	   the	   main	   actors	   that	   defined	   and	   promoted	   normative	  
evolution	  within	   the	  UN?	  Who	  were	   the	  main	  actors	   that	  were	   capable	  of	  demonstrating	  
normative	  evolution	  on	  the	  ground?	  
On	  4	  August	  1993,	  the	  government	  of	  Rwanda	  and	  the	  RPF	  signed	  the	  Arusha	  Peace	  
Agreement,	  which	   called	   upon	   the	  UN	   to	   assist	   Rwanda	  with	   its	   transition.	   The	   Security	  
Council	   authorized	   UNAMIR	   I	   on	   5	   October	   1993	   in	   accord	   with	   Chapter	   VI	   of	   the	   UN	  
Charter.120	  UNAMIR’s	  main	  objective	  was	  to	  monitor	  the	  new	  peace	  between	  the	  Rwandan	  
Government	  and	  the	  RPF	  as	  set	  forth	  by	  the	  Arusha	  Accords.	  UNAMIR’s	  Force	  Commander,	  
Romeo	   Dallaire,	   argued	   that	   4,500	   troops	   would	   be	   a	   responsible	   minimum.121	   The	   US	  
hoped	  to	  send	  as	   few	  as	  100	  to	  300	  peacekeepers,	   though	  American	   intelligence	  analysts	  
were	  aware	  that	  a	  large-­‐scale	  ethnic	  conflict	  could	  emerge	  in	  Rwanda.122	  Two	  days	  earlier,	  
eighteen	  American	  soldiers	  had	  died	  while	   conducting	  an	  operation	   for	  UNOSOM	   II.	  As	  a	  
result,	   the	  US	  became	  wary	  of	  crossing	  the	   ‘Mogadishu	  line,’	  “the	  dangerous	  tipping	  point	  
where	   peacekeeping	   became	   peace	   enforcement.”123	   The	   US,	   along	   with	   the	   United	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  Georgie	  Anne	  Geyer,	  “The	  World	  as	  Viewed	  from	  the	  UN	  Helm,”	  Washington	  Times,	  3	  April	  1994.	  	  
120	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/872,	  5	  October	  1993.	  
121	  Linda	  Melvern,	  Conspiracy	  to	  Murder:	  The	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  (London:	  Verso,	  2004),	  67.	  
122	  Power,	  A	  Problem	  from	  Hell:	  America	  and	  the	  Age	  of	  Genocide,	  338.	  	  
123	  Michael	  Barnett,	  Eyewitness	  to	  a	  Genocide	  (Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  44.	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Kingdom	   (UK),	   put	   pressure	   on	   the	   Security	   Council	   to	   cut	   costs	   and	   limit	   UNAMIR’s	  
responsibilities.	   A	   compromise	   of	   2,548	   soldiers	   was	   reached.124	   UNAMIR	   soldiers	   were	  
authorized	   to	   assist	   with	   the	   coordination	   of	   humanitarian	   aid,	   but	   they	   were	   not	  
authorized	  to	  use	  force	  beyond	  self-­‐defense.	  	  
Thus,	   largely	   because	   of	   the	   US,	   UNAMIR	   I	   was	   understaffed	   from	   the	   outset.	   In	  
addition,	  the	  mission	  was	  ill-­‐equipped	  because	  member	  states	  had	  refused	  to	  pay	  the	  DPKO	  
for	   basic	   equipment,125	   and	   the	   Force	   Commander	   was	   constantly	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   UN	  
Secretariat.	   Dallaire	   drafted	   more	   aggressive	   rules	   of	   engagement	   (ROE)	   for	   UNAMIR	   I,	  
which	  would	  allow	  the	  use	  of	  force	  to	  protect	  civilians	  under	  UN	  protection	  against	  attack	  
and	  to	  prevent	  any	  crime	  against	  humanity.126	  The	  DPKO	  did	  not	  approve	  Dallaire’s	  ROE,	  
despite	  compelling	  evidence	  that	  they	  would	  be	  necessary.127Moreover,	  the	  DPKO	  rejected	  
Dallaire’s	  request	  to	  raid	  weapons	  caches	  in	  Kigali	  and	  failed	  to	  pass	  Dallaire’s	  intelligence	  
regarding	   an	   impending	   massacre	   on	   to	   the	   Security	   Council.	   Instead,	   the	   DPKO	   urged	  
Dallaire	  to	  “avoid	  entering	  into	  a	  course	  of	  action	  that	  might	  lead	  to	  the	  use	  of	  force	  and	  to	  
unanticipated	  repercussions.”128	  
On	   5	   April	   1994,	   the	   Security	   Council	   renewed	   the	  mandate	   of	   UNAMIR	   I	   on	   the	  
condition	   that	   progress	   be	  made	   over	   the	   next	   six	  weeks	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   transitional	  
institutions	  provided	  for	  under	  the	  Arusha	  Peace	  Agreement.129	  The	  next	  day,	  the	  genocide	  
began	  and	  the	  war	  reignited.	  In	  New	  York,	  the	  Security	  Council	  was	  divided	  over	  UNAMIR’s	  
future.	  During	  the	  first	   four	  weeks	  of	  the	  genocide,	  some	  non-­‐permanent	  members	  of	  the	  
Security	  Council	  were	  in	  favor	  of	  extending	  and	  expanding	  UNAMIR’s	  mandate.	  The	  African	  
Group	  met	  with	   the	   Council	   on	   12	  April	   and	   encouraged	   them	   to	   take	  military	   action	   to	  
protect	  civilians	  in	  Rwanda.	  By	  this	  time,	  Dallaire	  had	  confirmed	  that	  the	  killings	  in	  Rwanda	  
constituted	   crimes	   against	   humanity,	   at	   the	   very	   least,	   and	   he	   requested	  more	   troops	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  Ibid.	  
125	  Melvern,	  Conspiracy	  to	  Murder:	  The	  Rwandan	  Genocide,	  74.	  
126	  Trevor	  Findlay,	  The	  Use	  of	  Force	  in	  Peace	  Operations	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  277-­‐278.	  
127	  For	  example,	  on	  11	  January	  1994,	  Dallaire	  sent	  information	  to	  UN	  Headquarters	  given	  to	  him	  by	  an	  
informant,	  who	  was	  formerly	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  President’s	  guard	  and	  had	  become	  a	  senior	  trainer	  
for	  the	  Hutu	  extremists.	  The	  informant	  admitted	  that	  he	  had	  been	  training	  Hutu	  extremists	  for	  what	  could	  
only	  be	  genocide,	  considering	  he	  had	  also	  been	  ordered	  to	  register	  all	  Tutsis	  within	  Kigali,	  Rwanda’s	  capital.	  
He	  warned	  that	  the	  Hutu	  extremists	  were	  capable	  of	  killing	  1,000	  Tutsis	  in	  only	  twenty	  minutes	  (Barnett,	  
Eyewitness	  to	  a	  Genocide,	  78).	  	  
128	  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  The	  United	  Nations	  and	  Rwanda	  1993-­1996,	  32.	   	  
129	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/909,	  5	  April	  1994.	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order	   to	   protect	   civilians.	   A	   few	   strongholds	   guarded	   by	   UNAMIR	   I	   had	   indeed	   formed	  
throughout	  Rwanda,	  and	  thousands	  of	  civilians	  had	  made	  their	  way	  to	  these	  strongholds.130	  
But	   some	   of	   the	   permanent	   members	   of	   the	   Security	   Council	   adamantly	   opposed	  
strengthening	  UNAMIR	   in	  order	   to	  protect	  Rwandan	  civilians,	  preferring	   instead	   to	   leave	  
all	  POC	  measures	   to	  humanitarian	  workers.	  Humanitarian	  agencies	   such	  as	   the	   ICRC	  and	  
MSF	   were	   anticipating	   civilian	   casualties	   on	   a	   large	   scale	   and	   had	   already	   begun	   to	  
stockpile	  medicines	  and	  water	  in	  Kigali.131	  
On	   7	   April	   1994,	   the	   incumbent	   Rwandan	   Prime	  Minister	  was	   brutally	  murdered	  
along	  with	  the	  ten	  Belgian	  peacekeepers	  protecting	  her.	  By	  April	  12,	  Belgium	  informed	  the	  
UN	  that	  it	  would	  be	  withdrawing	  its	  troops	  from	  Rwanda	  in	  light	  of	  the	  event.	  Belgium	  did	  
not	   want	   to	   withdraw	   on	   its	   own,	   and	   so	   it	   convinced	   France,	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   US	   that	  
withdrawal	  was	  UNAMIR’s	  best	  option.132	  The	  US	  then	  lobbied	  other	  nations	  to	  reject	  the	  
reinforcement	  of	  UNAMIR.133	  The	  Security	  Council	  voted	  unanimously	   to	   scale	  UNAMIR	   I	  
back	   to	   a	   paltry	   270	   troops,	   whose	   principal	   mission	   was	   the	   “act	   as	   an	   intermediary	  
between	   the	   parties	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   secure	   their	   agreement	   to	   a	   cease-­‐fire.”134	  Without	  
support	  from	  the	  Secretariat	  or	  the	  permanent	  five	  (P-­‐5),	  the	  weaker	  members	  of	  the	  UNSC	  
in	  favor	  of	  intervention	  were	  forced	  to	  concede	  that	  leaving	  a	  small	  contingency	  was	  better	  
than	  total	  withdrawal.	  	  
One	  week	   later,	   Boutros-­‐Ghali	  wrote	   to	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Security	   Council	   and	  
expressed	   his	   regret	   at	   the	   Council’s	   decision	   and	   asked	   them	   to	   authorize	   the	  
establishment	  of	  UNAMIR	  II.	  UNAMIR	  II	  would	  have	  a	  troop	  strength	  of	  5,500,	  and	  it	  would	  
be	  authorized	  “to	  contribute	  to	  the	  security	  and	  protection	  of	  displaced	  persons,	  refugees	  
and	   civilians	   at	   risk	   in	   Rwanda,	   including	   through	   the	   establishment	   and	   maintenance,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  For	  example,	  on	  16	  April	  UNAMIR	  sent	  a	  cable	  informing	  Headquarters	  that	  UNAMIR	  guarded	  the	  lives	  of	  
5,000	  civilians	  in	  Amahoro	  stadium,	  the	  majority	  being	  orphaned	  children	  under	  the	  age	  of	  fifteen.	  	  Dallaire	  
asked	  for	  5,500	  soldiers	  to	  help	  protect	  these	  strongholds.	  The	  Czech	  Republic,	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Nigeria	  
were	  in	  favor	  (Linda	  Melvern,	  A	  People	  Betrayed:	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  West	  in	  Rwanda’s	  Genocide,	  (London:	  Zed	  
Books,	  2000),	  162).	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  Melvern,	  Conspiracy	  to	  Murder:	  The	  Rwandan	  Genocide,	  101-­‐102.	  
132	  Melvern,	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  Genocide,	  215.	  
133	  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  Unvanquished:	  A	  US-­UN	  Saga,	  135	  
134	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/912,	  21	  April	  1994.	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where	  feasible,	  of	  secure	  humanitarian	  areas”	  and	  “to	  provide	  security	  and	  support	  for	  the	  
distribution	  of	  relief	  supplies	  and	  humanitarian	  relief	  operations.”135	  	  
By	   this	   time,	   it	  was	  becoming	  difficult	   for	   the	  UN	   to	  deny	   the	   reports	  of	   genocide	  
coming	  from	  NGOs.136	  However,	  the	  US	  refused	  to	  allow	  the	  UN	  to	  use	  the	  word	  genocide	  to	  
describe	  the	  killings	   in	  Rwanda.	  While	   its	  veto	  alone	  would	  have	  been	  enough	  to	  prevent	  
more	  robust	  intervention,	  the	  US	  also	  succeeded	  in	  persuading	  other	  nation-­‐states	  to	  veto	  
stronger	  intervention	  in	  Rwanda	  as	  well.	  Employing	  the	  term	  genocide	  would	  have	  obliged	  
the	  US	  to	  act	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  1948	  Geneva	  Convention,	  and	  the	  US	  did	  not	  support	  
the	   use	   of	   force	   to	   protect	   civilians	   in	   Rwanda.	   Some	   non-­‐permanent	   members	   of	   the	  
Security	  Council	  were	  in	  favor	  of	  using	  the	  word,	  but	  the	  US	  veto	  blocked	  them	  from	  using	  
it	  in	  any	  official	  UN	  statement.	  It	  was	  only	  six	  weeks	  after	  the	  genocide	  began	  that	  the	  US	  
could	  no	  longer	  avoid	  using	  the	  term	  and	  allowed	  the	  creation	  of	  UNAMIR	  II	  under	  Chapter	  
VI	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter.137	  It	  was	  recognized	  “that	  UNAMIR	  may	  be	  required	  to	  take	  action	  in	  
self-­‐defence	   against	   persons	   or	   groups	   who	   threaten	   protected	   sites	   and	   populations,	  
United	   Nations	   and	   other	   humanitarian	   personnel	   or	   the	   means	   of	   delivery	   and	  
distribution	   of	   humanitarian	   relief,”	   but	  UNAMIR	   II	   troops	  were	  not	   granted	  Chapter	  VII	  
authorization	  to	  protect	  the	  safe	  areas.138	  
The	   launch	   of	  UNAMIR	   II	  was	   delayed	   because	   the	  UN’s	   strongest	  member	   states	  
were	   hesitant	   to	   provide	   troops.	   The	  member	   states	   that	   did	   pledge	   troops	  were	   not	   in	  
possession	  of	  the	  proper	  military	  equipment,	  and	  soliciting	  from	  better-­‐equipped	  member	  
states	  proved	  time-­‐consuming.	  France	  offered	  to	  send	  a	  force	  of	  2,500	  that	  would	  set	  up	  a	  
safe	  zone	  in	  South-­‐West	  Rwanda	  on	  the	  border	  with	  Zaire	  (today	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  
of	   Congo)	   while	   UNAMIR	   II	   waited	   on	   troops	   and	   equipment.	   The	   Security	   Council	  
approved	  French-­‐led	  Operation	  Turquoise	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  authorizing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/918,	  17	  May	  1994.	  
136	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (HRW)	  had	  estimated	  that	  at	  least	  100,000	  Rwandans	  were	  dead,	  and	  it	  implored	  the	  
Security	  Council	  to	  begin	  using	  the	  term	  genocide.	  The	  ICRC	  estimated	  that	  as	  many	  as	  300,000	  were	  dead,	  
while	  Oxfam	  warned	  that	  these	  estimates	  were	  too	  low	  and	  as	  many	  as	  500,000	  Rwandans	  were	  missing	  
(Power,	  A	  Problem	  from	  Hell:	  America	  and	  the	  Age	  of	  Genocide,	  357).	  	  
137	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/918,	  17	  May	  1994.	  
138	  Ibid.	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the	   forces	   to	  use	  all	  necessary	  means	   to	  protect	  refugees	  at	  risk	  and	  provide	  security	   for	  
humanitarian	  operations.139	  	  
By	  November,	   the	  UN	  and	   the	   governments	   of	   its	  member	   states	   had	   all	   officially	  
recognized	  that	  the	  killings	  in	  Rwanda	  constituted	  genocide,	  but	  by	  this	  time	  the	  genocide	  
was	   over.	   On	   8	   November	   1994,	   the	   Security	   Council	   authorized	   the	   creation	   of	   the	  
International	   Criminal	   Tribunal	   for	   Rwanda	   (ICTR)	   to	   prosecute	   those	   responsible	   for	  
genocide	  and	  other	  crimes	  against	  IHL.140	  A	  year	  and	  a	  half	  earlier,	  the	  Security	  Council	  had	  
authorized	  a	  similar	  tribunal	  for	  former	  Yugoslavia	  (ICTY).	  The	  UN’s	  shame	  over	  its	  failures	  
in	  Bosnia	  and	  Rwanda	  “was	  channeled	  into	  a	  determination	  to	  ensure	  accountability	  for	  the	  
perpetrators	   of	   atrocities.”141	   In	   June	   1995,	   the	   Security	   Council	   voted	   to	   adjust	   the	  
mandate	  of	  UNAMIR	  II	  to	  assist	  the	  Rwandans	  in	  rebuilding	  their	  war-­‐torn	  nation.142	  Tasks	  
included	   helping	   Rwandans	   achieve	   many	   peace-­‐building	   objectives:	   national	  
reconciliation,	  repatriate	  and	  reintegrate	  refugees,	  rebuild	  trust	  in	  the	  military	  and	  police,	  
support	  the	  provision	  of	  humanitarian	  aid	  and	  provide	  security	  for	  humanitarian	  agencies	  
operating	  in	  the	  country	  and	  for	  the	  ICTR.143	  Thus,	  it	  was	  only	  well	  after	  the	  genocide	  had	  
ended	  that	  the	  UN	  introduced	  broader	  elements	  of	  POC	  to	  UNAMIR.	  UNAMIR	  II	  continued	  
operations	  in	  Rwanda	  until	  April	  1996.	  	  
	   In	  summation,	  throughout	  the	  majority	  of	  UNAMIR,	  normative	  evolution	  was	  stalled	  
because	   the	   UN	   refused	   to	   authorize	   the	   use	   of	   force	   for	   anything	   beyond	   self-­‐defense,	  
including	   the	   protection	   of	   civilians	   in	   safe	   areas	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   humanitarian	  
supplies	  or	  personnel.	  The	  UN	  Secretariat,	  specifically	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  and	  the	  DPKO	  
(with	   the	   exception	   of	   Dallaire),	   downplayed	   the	   need	   for	   militarized	   POC	   measures	   in	  
Rwanda.	   The	   P-­‐5,	   most	   specifically	   the	   US,	   vetoed	   any	   suggestion	   that	   UNAMIR	   be	  
authorized	  to	  use	  force	  to	  protect	  civilians,	  even	  after	  the	  genocide	  began	  and	  the	  accounts	  
of	   Dallaire,	   the	   RPF	   and	   NGOs	   were	   confirmed.	   The	   only	   actor	   willing	   to	   use	   force	   to	  
demonstrate	  POC	  objectives	  was	  France.	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  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/929,	  22	  June	  1994.	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  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/955,	  8	  November	  1994.	  	  
141	  Rosa	  Brooks,	  “The	  UN	  Security	  Council	  and	  Civilian	  Protection,”	  in	  The	  UN	  Security	  Council	  in	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  Age	  of	  
Human	  Rights,	  eds.	  Jared	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  and	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  York:	  Cambridge	  University	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  2013),	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  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/997,	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  June	  1995.	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  Ibid.	  




	   This	   section	   explores	   which	   motives	   best	   explain	   normative	   evolution	   during	  
UNAMIR.	   Was	   normative	   evolution	   at	   the	   UN	   during	   UNAMIR	   motivated	   primarily	   by	  
ideational	  influences	  or	  praxis-­‐challenges?	  
	   The	  UN	   and	   its	  member	   states	  were	   presented	  with	  multiple	   opportunities	   to	   act	  
upon	   its	   ideational	   commitments	   articulated	   in	   An	   Agenda	   for	   Peace	   and	   the	   Vienna	  
Declaration	  prior	  to	  and	  throughout	  UNAMIR	  I.	  Even	  before	  the	  creation	  of	  UNAMIR	  I,	  a	  UN	  
Special	  Rapporteur	  visited	  Rwanda	  from	  8-­‐17	  April	  1993	  and	  confirmed	  that	  thousands	  of	  
Rwandan	  civilians	  had	  been	  the	  victims	  of	  unjust	  executions	  and	  massacres.144	  The	  Special	  
Rapporteur	  reported	  that	  the	  massacres	  in	  Rwanda	  partially	  fit	  the	  description	  of	  genocide	  
put	   forward	   by	   the	   Convention	   on	   the	   Prevention	   and	   Punishment	   of	   the	   Crime	   of	  
Genocide,145	   and	  he	   recommended	   that	   the	  UN	   immediately	   set	  up	  a	   “mechanism	   for	   the	  
protection	   of	   civilian	   populations	   against	   massacres.”146	   However,	   the	   UN	   ignored	  
intelligence	  reports	  foretelling	  ethnic	  violence,	  and	  it	  also	  disregarded	  the	  RPF’s	  appeals	  for	  
a	  Western	  response	  after	  the	  genocide	  began.147	  	  
Instead	   of	   being	   motivated	   by	   ideological	   influences	   to	   intervene	   during	   the	  
genocide,	   the	   UN	  was	  motivated	   by	   praxis-­‐challenges	   to	   curb	   its	   involvement.	   First,	   the	  
UN’s	   enthusiasm	   for	   large,	   multidimensional	   peace	   missions	   was	   waning	   because	   its	  
resources	   for	   peacekeeping	  were	   becoming	   exhausted.	   From	   1989	   to	   1992,	   the	   Security	  
Council	   had	   authorized	   thirteen	   new	   peace	   missions.	   During	   that	   same	   time,	   the	  
peacekeeping	  budget	  rose	  eightfold,	  with	  nearly	  73,000	  peacekeepers	   in	  the	  field.148	  And,	  
despite	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  DPKO,	  the	  UN	  was	  struggling	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  workload	  because	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  United	  Nations	  Special	  Rapporteur,	  E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1,	  11	  August	  1993,	  paragraph	  28.	  
145	  United	  Nations	  Special	  Rapporteur,	  E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1,	  11	  August	  1993,	  paragraph	  78-­‐79.	  
146	  United	  Nations	  Special	  Rapporteur,	  E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1,	  11	  August	  1993,	  paragraph	  64.	  
147	  The	  RPF	  Representative,	  Claude	  Dusaidi,	  wrote	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  and	  Security	  Council	  on	  23	  April	  
1994.	  He	  argued,	  “When	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  UN	  was	  created	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  one	  of	  its	  
fundamental	  objectives	  was	  to	  see	  to	  it	  that	  what	  happened	  to	  the	  Jews	  in	  Nazi	  Germany	  would	  never	  happen	  
again	  (Melvern,	  A	  People	  Betrayed,	  177).	  	  
148	  Barnett,	  Eyewitness	  to	  Genocide,	  29.	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“the	   number	   of	   staff	   committed	   to	   peacekeeping	   operations	   had	   not	   changed	   since	  
1987.”149	  
Second,	  problems	  using	  military	  actors	  to	  achieve	  POC	  objectives	  in	  Somalia	  curbed	  
the	   UN’s	   enthusiasm	   for	   protecting	   civilians	   during	   conflict,	   especially	   because	   these	  
problems	  attracted	  criticism	  to	  the	  organization.	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  worried	  about	  maintaining	  
the	  UN’s	  credibility,	  and	  so	  the	  thinking	  at	  time	  “was	  that	  the	  UN	  should	  put	  its	  good	  name	  
on	   the	   line	   only	   when	   it	   had	   a	   reasonable	   chance	   of	   success.”150	   The	   Security	   Council	  
initally	   authorized	   UNAMIR	   because	   it	   believed	   that	  monitoring	   the	   peace	   agreement	   in	  
Rwanda	   would	   be	   straightforward.	   The	   Security	   Council,	   along	   with	   the	   DPKO,	   felt	   that	  
Rwanda	   presented	   a	  much-­‐needed	   opportunity	   for	   the	   UN	   to	   bolster	   its	   own	   credibility	  
with	   a	  peacekeeping	   ‘victory.’151	  Thus,	   even	   after	   the	   genocide	  began,	   the	  UN	  Secretariat	  
refused	   to	   support	   efforts	   to	   authorize	   UNAMIR	   to	   protect	   civilians	   on	   the	   basis	   that	  
addressing	  anything	  in	  Rwanda	  beyond	  a	  cease-­‐fire	  would	  be	  too	  difficult,	  and	  subsequent	  
failures	  would	  occur	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  organization.	  	  
Third,	  the	  UN	  was	  unable	  to	  take	  on	  multidimensional	  peace	  missions	  because	  the	  
US	  refused	  to	  authorize	  their	  creation.	  For	  the	  US,	  the	  deaths	  of	  the	  Belgian	  peace	  soldiers	  
in	   Rwanda	   proved	   that	   UNAMIR	   would	   suffer	   the	   same	   difficulties	   as	   UNOSOM.152	  
Moreover,	  by	  early	  1994,	   the	  US	  was	  well	  under	  way	  with	   the	  production	  of	  Presidential	  
Directive	  Decision	  25	   (PDD-­‐25),	  which	  would	  eventually	   comprise	  of	   sixteen	   factors	   that	  
the	  US	  had	  to	  consider	  when	  deciding	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  support	  a	  peace	  mission.	  Among	  
them	   were	   provisions	   to	   prohibit	   US	   involvement	   in	   missions	   that	   did	   not	   advance	   US	  
interests.	   Although	   the	   US	   did	   not	   publicly	   release	   PDD-­‐25	   until	   3	   May	   1994,	   “the	  
considerations	   encapsulated	   in	   the	   doctrine	   and	   the	   administration’s	   frustration	   with	  
peacekeeping	   greatly	   influenced	   the	   thinking	   of	   US	   officials	   involved	   in	   shaping	   Rwanda	  
policy.”153	  The	  US	  also	  encouraged	  other	  member	  states	  on	  the	  Security	  Council	   to	  refuse	  
authorization	  for	  POC	  measures.	  The	  US,	  and	  specifically	  the	  Pentagon,	  feared	  that	  a	  small	  
enforcement	   operation	  with	  humanitarian	   intentions	  would	   end	  with	  Americans	   funding	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and	  fighting	  a	  large,	  costly	  peace	  mission.154	  This	  was	  another	  lesson	  of	  Somalia,	  where	  US	  
soldiers	  died	  in	  Mogadishu	  attempting	  to	  save	  the	  beleaguered	  Pakistanis.155	  	  
By	  mid-­‐May	  1994,	   however,	   it	  was	   clear	   that	   the	  UN’s	   failure	   to	   react	   swiftly	   and	  
severely	   to	   the	   Rwandan	   genocide	   would	   prove	   a	   scandalous	   embarrassment	   to	   the	  
organization.	  But	  because	  of	  the	  UN’s	   failures	   in	  Somalia,	   the	  Security	  Council	  was	  still	   in	  
“no	  mood	  to	  pledge	  enforcement	  action	  in	  another	  part	  of	  the	  world,	  especially	  where	  the	  
most	   power	   members	   of	   the	   [C]ouncil	   did	   not	   have	   strategic	   interests.”156	   Instead,	   it	  
authorized	   Operation	   Turquoise	   under	   Chapter	   VII	   because	   it	   would	   bear	   no	   blame	   for	  
France’s	  failures,	  and	  it	  eventually	  included	  POC	  measures	  and	  peace-­‐building	  objectives	  in	  
UNAMIR	   II’s	  mandate	   in	   order	   to	   belatedly	   uphold	   its	   ideational	   commitments	   as	   a	   self-­‐
proclaimed	  protector	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era.	  	  
Thus,	   while	   shaping	   UNAMIR’s	   POC	   agenda,	   the	   UN	   was	   motivated	   by	   praxis-­‐
challenges	   to	   stall	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   POC	   norm,	   including	   motives	   of	   protection	   of	  





	   This	  section	  explores	  the	  mechanisms	  behind	  normative	  evolution	  during	  UNAMIR.	  
Did	   normative	   evolution	   occur	   during	   UNAMIR	   primarily	   through	   institutionalization	   or	  
demonstration?	  
There	  was	   no	   normative	   evolution	   during	   UNAMIR.	   The	   UN	   gradually	   introduced	  
POC	   measures	   to	   the	   mandate	   of	   UNAMIR,	   but	   each	   of	   these	   POC	   measures	   had	   been	  
institutionalized	  in	  the	  mandate	  of	  a	  previous	  peace	  mission.	  For	  example,	  at	  first,	  UNAMIR	  
was	  also	  authorized	  to	  assist	  with	  the	  coordination	  of	  humanitarian	  aid	  in	  conjunction	  with	  
relief	  operations.	  In	  May	  1994,	  Resolution	  918	  authorized	  UNAMIR	  troops	  to	  establish	  and	  
maintain	  safe	  areas	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  refugees	  and	  civilians	  at	  risk,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  provide	  
security	  for	  relief	  operations.	   In	  mid-­‐1995,	  the	  UN	  introduced	  peace-­‐building	  elements	  to	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the	  UNAMIR	  operation,	  and	  it	  authorized	  UNAMIR	  to	  provide	  security	  for	  the	  ICTR.157	  None	  
of	   these	   measures	   constituted	   normative	   evolution	   because	   the	   UN	   had	   authorized	  
UNOSOM	  and	  UNPROFOR	  troops	  to	  do	  these	  tasks	  at	  an	  earlier	  date.	  	  
It	   was	   nearly	   impossible	   for	   UNAMIR	   troops	   to	   demonstrate	   POC	   because	   the	  
Security	  Council	  consistently	  refused	  to	  authorize	  UNAMIR	  troops	  to	  use	  force	  beyond	  self-­‐
defense.	   Because	   the	   Security	   Council	   prioritized	   UNAMIR’s	   neutrality	   over	   its	   ability	   to	  
protect	   civilians,	   the	   UNAMIR	   troops	  were	   also	   denied	  more	   aggressive	   ROE.	   The	   DPKO	  
insisted	  that	  “rather	  than	  intervene	  to	  protect	  the	  population,	  all	  that	  the	  troops	  could	  do	  
was	   to	  patrol	   and	  be	   visible.”158	   In	   addition,	  UNAMIR	  did	  not	   have	   the	   troop	   strength	   to	  
demonstrate	  POC,	  rendering	  mandated	  POC	  objectives	  moot.	  For	  example,	  while	  Resolution	  
912	  granted	  UNAMIR	  authorization	  to	  protect	  civilians	  in	  their	  custody	  while	  the	  genocide	  
was	  still	  on-­‐going,	  it	  also	  reduced	  the	  size	  of	  UNAMIR	  to	  270	  troops.	  Predictably,	  “as	  soon	  
as	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  UNAMIR	  troops	  left	  Kigali,	  many	  of	  the	  civilians	  protected	  by	  them	  were	  
immediately	  killed.”159	  
UNAMIR	   demonstrated	   POC	   limitedly	   during	   Operation	   Turquoise	   and	   the	   ICTR,	  
both	   under	   Chapter	   VII	   of	   the	   UN	   Charter.	   However,	   both	   creations	   had	   flaws	   that	  
ultimately	   proved	   detrimental	   to	   POC.	   By	   the	   time	   Operation	   Turquoise	   became	  
operational,	   the	   genocide	   was	   largely	   over,	   though	   between	   fifteen	   and	   twenty-­‐five	  
thousand	  Tutsis	  found	  sanctuary	  in	  the	  French	  safe	  zone.160	  However,	  with	  the	  RPF	  closing	  
in	  on	  victory,	  thousands	  of	  Hutus	  were	  also	  fleeing	  Rwanda	  for	  this	  safe	  zone.	  The	  French	  
departed	   in	  August	  1994,	   amidst	   allegations	  of	  harboring	  war	   criminals	   and	  withholding	  
information	  regarding	   the	  genocidaires	   from	  the	  UN.161	  Dallaire	  believed	   that	   the	  French,	  
who	   had	   declared	   that	   their	   operation	  was	   a	   humanitarian	   one,	   had	   used	   humanitarian	  
rhetoric	  to	  mask	  political	  motivations;	  the	  French	  wanted	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  allies	  in	  the	  
Rwandan	  government	  escaped	  death	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  RPF.162	  Dallaire	  also	  argued	  that	  
Operation	  Turquoise	   seriously	  undermined	  UNAMIR’s	   own	   rescue	  units	   because	  Dallaire	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was	  obligated	  to	  send	  home	  his	  French-­‐speaking	  African	  officers	  for	  fear	  of	  RPF	  reprisals,	  
many	  of	  whom	  were	  team	  leaders	  on	  dozens	  of	  rescue	  missions.163	  While	  the	  ICTR	  focused	  
on	  locating	  and	  punishing	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  genocide,	  it	  did	  not	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  UN’s	  
own	  culpability.	  	  
After	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide,	  the	  UN	  avoided	  further	  institutionalization	  of	  POC.	  In	  
January	   1995,	   Boutros-­‐Ghali’s	   wrote	   the	   supplement	   to	   the	   Agenda	   for	   Peace,	   which	  
reflected	   upon	   challenges	   to	   UN	   peace	   missions	   unforeseen	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	   decade.	  	  
Boutros-­‐Ghali	  noted	  that	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era	  of	  peace	  missions	  proved	  that	  respect	  for	  
consent,	   impartiality	   and	   the	   non-­‐use	   of	   force	   except	   in	   self-­‐defense	   were	   critical	  
components	   to	   successful	   peace	   missions.164	   These	   principles	   were	   violated	   in	   order	   to	  
protect	  humanitarian	  operations,	  civilians	  and	  safe	  areas	  in	  Somalia	  and	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  
Boutros-­‐Ghali	   cautioned	   that	   the	   consequences	   of	   using	   force	   during	   peace	  missions	   for	  
purposes	   beyond	   self-­‐defense	  must	   be	   of	   greater	   concern.165	   In	  October	  1995,	   the	  DPKO	  
released	  its	  General	  Guidelines	  for	  Peacekeeping,	  which	  made	  only	  one	  uncritical	  reference	  
to	  POC	  and	  did	  not	  reference	  genocide,	  massacres	  or	  crimes	  against	  humanity.166	  In	  1996,	  
the	   DPKO	   produced	   the	   report	   Multidisciplinary	   Peacekeeping:	   Lessons	   from	   Recent	  
Experience,	  which	   also	   failed	   to	  mention	  genocide	  or	   crimes	   against	  humanity.167	   Finally,	  
that	   same	   year,	   the	  Department’s	   Peacekeeping	  Training	  Manual,	   nearly	   300	   pages	   long,	  
did	  not	  refer	  to	  POC	  either.168	  	  	  
	   Thus,	   there	   was	   little	   institutionalization	   or	   demonstration	   of	   the	   existing	   POC	  
agenda	   during	   UNAMIR,	   let	   alone	   of	   normative	   evolution.	   After	   UNAMIR,	   the	   UN	   made	  
conscious	   efforts	   to	   avoid	   further	   institutionalization	   of	   POC	   measures	   for	   its	   peace	  
missions.	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3.6	  Conclusion	  
	  
	   In	   summation,	   throughout	   UNAMIR,	   normative	   evolution	  was	   stalled	   because	   the	  
UN	   refused	   to	   authorize	   the	   use	   of	   force	   for	   anything	   beyond	   self-­‐defense,	   including	   the	  
protection	   of	   civilians	   in	   safe	   areas	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   humanitarian	   supplies	   or	  
personnel.	   POC	   objectives	   were	   gradually	   introduced	   to	   UNAMIR’s	   mandate,	   but	   these	  
objectives	   had	   been	   institutionalized	   and	   demonstrated	   during	   previous	   UN	   peace	  
missions.	  
	   The	  main	  actors	  responsible	  for	  stalling	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  POC	  norm	  were	  the	  UN	  
Secretariat,	   specifically	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   and	   the	   DPKO	   (with	   the	   exception	   of	  
Dallaire),	   and	   the	   P-­‐5.	   The	   UN	   Secretariat	   downplayed	   the	   humanitarian	   situation	   in	  
Rwanda	   as	   it	   was	   looming.	   And	   by	   denying	   Dallaire’s	   requests	   for	   stronger	   ROE	   and	  
refusing	   to	   pass	   on	  Dallaire’s	   intelligence	   reports	   to	   the	   Security	   Council,	   the	   Secretariat	  
made	  sure	  that	  UNAMIR	  did	  not	  adopt	  any	  objectives	  beyond	  its	  original	  military	  mandate.	  
But	  even	  after	  the	  genocide	  commenced,	  the	  Security	  Council	  refused	  to	  authorize	  the	  use	  
of	  force	  to	  protect	  civilians,	  safe	  areas	  or	  relief	  operations,	  leaving	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  
of	  innocent	  civilians	  unprotected	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  genocide.	  	  
	   These	  actors	  were	  motivated	  by	  praxis-­‐challenges	  to	  stall	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  POC	  
norm.	  For	  member	  states,	  particularly	  the	  US,	  memories	  of	  the	  UN’s	  failures	  in	  enforce	  POC	  
in	   Somalia	   made	   contributing	   troops	   or	   authorizing	   the	   use	   of	   force	   for	   another	   peace	  
mission	   seem	   disagreeable,	   especially	   a	   peace	   mission	   in	   Africa.	   For	   the	   UN,	   fear	   that	  
another	  peacekeeping	  failure	  would	  cripple	  the	  organization’s	  capacity	  to	  tackle	   issues	  of	  
peace	  and	  security	  in	  the	  future	  made	  expanding	  UNAMIR’s	  mandate	  beyond	  monitoring	  a	  
cease-­‐fire	  seem	  unreasonable.	  	  
Finally,	   there	   was	   little	   institutionalization	   or	   demonstration	   of	   the	   existing	   POC	  
agenda	   during	   UNAMIR,	   let	   alone	   of	   normative	   evolution.	   The	   only	   actor	   willing	   to	   use	  
force	   to	   demonstrate	   POC	   objectives	   was	   France,	   though	   one	   could	   argue	   that	   France	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Chapter	  4	  






	   From	  October	  1999	  to	  December	  2005,	  the	  UN	  conducted	  a	  peace	  mission	  in	  Sierra	  
Leone.	   The	   purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   explore	   how	   the	   POC	   norm	   evolved	   during	   the	  
course	   of	   UNAMSIL	   (October	   1999-­‐December	   2005)	   using	   the	   Constructivist	   framework	  
outlined	   in	   Chapter	   1.	   The	   objective	   is	   to	   determine	   the	   main	   actors,	   motives	   and	  
mechanisms	  responsible	  for	  normative	  evolution.	  First,	  I	  provide	  background	  information	  
that	  outlines	  the	  national	  and	  international	  context	  and	  explains	  the	  state	  of	  the	  POC	  norm	  
at	   the	   start	   of	   UNAMSIL.	   Then,	   I	   employ	   the	   following	   questions	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   the	  
stated	  objective:	  	  
Who	  were	   the	  main	  actors	   that	  defined	  and	  promoted	  normative	  evolution	  within	  
the	  UN	  during	  UNAMSIL?	  Who	  were	   the	  main	  actors	   that	  were	  capable	  of	  demonstrating	  
normative	  evolution	  on	  the	  ground?	  Was	  normative	  evolution	  at	  the	  UN	  during	  UNAMSIL	  
motivated	  primarily	   by	   ideational	   influences	   or	  praxis-­‐challenges?	   Finally,	   did	  normative	  
evolution	  occur	  during	  UNAMSIL	  through	  institutionalization	  or	  demonstration?	  
	  
	  
4.2	  Background:	  The	  POC	  Norm	  Prior	  to	  UNAMSIL	  
	  
4.2.1	  National	  Context	  
	  
	   On	   23	  March	   1991,	   intrastate	  war	   began	   in	   Sierra	   Leone	  when	   the	  Revolutionary	  
United	  Front	  (RUF)	  attempted	  to	  overthrow	  the	  government	  of	  Joseph	  Momoh.	  Formerly	  a	  
British	   Protectorate,	   Sierra	   Leone	   had	   suffered	   three	   decades	   of	   economic	   and	   state	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disintegration	  prior	  to	  the	  start	  of	  the	  civil	  war.169	  Life	  expectancy	  had	  dropped	  to	  38	  years,	  
adult	  literacy	  was	  a	  meager	  32%	  and	  the	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP)	  per	  capita	  was	  only	  
US	   $448.170	   The	   RUF	  was	   readily	   able	   to	   recruit	   Sierra	   Leonean	   youths,	   a	   generation	   of	  
uneducated,	  unemployed	  people,	  disillusioned	  by	   the	  national	   government.	  The	  RUF	  was	  
also	   easily	   able	   to	   acquire	   arms	   from	  Charles	   Taylor,	   the	   leader	   of	   neighboring	   Liberia’s	  
rebel	  group	  the	  National	  Patriotic	  Front	  of	  Liberia	  (NPFL).	  
	   The	   RUF’s	   eleven	   year	   rebellion	   against	   the	   Sierra	   Leonean	   government	   became	  
notorious	   for	   atrocities	   committed	   against	   civilians.	  During	   the	  war,	   nearly	  half	   of	   Sierra	  
Leone’s	  five	  million	  citizens	  would	  be	  displaced,	  70,000	  would	  perish,	  an	  estimated	  27,000	  
children	  would	  be	  enlisted	  as	  soldiers	  and	  another	  20,000	  civilians	  would	  be	  left	  maimed	  
as	  the	  result	  of	  violent	  amputation.171	  The	  rebel	  groups	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  majority	  
of	  attacks	  on	  civilians,	  though	  government	  forces	  were	  also	  guilty	  of	  committing	  atrocities	  
against	  civilians	  throughout	  the	  war.	  
	   	  
4.2.2	  International	  Context	  
	  
	   The	  international	  community’s	  guilt	  over	  its	  failure	  to	  save	  800,000	  Rwandans	  from	  
genocide	  deepened	  in	  July	  1995	  when	  Bosnian	  Serb	  troops	  took	  control	  of	  a	  safe	  area	  in	  the	  
Bosnian	  town	  of	  Srebrenica.	  The	  troops	  removed	  more	  than	  seven	  thousand	  men	  from	  the	  
safe	   area	   and	   executed	   them.	   The	   massacre	   was	   shocking	   not	   only	   because	   of	   the	  
magnitude	  of	  crimes	  committed,	  but	  also	  because	  soldiers	  from	  UNPROFOR	  and	  the	  North	  
Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO)	  present	  in	  the	  safe	  area	  did	  nothing	  to	  stop	  it.172	  	  
	   In	  1998,	  the	  international	  community	  was	  given	  a	  chance	  to	  redeem	  itself	  in	  former	  
Yugoslavia,	   when	   the	   Kosovo	   Liberation	   Army’s	   efforts	   to	   secede	   from	   Serbia	   became	  
violent	  and	  the	  Yugoslav	  authorities	  responded	  with	  excessive	   force,	  killing	  civilians.	  The	  
Security	   Council	   responded	   swiftly	  with	   Resolution	   1160,	   which	   condemned	   “the	   use	   of	  
excessive	  force	  by	  Serbian	  police	  forces	  against	  civilians	  and	  peaceful	  demonstrators”	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169	  John	  Hirsch,	  “War	  in	  Sierra	  Leone,”	  Survival	  43,	  3	  (2001),	  146.	  
170	  Mark	  Malan,	  Phenyo	  Rakate	  and	  Angela	  McIntyre,	  Peacekeeping	  in	  Sierra	  Leone:	  UNAMSIL	  Hits	  the	  Home	  
Straight	  (Pretoria:	  Institute	  for	  Security	  Studies,	  2002),	  9.	  
171	  Malan,	  Rakate	  and	  McIntyre,	  Peacekeeping	  in	  Sierra	  Leone:	  UNAMSIL	  Hits	  the	  Home	  Straight,	  13.	  
172	  United	  Nations	  Secretary-­‐General,	  Report	  of	  the	  Secretary-­General	  pursuant	  to	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  
53/55:	  The	  Fall	  of	  Srebrenica,	  A/54/549,	  15	  November	  1999,	  468.	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placed	  an	  arms	  embargo	  on	  Yugoslavia.173	  When	  Serbian	  security	  forces	  and	  the	  Yugoslav	  
Army	   continued	   to	   use	   excessive	   and	   indiscriminate	   force	   against	   civilians,	   resulting	   in	  
casualties	  and	  massive	  displacement,	   the	  Security	  Council	  passed	  Resolution	  1190,	  which	  
declared	   its	   intent	   to	   “consider	   further	   action	   and	   additional	   measures	   to	   maintain	   or	  
restore	  peace	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  region”	  should	  the	  human	  rights	  situation	  not	  improve.174	  
The	  speed	  and	  decisiveness	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  was	  meant	  to	  send	  a	  clear	  message:	  this	  
time,	  the	  UN	  would	  not	  allow	  mass	  atrocities	  to	  be	  committed	  against	  civilians.175	  	  
It	   soon	  became	  clear,	  however,	   that	  neither	  Russia	  nor	  China	  would	  authorize	   the	  
Security	  Council	  to	  use	  force	  to	  protect	  civilians	  in	  Kosovo.	  Instead,	  NATO	  took	  the	  lead	  and	  
initiated	  an	  aggressive	  bombing	  campaign	  against	  Serbian	  targets.	  After	  only	  three	  months	  
of	   bombing,	   Yugoslav	   President	   Slobodan	   Milosevic	   capitulated	   and	   signed	   a	   peace	  
agreement,	   ending	   the	   conflict.	   Although	   an	   estimated	   10,000	   Kosovars	   died	   prior	   to	  
Milosevic’s	  capitulation,	  some	  by	  NATO	  air	  strikes,	  it	  is	  generally	  agreed	  that	  the	  death	  toll	  
would	  have	  been	  higher	  had	  NATO	  not	  intervened.176	  NATO’s	  action	  indicated	  that	  the	  tide	  
was	  changing	  in	  favor	  of	  using	  military	  force	  to	  achieve	  POC	  objectives	  once	  again.177	  	  
	   	  
	   	  	  
4.3	  Actors	  
	  
This	  section	  explores	  which	  actors	  were	  most	  responsible	   for	  normative	  evolution	  
during	   UNAMSIL.	   Who	   were	   the	   main	   actors	   that	   defined	   and	   promoted	   normative	  
evolution	  within	   the	  UN?	  Who	  were	   the	  main	  actors	   that	  were	   capable	  of	  demonstrating	  
normative	  evolution	  on	  the	  ground?	  
In	   1997,	   peacekeepers	   under	   the	   auspices	   of	   the	   Economic	   Community	   of	   West	  
African	  States	  (ECOWAS)	  intervened	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Sierra	  Leonean	  government,	  six	  years	  
after	   the	  start	  of	   the	  war.	  By	  this	   time,	   the	  plight	  of	  civilians	   in	  Sierra	  Leone	  had	  become	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/1160,	  31	  March	  1998.	  
174	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/1190,	  23	  September	  1998.	  	  
175	  Brooks,	  “The	  UN	  Security	  Council	  and	  Civilian	  Protection,”	  14.	  
176	  Brooks,	  “The	  UN	  Security	  Council	  and	  Civilian	  Protection,”	  15.	  	  
177	  NATO’s	  action	  in	  Kosovo	  was	  also	  significant	  because	  its	  aerial	  campaign	  succeeded	  without	  sacrificing	  the	  
life	  of	  a	  single	  NATO	  soldier,	  making	  bombing	  a	  more	  attractive	  POC	  strategy	  than	  a	  ground	  invasion,	  even	  
though	  bombing	  results	  in	  civilian	  casualties.	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difficult	   to	   ignore.	  The	  new	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General,	  Kofi	  Annan,	  responded	  to	  the	  situation	  
by	  adding	  a	  human	  rights	  adviser	  to	  his	  Special	  Envoy	  in	  Sierra	  Leone,	  and	  he	  dispatched	  
his	   Special	   Representative	   for	   Children	   in	   Armed	   Conflict	   to	   assess	   the	   plight	   of	   Sierra	  
Leonean	   children	   affected	   by	   the	   war	   and	   to	   negotiate	   the	   provisions	   to	   halt	   child	  
recruitment	   into	  armed	   forces.	  He	  visited	  Sierra	  Leone	   in	   June	  1998	  and	   reported	   to	   the	  
Security	  Council	   that	  his	   “main	   focus	  of	   human	   rights	   concerns…has	  been	   the	   attacks	  on	  
civilians	   by	   armed,	   uniformed	   groups.”178	   These	   attacks	   included	   systematic	   mutilation,	  
dismemberment	   and	   rape.179	   In	   light	   of	   this	   situation,	   Annan	   encouraged	   the	   Security	  
Council	   to	   authorize	   the	   United	   Nations	   Observer	   Mission	   in	   Sierra	   Leone	   (UNOMSIL),	  
mainly	   to	   monitor	   disarmament	   processes	   but	   also	   to	   discourage	   violence	   against	  
civilians.180	  Resolution	  1181	  expressed	  the	  UN’s	  concern	  for	  “the	  loss	  of	  life	  and	  immense	  
suffering	   undergone	   by	   the	   people	   of	   Sierra	   Leone…as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   continuing	   rebel	  
attacks,	  and	  in	  particular	  at	  the	  plight	  of	  children	  affected	  by	  the	  conflict”	  and	  condemned	  
“the	  violence…against	  the	  civilian	  population	  of	  Sierra	  Leone.”181	  	  
By	  late	  1998,	  political	  volatility	  in	  Nigeria	  led	  an	  interim	  military	  government	  there	  
to	   announce	   that	   Nigeria’s	   future	   in	   the	   Economic	   Community	   of	   West	   African	   States	  
Monitoring	  Group	   (ECOMOG)	  was	  uncertain.	   The	  RUF	   took	   advantage	   of	   the	   situation	   to	  
unleash	   an	   unprecedented	   wave	   of	   human	   rights	   violations	   against	   civilians	   in	   Sierra	  
Leone.182	   In	   January	   1999,	   it	   conducted	   Operation	   No	   Living	   Thing,	   during	   which	   it	  
overwhelmed	  ECOMOG	  forces	  in	  Freetown,	  killing	  thousands	  of	  civilians	  while	  raping	  and	  
dismembering	   tens	   of	   thousands	   more.183	   Worn	   down	   by	   the	   coup	   and	   the	   siege	   of	  
Freetown,	   the	   Sierra	   Leonean	   government	   was	   forced	   to	   negotiate	   and	   make	   serious	  
concessions	   to	   the	   RUF	   in	   the	   Lomé	   Peace	   Agreement	   of	   July	   1999.	   Both	   signatories	  
requested	  that	  the	  UN,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  ECOMOG,	  deploy	  a	  peacekeeping	  force	  to	  Sierra	  
Leone.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178	  United	  Nations	  Secretary-­‐General,	  S/1998/486,	  9	  June	  1998,	  7.	  
179	  Ibid.	  	  
180	  United	  Nations	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The	   Security	   Council	   voted	   to	   authorize	  UNAMSIL	   in	  October	   1999.184	  UNAMSIL’s	  
main	   tasks	   would	   be	   to	   implement	   the	   peace	   accord	   and	   assist	   with	   the	   disarmament,	  
demobilization	  and	  reintegration	  plan	   in	  conjunction	  with	  ECOMOG	  forces	  under	  Chapter	  
VI	   of	   the	   UN	   Charter.	   Due	   to	   the	   frequency	   and	   heinous	   nature	   of	   the	   atrocities	   being	  
committed	   against	   civilians	   in	   Sierra	   Leone,	   the	   Security	   Council	  mandated	   UNAMSIL	   to	  
“take	   the	   necessary	   action…to	   afford	   protection	   to	   civilians	   under	   imminent	   threat	   of	  
physical	  violence”	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  of	   the	  UN	  Charter.185	  UNAMSIL	  became	   the	   first	  UN	  
force	  to	  have	  POC	  explicitly	  included	  in	  its	  mandate,	  the	  most	  significant	  contribution	  to	  the	  
POC	  norm’s	  evolution	  since	  its	  conception.	  	  
In	  Sierra	  Leone,	  UNAMSIL	  and	  ECOMOG	  forces	  were	  to	  work	  together	  to	  monitor	  the	  
cease-­‐fire,	   implement	   the	   peace	   agreement,	   demobilize	   roughly	   45,000	   combatants	   and	  
prepare	   Sierra	   Leone	   for	   national	   elections.	   Since	   ECOMOG	   forces	   already	   numbered	  
13,000,	   the	   Security	   Council	   only	   authorized	   UNAMSIL	   to	   have	   6,000	   troops.	   However,	  
UNAMSIL	   quickly	   ran	   into	   problems	  when	   Nigeria	   announced	   in	   December	   1999	   that	   it	  
would	  be	  withdrawing	  its	  troops	  from	  ECOMOG.	  The	  withdrawal	  of	  Nigerian	  soldiers	  led	  to	  
the	  withdrawal	  of	  ECOMOG	  in	  its	  entirety.	  The	  UN	  felt	  confident	  that	   it	  could	  manage	  the	  
situation	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  without	  ECOMOG,	  but	  numerous	  factors	  worked	  to	  the	  detriment	  
of	   UNAMSIL	   between	   October	   1999	   and	   May	   2000.	   The	   DPKO	   struggled	   to	   secure	  
equipment	   from	   member	   states.	   Rebel	   troops	   almost	   immediately	   began	   violating	   the	  
cease-­‐fire	   agreement,	   launching	   ambushes	   against	   both	   civilians	   and	   UN	   personnel.	   The	  
deployment	  of	  additional	  troops	  was	  painfully	  slow.	  The	  rebels	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  poor	  
coordination	  between	  UNAMSIL	  and	  ECOMOG	  regarding	  ECOMOG’s	  withdrawal,	  and	  they	  
were	  able	  to	  isolate	  and	  disarm	  Indian,	  Kenyan	  and	  Zambian	  factions	  of	  UNAMSIL.	  In	  May	  
2000,	   “at	   the	   moment	   of	   final	   handover	   from	   ECOMOG	   when	   UN	   forces	   were	   at	   their	  
weakest,”	  the	  RUF	  seized	  500	  UNAMSIL	  peace	  soldiers	  and	  held	  them	  as	  hostages.186	  	  
Many	  observers	  expected	  the	  UN	  to	  react	  to	  the	  hostage	  crisis	  with	  a	  Somalia-­‐type	  
retreat	  from	  Sierra	  Leone.187	  Instead,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  called	  member	  states	  to	  create	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a	  ‘rapid-­‐reaction’	  force	  for	  immediate	  deployment.188	  He	  looked	  specifically	  to	  the	  UK	  and	  
the	   US,	   but	   neither	   would	   deploy	   a	   force	   under	   UN	   command.	   On	   7	   May	   2000,	   the	   UK	  
announced	   that	   it	  would	   send	   British	   soldiers	   to	   Sierra	   Leone,	   but	   these	   soldiers	  would	  
remain	  under	  UK	  command.	  Initially,	  the	  main	  purpose	  of	  the	  force	  was	  to	  evacuate	  British	  
nationals,	   but	   soon	   the	   mission	   expanded	   to	   include	   the	   defense	   of	   Freetown,	   and	  
eventually	   the	   UK	   ended	   up	   running	   UNAMSIL’s	   operational	   activities.189	   In	   addition	   to	  
taking	  the	  lead	  on	  the	  ground,	  the	  UK	  also	  took	  the	  reins	  in	  the	  Security	  Council,	  drafting	  
the	  mandates	  that	  would	  eventually	  bring	  UNAMSIL’s	  troop	  strength	  to	  17,500	  troops.190	  	  
Under	   British	   control,	   POC	   remained	   a	   main	   component	   of	   UNAMSIL.	   In	   2001,	  
UNAMSIL’s	  military	  concept	  of	  operations	  (CONOPS)	  included	  “affording	  and	  facilitating	  a	  
degree	  of	  protection,	  freedom	  of	  movement	  and	  the	  delivery	  of	  humanitarian	  assistance	  to	  
civilians.”191	   UNAMSIL’s	   CONOPS	   for	   2002	   contained	   the	   same	   objective.192	   Initially,	  
differences	  of	  opinion	  regarding	  UNAMSIL’s	  use	  of	  force	  arose	  between	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  UN,	  
with	  the	  UK	  believing	  that	  UNAMSIL	  should	  launch	  counter-­‐offensives	  against	  the	  RUF	  with	  
maximum	  force.193	  In	  August	  2000,	  the	  UK	  succeeded	  in	  persuading	  the	  Security	  Council	  to	  
adopt	   Resolution	   1313,	   which	   authorized	   UNAMSIL	   troops	   to	   use	   force	   to	   pro-­‐actively	  
counter	  RUF	  threats	  and	  to	  restore	  law	  and	  order	  to	  Sierra	  Leone.194	  UNAMSIL	  effectively	  
became	  a	  peace	  enforcement	  mission.	  
Initially,	   the	   newly	   empowered	   UNAMSIL	   struggled,	   especially	   after	   India	   and	  
Jordan	  decided	  to	  withdraw	  their	  contingents	  (4,800	  troops)	  to	  protest	  the	  lack	  of	  Western	  
troops	   contributions	   to	   UNAMSIL	   and	   the	   UNAMSIL	   Force	   Commander	   resigned	   after	  
alleging	  that	  the	  Nigerian	  troops	  were	  colluding	  with	  the	  RUF.195	  By	  March	  2001,	  however,	  
UNAMSIL	   had	   regrouped	   and	   it	   was	   able	   to	   venture	   into	   RUF-­‐held	   territory,	   where	   the	  
“civilian	  population	   continued	   to	   suffer	   from	  what	   the	  Secretary	  General	   euphemistically	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called	  the	  ‘harmful	  effects’	  of	  the	  RUF’s	  hold	  over	  the	  area:	  summary	  executions,	  rape	  and	  
other	   forms	   of	   sexual	   violence,	   amputations	   and	   mutilations.”196	   By	   January	   2002,	  
UNAMSIL	  succeeded	  in	  disarming	  the	  rebels	  and	  Sierra	  Leone’s	  war	  came	  to	  an	  end.	  	  
After	   disarming	   and	   demobilizing	   the	   rebels,	   UNAMSIL	   changed	   its	   focus	   from	  
enforcement	   activities	   to	   post-­‐conflict	   peace-­‐building	   activities.	   UNAMSIL	   remained	   in	  
Sierra	   Leone	  until	   31	  December	  2005	   in	   order	   to	   help	   organize	   and	  monitor	  democratic	  
elections,	   and	   it	  was	   succeeded	  by	   the	  United	  Nations	   Integrated	  Office	   for	   Sierra	   Leone	  
post-­‐conflict	  peace-­‐building	  mission.	  
The	  explicit	  inclusion	  of	  POC	  in	  UNAMSIL’s	  mandate	  was	  the	  result	  of	  the	  efforts	  of	  
many	  different	  actors,	  but	  it	  was	  Annan	  who	  introduced	  the	  concept	  of	  POC	  to	  the	  UN	  in	  his	  
report	   The	   Causes	   of	   Conflict	   and	   the	   Promotion	   of	   Durable	   Peace	   and	   Sustainable	  
Development	  in	  Africa197	  and	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  “fundamental	  to	  the	  central	  mandate	  of	  the	  
Organization.”198	  Annan	  began	  working	   for	   the	  UN	   in	  1962,	  and	  he	   rose	  steadily	   through	  
the	  ranks	  of	  the	  UN	  to	  become	  Secretary-­‐General.	  He	  had	  worked	  for	  the	  DPKO	  during	  the	  
Rwandan	   genocide	   and	   Srebrenica	   massacre;	   the	   moral	   rhetoric	   of	   the	   institution	   was	  
deeply	  ingrained	  in	  him	  and	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  UN’s	  failures	  in	  the	  1990s	  did	  not	  sway	  his	  
belief	  in	  the	  organization’s	  utility	  and	  purpose.199	  Like	  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  he	  believed	  that	  the	  
concept	  of	  international	  security	  as	  put	  forth	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  had	  changed.	  He	  argued	  
that	   international	   security	   now	   demanded	   that	   the	   protection	   of	   individuals	   be	   given	  
priority	  over	  the	  protection	  of	  state	  sovereignty.200	  As	  such,	  addressing	  the	   issue	  of	  mass	  
atrocities	  against	  civilians	  became	  one	  of	  the	  issues	  central	  to	  Annan’s	  tenure	  as	  Secretary-­‐
General.201	   After	   the	   UN	   released	   its	   internal	   reports	   on	   Rwanda	   and	   Srebrenica,	   Annan	  
pledged,	   “Of	   all	  my	  aims	   as	   Secretary-­‐General,	   there	   is	   none	   to	  which	   I	   feel	  more	  deeply	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committed	   than	   that	   of	   enabling	   the	   United	   Nations	   never	   again	   to	   fail	   in	   protecting	   a	  
civilian	  population	  from	  genocide	  or	  mass	  slaughter.”202	  	  
Annan	  was	  more	   successful	   at	   promoting	   normative	   change	   than	   his	   predecessor	  
because,	   among	   other	   things,	   he	   had	   a	   better	   relationship	   with	   the	   US.	   The	   US	   vetoed	  
Boutros-­‐Ghali’s	   second	   term	  as	   Secretary-­‐General.	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	   envisioned	  a	   larger	   role	  
for	  UN	  peace	  soldiers	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  As	  the	  internationalism	  that	  the	  US	  had	  
embraced	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	   decade	   gave	   way	   to	   isolationism,	   many	   conservatives	   in	  
Congress	  demanded	  that	  the	  UN	  reform.	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  vehemently	  opposed	  reform,	  and	  he	  
“rarely	   passed	   up	   an	   opportunity	   to	   needle	   the	   United	   States	   for	   failing	   to	   pay	   its	   dues,	  
failing	  to	  provide	  troops,	  failing	  to	  stay	  the	  course.”203	  The	  title	  of	  Boutros-­‐Ghali’s	  memoir,	  
Unvanquished,	   reveals	   precisely	   the	   type	   of	   uncompromising	   relationship	   the	   Secretary-­‐
General	   had	   with	   the	   US.204	   Annan	   set	   out	   to	   change	   “the	   perception	   of	   the	   UN	   among	  
America’s	  ruling	  elite”	  immediately	  after	  becoming	  Secretary-­‐General.205	  And,	  in	  contrast	  to	  
his	  predecessor,	  Annan	  was	  shrewd	  enough	  to	  use	  NGOs,	  global	  civil	  society	  organizations	  
and	  especially	  the	  media	  to	  promote	  his	  objectives.206	  	  
Other	   actors	   responsible	   for	   the	   explicit	   inclusion	   of	   POC	   in	   UNAMSIL’s	  mandate	  
include	   NGOs	   and	   the	   UN’s	   Office	   for	   the	   Coordination	   of	   Humanitarian	   Affairs	   (OCHA),	  
which	  is	  part	  of	  the	  UN	  Secretariat.	  In	  1997,	  the	  UN	  established	  an	  NGO	  Working	  Group	  on	  
the	   Security	   Council,	  whose	  members	   included	   organizations	   such	   as	   Care	   International,	  
Human	  Rights	  Watch	   (HRW),	  MSF	  and	  Oxfam.	  These	  NGOs	  played	   a	   role	   in	  defining	   and	  
promoting	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  POC	  norm.	  For	  example,	  on	  12	  April	  2000,	  the	  Ambassador	  
of	   the	   Netherlands	   convened	   a	   meeting	   on	   POC	   in	   armed	   conflict	   with	   CARE,	   MSF	   and	  
Oxfam,	   and	   the	   contributions	   of	   these	   NGOs	   helped	   informed	   the	   content	   of	   Resolution	  
1296,207	   the	   UN’s	   second	   thematic	   Resolution	   on	   POC.	   The	   OCHA	   contributed	   to	   the	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evolution	   of	   the	   POC	   norm	   by	   drafting	   the	   Secretary-­‐Generals	   reports	   on	   POC	   to	   the	  
UNSC.208	  
These	   NGOs	   can	   be	   considered	   part	   of	   a	   larger	   TAN	   that	   exists	   to	   promote	   the	  
growth	  of	  the	  POC	  norm.	  A	  TAN	  refers	  to	  a	  group	  of	  “actors	  working	  internationally	  on	  an	  
issue,	  who	  are	  bound	  together	  by	  shared	  values,	  a	  common	  discourse,	  and	  dense	  exchanges	  
of	   information	   and	   services.”209	   TANs	   use	   information	   politics,210	   symbolic	   politics,211	  
leverage	  politics,212	  and	  accountability	  politics213	  to	  promote	  change	  in	  normative	  content	  
or	  to	  enforce	  compliance	  with	  a	  norm.	  The	  emergence	  of	  a	  “globalized,	  24/7	  media”	  in	  the	  
1990s	  has	  assisted	  TANs	   in	   the	  spreading	  of	   information	  and	   the	  promotion	  of	  norms,214	  
including	  the	  promotion	  of	  norms	  within	  IOs.215	  	  
Demonstration	  of	  this	  new	  POC	  objective	  would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  the	  
UK.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  UK	  guide	  the	  Security	  Council	  on	  UNAMSIL	  and	  lead	  UNAMSIL’s	  POC	  
efforts	  on	  the	  ground,	  but	  its	  interest	  in	  the	  hostage	  crisis	  and	  the	  conflict	  also	  “galvanized	  
action	  among	  a	  host	  of	  players	  who	  might	  otherwise	  not	  have	  considered	  Sierra	  Leone	  a	  
priority,”	  particularly	  the	  US.216	  In	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  the	  stipulations	  of	  PDD-­‐25	  prevented	  the	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  and	  Sikkink,	  “Transnational	  Advocacy	  Networks	  in	  International	  and	  Regional	  Politics,”	  95).	  
For	  example,	  testimonies	  taken	  from	  civilians	  caught	  in	  conflict	  	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  were	  used	  by	  Sierra	  Leonean	  
civil	  society	  to	  pressure	  the	  UK	  to	  act	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  (Olanisakin,	  Peacekeeping	  in	  Sierra	  Leone:	  The	  Story	  of	  
UNAMSIL	  22-­‐23).	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  of	  a	  situation	  or	  claim	  for	  an	  audience	  
that	  is	  frequently	  far	  away”	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  “Transnational	  Advocacy	  Networks	  in	  International	  and	  
Regional	  Politics,”	  95).	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  argue	  that	  “activists	  frame	  issues	  by	  identifying	  and	  providing	  
convincing	  explanations	  for	  powerful	  symbolic	  events,	  which	  in	  turn	  become	  catalysts	  for	  the	  growth	  of	  
networks”	  (Ibid).	  The	  Rwandan	  genocide	  became	  a	  powerful	  symbolic	  event,	  used	  by	  TANs	  to	  catalyze	  the	  
growth	  of	  the	  POC	  agenda.	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  powerful	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  a	  situation	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  weaker	  members	  of	  a	  network	  are	  
unlikely	  to	  have	  influence”	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  “Transnational	  Advocacy	  Networks	  in	  International	  and	  
Regional	  Politics,”	  95).	  TANs	  especially	  have	  moral	  leverage	  over	  more	  powerful	  actors	  that	  place	  a	  high	  value	  
on	  international	  prestige,	  such	  as	  the	  use	  of	  moral	  leverage	  by	  NGOs	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  Somalia	  in	  1991	  in	  
order	  to	  generate	  a	  greater	  humanitarian	  response	  from	  the	  UN.	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(Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  “Transnational	  Advocacy	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  in	  International	  and	  Regional	  Politics,”	  95).	  Efforts	  by	  
TANs	  led	  to	  the	  US	  Congress	  supporting	  the	  position	  that	  the	  campaign	  of	  ethnic	  cleansing	  occurring	  in	  Darfur	  
was	  actually	  genocide.	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US	  from	  becoming	  involved	  in	  the	  Sierra	  Leonean	  conflict;	  in	  the	  late	  1990s,	  the	  US’	  focus	  
centered	   around	   Liberia.	   But	   in	   1999,	   the	   US’	   new	   Ambassador	   to	   the	   UN,	   Richard	  
Holbrooke,	  encouraged	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  stronger	  US	  peacekeeping	  presence	  on	  the	  continent.	  
In	  January	  1999,	  he	  spent	  the	  entirety	  of	  his	  presidency	  on	  the	  Security	  Council	  focusing	  on	  
African	   security	   issues.217	   Holbrooke,	   remembering	   Rwanda	   and	   Somalia,	   pushed	  
Washington	  to	  respond	  in	  favor	  of	  strengthening	  UNAMSIL	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  hostage	  
crisis.218	   Thus,	  while	   the	  US	   had	   played	   an	   active	   role	   in	   limiting	  UNAMSIL’s	   strength	   in	  
1999,	  it	  began	  to	  work	  with	  the	  UK	  on	  the	  Security	  Council	  to	  mobilize	  support	  and	  elicit	  
contributions	   from	  member	   states	   in	  2000.219	  Without	   support	   from	   the	  US,	   the	  Security	  
Council	  would	  not	  have	  been	  able	   to	  authorize	  enforcement	  powers	   for	  UNAMSIL,	  which	  
were	  the	  key	  to	  the	  mission’s	  victory.	  
In	   summation,	   the	   UN	   Secretariat,	   Security	   Council	   and	   NGOs	   played	   significant	  
roles	  in	  defining	  and	  promoting	  normative	  evolution	  during	  UNAMSIL.	  Both	  advocated	  for	  
the	   use	   of	   authorizing	   a	   peace	  mission	   to	   use	   force	   to	   protect	   civilians	   “under	   imminent	  
threat	   of	   physical	   violence”	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   UN	   history.	   In	   particular,	   the	   Secretary-­‐
General	  and	  the	  UK	  played	  a	  strong	  role	   in	  drawing	  the	  Council’s	  attention	  to	   the	  human	  
rights	  situation	  in	  Sierra	  Leone.	  However,	  without	  diplomatic	  pressure	  from	  the	  UK	  on	  the	  
Security	   Council	   and	  military	   assistance	   from	   the	  UK	  on	   the	   ground,	   the	  UN	  would	   have	  





	   This	   section	   explores	   which	   motives	   best	   explain	   normative	   change	   during	  
UNAMSIL.	  Was	   normative	   evolution	   at	   the	   UN	   during	   UNAMSIL	   motivated	   primarily	   by	  
ideational	  influences	  or	  praxis-­‐challenges?	  
Criticism	   over	   the	   UN’s	   complicity	   in	   the	   Rwandan	   genocide	   and	   Srebrenica	  
massacre	  inspired	  a	  period	  of	  introspection	  under	  Annan,	  who	  had	  been	  with	  the	  DPKO	  at	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the	  time	  of	  both	  tragedies.	  This	  introspection	  led	  to	  a	  proliferation	  of	  work	  on	  the	  UN’s	  POC	  
agenda,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  organization’s	  renewed	  commitment	  to	  playing	  a	  military	  role	  in	  
protecting	  civilians	  during	  its	  peace	  missions.	  
On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   POC	   norm	   at	   the	   UN	   was	   driven	   by	   the	  
organization’s	  evolving	  notions	  of	  appropriate	  behavior	  regarding	  civilians	  in	  conflict.	  The	  
UN’s	   actions	   (or,	   rather,	   inaction)	   in	   Rwanda	   and	   Srebrenica	   attracted	   severe	   criticism,	  
with	  specific	  regard	  to	  the	  organization’s	  peace	  missions.	  This	  criticism	  signaled	  to	  the	  UN	  
that	   the	   international	   community	   had	   come	   to	   expect	   the	   UN	   to	   protect	   civilians	   during	  
conflict.	   Changed	   conceptions	   of	   international	   security	   that	   promoted	   the	   rights	   of	  
individuals	   over	   the	   rights	   of	   states	   drove	   the	   UN	   to	   develop	   standards	   for	   civilian	  
protection	  in	  areas	  of	  conflict	  in	  the	  late	  1990s,220	  and	  the	  UN	  began	  to	  institutionalize	  POC	  
in	  reports	  and	  UNSC	  Resolutions.	  For	  example,	  the	  UN’s	  report	  on	  Rwanda	  recommended	  
that	  the	  mandates	  of	  future	  UN	  peace	  missions	  include	  specific	  provisions	  related	  to	  POC,	  
and	   the	   Brahimi	   Report	   suggested	   that	   UN	   peace	   soldiers	   who	  witness	   violence	   against	  
civilians	  should	  be	  presumed	   to	  be	  authorized	   to	  stop	   it.	   In	   this	  way,	   ideational	  progress	  
influenced	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  POC	  norm	  at	  the	  UN.	  	  
	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   behavior	  most	   often	  has	   dual	  motives	  when	   ‘humanitarian’	   or	  
‘moral’	   motives	   are	   involved.221	   For	   the	   UN,	   ideological	   motives	   must	   be	   considered	  
alongside	   motives	   for	   organizational	   survival.	   Criticism	   of	   the	   UN’s	   failures	   in	   Somalia	  
motivated	  the	  UN	  to	  scale	  back	  some	   its	  more	  complicated	  peacekeeping	   tasks,	   including	  
POC.	   But	   the	   UN’s	   greater	   peacekeeping	   fiascos	   in	   Rwanda	   and	   former	   Yugoslavia	  
“discredited	   peacekeeping,	   and	   indeed	   the	   UN	   itself,	   for	   it	   was	   above	   all	   through	   the	  
deployment	  of	  blue	  helmets	   that	   the	  UN	   realized	   its	   founding	   ideals.”222	  By	  1996,	   the	  US	  
owed	   the	   UN	   $1.6	   billion	   in	   backlogged	   dues,	   and	   that	   same	   year	   Congress	   voted	  
unilaterally	  that	   it	  would	  begin	  to	  pay	  only	  25	  percent	  of	  the	  UN’s	  peacekeeping	  costs,	  as	  
opposed	   to	   the	   31	   percent	   it	   was	   assessed.223	   Other	   nations	   had	   been	   ignoring	   their	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  few	  actors	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payments	  as	  well,	  “claiming	  that	  they	  would	  only	  be	  paying	  what	  the	  Americans	  owed.”224	  
The	  US	  demanded	  reform,	  and	   thus	   the	  survival	  of	   the	  organization	  (or	  at	   least	   its	  peace	  
missions)	  required	  change.	  
Boutros-­‐Ghali	   had	   little	   interest	   in	   examining	   the	   UN’s	   own	   failures.	   Instead,	   he	  
lectured	  others	  about	  their	  global	  obligations,	  which	  infuriated	  the	  conservative	  members	  
of	   Congress	   even	   more.225	   Initially,	   Annan	   also	   resisted	   pressure	   from	   some	   of	   his	  
colleagues	   to	   investigate	   the	   UN’s	   complicity	   in	   the	   Rwandan	   genocide	   and	   Srebrenica	  
massacre.	   In	   June	  1998,	  during	  a	  belated	  apology	  speech	  given	   in	  Rwanda,	  Annan	  had	   in	  
fact	  emphasized	  that	  forces	  internal	  to	  Rwanda	  were	  most	  responsible	  for	  the	  genocide.226	  
And,	  after	  the	  report	  on	  Rwanda	  was	  released,	  Annan	  was	  inclined	  to	  dispute	  its	   findings	  
because	   he	   thought	   the	  UN	   took	   too	   large	   a	   share	   of	   the	   blame.227	   But	  Annan’s	   eventual	  
acceptance	  of	  blame	  revealed	  that	  he	  “understood	  how	  very	  deep	  and	  urgent	  was	  the	  need	  
for	  change.”228	  	  
Constructivist	  work	  on	   IOs	   argues	   that	   IOs,	   as	  bureaucracies,	   change	   in	  ways	   that	  
tend	   to	   expand	   the	   size	   and	   scope	   of	   tasks.	   This	   constitutive	   argument	   emphasizes	   the	  
internal	  logic	  of	  IOs	  as	  they	  expand	  their	  functions	  beyond	  their	  initial	  mandate	  in	  order	  to	  
prove	   their	   relevance	   and	   guarantee	   their	   own	   survival.	   They	  do	   this	   in	   part	   by	   framing	  
situations	  “in	  ways	  that	  permit,	  or	  even	  require,	  more	   intervention.”229	  Thus,	   the	  UN	  was	  
motivated	   by	   praxis-­‐challenges	   not	   to	   reduce	   the	   number	   of	   tasks	   for	   which	   its	   peace	  
soldiers	  were	   responsible,	   but	   rather	   to	   expand	   them.	   By	   laying	   blame	   for	   the	  Rwandan	  
genocide	  and	  Srebrenica	  massacres	  with	  itself,	  the	  UN	  framed	  POC	  during	  armed	  conflicts	  
as	  a	  problem	  it	  could	  and	  should	  solve.	  Subsequently,	  the	  UN	  worked	  fervently	  to	  expand	  
POC	  as	  a	  concept,	  which	  would	  only	  lead	  to	  more	  tasks	  for	  the	  peace	  soldiers	  on	  the	  ground	  
and	  the	  UN	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  
	   Ultimately,	   motives	   of	   organizational	   survival	   inspired	   the	   UN’s	   renewed	  
commitment	  to	  playing	  a	  military	  role	  in	  protecting	  civilians	  during	  its	  peace	  missions.	  The	  
UN’s	  need	   to	   rebuild	   its	   reputation	  after	   its	  peacekeeping	   failures	   in	  Rwanda	  and	   former	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Yugoslavia	   compelled	   organizational	   change.	   For	   this	   same	   reason,	   the	   Security	   Council	  
explicitly	   mandated	   UNAMSIL	   to	   protect	   civilians	   “under	   imminent	   threat	   of	   physical	  





This	  section	  explores	  the	  mechanisms	  behind	  normative	  evolution	  during	  UNAMSIL.	  
Did	  normative	  evolution	  occur	  during	  UNAMSIL	  primarily	   through	   institutionalization	  or	  
demonstration?	  	  
Throughout	   UNAMSIL,	   there	   was	   large-­‐scale	   institutionalization	   of	   the	   UN’s	  
enhanced	  POC	  agenda	   for	   its	  peace	  missions	   in	   rhetoric.	   Institutionalization	   included	   the	  
UN	   reports	   on	   Rwanda	   and	   Srebrenica,	   thematic	   Security	   Council	   resolutions	   on	   the	  
protection	   of	   civilians	   and	   the	   Brahimi	   Report.	   The	   General	   Assembly	   had	   requested	   an	  
investigation	  of	   the	  civilian	  massacre	  at	  Srebrenica,230	  and	   the	  Security	  Council	  approved	  
Annan’s	   request	   to	   set	   up	   an	   independent	   inquiry	   of	   the	   UN’s	   role	   in	   the	   Rwandan	  
genocide.231	  The	  resulting	  reports	  confirmed	  the	  UN’s	  guilt	   in	  both	  tragedies.	  The	  reports	  
also	  offered	  recommendations	  regarding	  the	  UN’s	  military	  role	  in	  POC,	  “lessons	  that	  must	  
be	  learned	  if	  [the	  UN	  is]	  to	  expect	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  world	  to	  place	  their	  faith	  in	  the	  United	  
Nations.”232	   First,	   with	   regard	   to	   genocide	   or	   ethnic	   cleansing,	   the	   report	   on	   Srebrenica	  
argued	  that	  the	  “cardinal	  lesson	  of	  Srebrenica	  is	  that	  a	  deliberate	  and	  systematic	  attempt	  to	  
terrorize,	   expel	   or	   murder	   an	   entire	   people	   must	   be	   met	   decisively	   with	   all	   necessary	  
means,	  and	  with	   the	  political	  will	   to	  carry	   the	  policy	   through	  to	   its	   logical	  conclusion.”233	  
Second,	  with	   regard	   to	   POC	   during	   armed	   conflict,	   the	   report	   on	   Rwanda	   acknowledged	  
that	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	  peace	  soldiers	  raises	  expectations	  of	  protection	  among	  civilians.	  
It	   argued	   that	   “efforts	   need	   to	   be	  made	   to	   improve	   the	   protection	   of	   civilians	   in	   conflict	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  President	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232	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situations”234	   and	   recommended	   that	   “[s]pecific	   provisions	   related	   to	   the	   protection	   of	  
civilian	   populations	   should	   be	   included	   in	   the	   mandates	   of	   peacekeeping	   operations	  
wherever	  appropriate	  and	  ensure	  the	  necessary	  resources	  for	  such	  protection.”235	  
The	  UN	  also	  produced	  a	  series	  of	  thematic	  resolutions	  dealing	  with	  the	  protection	  of	  
civilians	  in	  armed	  conflict.	  Its	  thematic	  work	  was	  partly	  inspired	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  
report,	   The	   Causes	   of	   Conflict	   and	   the	   Promotion	   of	   Durable	   Peace	   and	   Sustainable	  
Development	   in	   Africa,	   which	   defined	   the	   protection	   of	   civilians	   as	   a	   humanitarian	  
imperative.236	   After	   the	   release	   of	   the	   report,	   the	   Security	   Council	   expressed	   its	   concern	  
over	   the	   continued	   targeting	   of	   civilians	   during	   armed	   conflict.237	   Its	   first	   thematic	  
resolution,	   Resolution	   1261,	   condemned	   the	   targeting	   of	   children	   during	   armed	   conflict	  
and	  urged	  “all	  parties	  to	  armed	  conflicts	  to	  abide	  by	  concrete	  commitments	  made	  to	  ensure	  
the	  protection	  of	  children	  in	  situations	  of	  armed	  conflict.”238	  239	  The	  Security	  Council	  also	  
requested	   that	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   submit	   a	   report	  with	   recommendations	   on	   how	   to	  
improve	  the	  physical	  and	  legal	  protection	  of	  civilians,	  and	  in	  September	  1999	  Annan	  issued	  
a	   report	   recommending	   that	   “in	   situations	   where	   the	   parties	   to	   the	   conflict	   commit	  
systematic	  and	  widespread	  breaches	  of	  international	  humanitarian	  and	  human	  rights	  laws,	  
causing	  threats	  of	  genocide,	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  and	  war	  crimes,	  the	  Security	  Council	  
should	  be	  prepared	  to	  intervene	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  Charter.”240	  	  
Later	   that	  month,	   the	  Security	  Council	  approved	   its	  second	  thematic	  resolution	  on	  
POC.	  Resolution	  1265	   condemned	   the	  deliberate	   targeting	   of	   civilians	   and	   expressed	   the	  
Security	   Council’s	   “willingness	   to	   respond	   to	   such	   situations	   of	   armed	   conflict	   where	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  entitled	  Impact	  of	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  Conflict	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  Children,	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  that	  two	  million	  children	  had	  
perished	  during	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  It	  recommended	  measures	  to	  improve	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  armed	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  and	  it	  recommended	  that	  special	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  for	  children	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  by	  
conflict	  be	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  in	  UN	  peace	  missions,	  emphasizing	  the	  role	  that	  peacekeeping	  forces	  can	  play	  in	  
promoting	  and	  respecting	  children’s	  rights	  (Graca	  Machel,	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  Conflict	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civilians	  are	  being	  targeted…including	  through	  the	  consideration	  of	  appropriate	  measures	  
at	   the	   Council’s	   disposal	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   Charter	   of	   the	   United	   Nations.”241	  
Resolution	  1265	  marked	  a	  definitive	  change	  in	  the	  Security	  Council’s	  stance	  on	  POC	  in	  two	  
ways.	  First,	  it	  made	  clear	  the	  Council’s	  willingness	  to	  authorize	  the	  use	  of	  force	  to	  protect	  
civilians	   during	   armed	   conflict,	  whereas	   before	   the	   Council	   had	   only	   been	  willing	   to	   use	  
force	   to	   protect	   safe	   areas	   or	   to	   ensure	   the	   safe	   delivery	   of	   humanitarian	   aid.	   Second,	   it	  
argued	   the	   targeting	  of	  civilians	  had	  a	  direct	   impact	  on	  durable	  peace,	   reconciliation	  and	  
development	  because	   civilians	  now	   “account	   for	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	   casualties	   in	   armed	  
conflicts	  and	  are	  increasingly	  targeted	  by	  combatants	  and	  armed	  elements.”242	  If	  failures	  to	  
protect	   civilians	   could	   undermine	   durable	   peace,	   then	   the	   protection	   of	   civilians	  was	   an	  
integral	   part	   of	   the	   UN’s	   promise	   to	   maintain	   international	   peace	   and	   security.243	  
Therefore,	  starting	  in	  1999,	  the	  UN	  began	  to	  define	  itself	  “by	  its	  commitment	  to	  preventing	  
conflict-­‐related	  harm	  to	  individuals,	  at	  least	  when	  such	  harm	  occurred	  on	  a	  large	  scale.”244	  	  	  
In	  August	  2000,	  the	  Panel	  on	  United	  Nations	  Peace	  Operations	  published	  its	  report,	  
known	  more	  commonly	  as	   the	  Brahimi	  Report.	  Annan	  had	  assembled	  the	  Panel	   in	  March	  
2000	  in	  preparation	  for	  the	  upcoming	  Millennium	  Summit,	  when	  world	  leaders	  would	  meet	  
at	  the	  UN	  to	  discuss	  the	  role	  of	  the	  international	  organization	  in	  the	  21st	  century.	  The	  Panel	  
was	  charged	  with	  undertaking	  a	  thorough	  review	  of	  UN	  peace	  missions	  and	  presenting	  “a	  
clear	  set	  of	  specific,	  concrete	  and	  practical	  recommendations	  to	  assist	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  
conducting	  such	  activities	  better	  in	  the	  future.”245	  With	  regard	  to	  POC,	  the	  Brahimi	  Report	  
recommended:	  
	  
United	   Nations	   peacekeepers	   –	   troops	   or	   police	   –	   who	   witness	   violence	   against	  
civilians	   should	   be	   presumed	   to	   be	   authorized	   to	   stop	   it,	   within	   their	   means,	   in	  
support	   of	   basic	  United	  Nations	   principles.	  However,	   operations	   given	   a	   broad	   and	  
explicit	  mandate	  for	  civilian	  protection	  must	  be	  given	  the	  specific	  resources	  needed	  
to	  carry	  out	  that	  mandate.246	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   The	   Brahimi	   Report	  made	  mention	   of	   UNAMSIL’s	   operational	   difficulties	  multiple	  
times.	   Fortunately	   for	   Sierra	  Leoneans,	  UNAMSIL	  also	  became	   the	   testing	  ground	   for	   the	  
report’s	   recommendations.247	   By	   2002,	   the	   UN’s	   commitment	   to	   ensuring	   UNAMSIL’s	  
success	  in	  POC	  was	  reflected	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  UNAMSIL	  “was	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  expensive	  
UN	  mission	  on	  the	  ground,	  with	  over	  17,000	  troops	  and	  a	  large	  civilian	  staff,	  at	  a	  total	  cost	  
of	  nearly	  $US	  700	  million	  a	  year.”248	  
In	   addition,	   organizational	   capacity	   also	   increased,	   in	   part	   to	   make	   room	   for	  
enhanced	  the	  enhanced	  POC	  agenda.	  The	  DPKO	  had	  already	  benefitted	  from	  the	  addition	  of	  
an	   Office	   for	   Planning	   and	   Support	   for	   mission	   planning	   and	   logistics,	   a	   Field	   Missions	  
Procurement	   Section	   and	   a	   permanently	   staffed	   Situation	   Room	   since	   UNOSOM.249	   But	  
after	  the	  Rwandan	  genocide,	  the	  UN	  created	  the	  Lessons	  Learned	  Unit	  for	  the	  DPKO,	  which	  
“gave	  the	  UN	  for	  the	  first	  time	  an	  institutional	  memory	  in	  relation	  to	  peacekeeping	  and	  an	  
institutional	  capacity	  to	  begin	  addressing	  broader	  conceptual	  issues,”	  such	  as	  POC.250	  After	  
the	  Brahimi	  Report,	  which	  recommended	  that	  more	  resources	  be	  devoted	  to	  the	  DPKO	  to	  
support	  peace	  missions,	   the	  DPKO	  began	   to	  expand	   further.	  Moreover,	  due	   in	  part	   to	   the	  
large-­‐scale	  incidence	  of	  child	  abduction	  and	  soldiering	  in	  Sierra	  Leone,	  the	  Security	  Council	  
approved	  a	  proposal	  that	  a	  Senior	  Child	  Protection	  Advisor	  (CPA)	  be	  deployed	  with	  every	  
future	  UN	  peace	  mission.251	  The	  CPA’s	  job	  includes	  ensuring	  that	  the	  protection	  of	  children	  
remains	  a	  priority	  throughout	  peace	  missions	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  peace	  processes.252	  
Though	   the	   Security	   Council	   equipped	   UNAMSIL	   with	   a	   robust	   mandate,	   several	  
significant	   issues	   prevented	   UNAMSIL	   troops	   from	   demonstrating	   POC	   consistently.	  
UNAMSIL	  initially	  lacked	  the	  troop	  strength	  to	  allow	  for	  widespread	  deployment	  into	  areas	  
controlled	   by	   the	   RUF	   where	   civilian	   casualties	   were	   occurring.	   Moreover,	   poor	  
communication	  between	  UNAMSIL	  contingencies	  resulted	  in	  civilian	  casualties	  in	  UNAMSIL	  
controlled	  areas	  in	  Freetown	  and	  in	  the	  capital’s	  proximity.	  UNAMSIL’s	  Force	  Commander	  
reported	   that,	   months	   after	   the	   establishment	   of	   UNAMSIL,	   he	   was	   still	   unable	   to	   talk	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directly	   to	   any	   of	   his	   battalion	   commanders.253	   UNAMSIL	   troops	   lacked	   a	   “commonly	  
shared	   understanding	   of	   the	   mandate	   and	   rules	   of	   engagement.”254	   Some	   contingencies	  
were	   later	   singled	   out	   for	   their	   unwillingness	   to	   use	   force	   to	   protect	   civilians	   and	  
colleagues.255	  Others,	  according	  to	  the	  Force	  Commander,	  were	  not	  briefed	  in	  their	  country	  
about	   the	   application	   of	   Chapter	   VII,256	   and	   some	   were	   confused	   about	   what	   actually	  
constituted	   an	   imminent	   threat.	   Finally,	   coordination	   between	   the	   military	   and	  
humanitarian	  components	  of	  UNAMSIL	  was	  poor,	  and	  early	  enforcement	  action	  against	  the	  
RUF	  undermined	  the	  neutrality	  of	  the	  UN’s	  humanitarian	  agencies	  on	  the	  ground.	  Between	  
May	  and	  July	  2000,	  not	  a	  single	  meeting	  took	  place	  between	  the	  Special	  Representative	  to	  
the	   Secretary-­‐General	   (SRSG),	  who	  was	   in	   charge	  of	  UNAMSIL,	   and	   the	  UN	  humanitarian	  
agencies.257	  	  
Thus,	  by	  March	  2000,	  the	  security	  situation	  for	  civilians	  had	  not	  much	  improved.	  In	  
his	  third	  report	  to	  the	  Security	  Council	  on	  UNAMSIL,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  noted	  that	  the	  
human	   rights	   situation	   in	   RUF-­‐controlled	   areas	   remained	   poor,	   even	   in	   UNAMSIL	  
controlled	  areas	  such	  as	  Port	  Loko,	  “where	  looting	  of	  villages,	  house	  burnings,	  harassment	  
and	  abduction	  of	  civilians,	  rape	  and	  sexual	  abuse	  continue.”258	  HRW	  documented	  numerous	  
rebel	   abuses	   in	   the	   Port	   Loko	   area	   during	   January	   and	   February	   2000.259	   Some	   attacks	  
occurred	  less	  than	  a	  kilometer	  from	  UNAMSIL	  checkpoints.	  HRW	  accused	  UNAMSIL	  troops	  
of	   being	   unwilling	   to	   intervene	   to	   protect	   the	   civilian	   population,	   despite	   having	   the	  
authorization	   to	  do	   so.	  The	  hostage	   crisis	   in	  May	  2000	   revealed	  precisely	  how	  unwilling	  
some	  forces	  were	  to	  employ	  authorized	  levels	  of	  force.	  UNAMSIL’s	  public	  image	  sank	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  its	  failures	  to	  protect	  civilians	  and	  the	  hostage	  situation.	  It	  was	  accused	  of	  military	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incompetence	  by	   the	  media	  and	  referred	   to	  by	  unfortunate	  acronyms	  such	  as	   “U-­‐NASTY”	  
and	  “UNAMSILLY”	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  Sierra	  Leone.260	  	  
UNAMSIL’s	   demonstration	   of	   its	   POC	  objectives	   improved	   after	   the	   hostage	   crisis.	  
The	   influx	  of	  UK	  troops	  provided	  the	  additional	  manpower	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  the	  RUF	  
from	  retaking	  Freetown,	  where	   it	  had	  murdered	  thousands	  of	  civilians	  during	  “Operation	  
No	  Living	  Thing”	  during	  January	  1999.	  With	  help	  from	  the	  UK,	  UNAMSIL	  was	  better	  able	  to	  
protect	  civilians	  around	  Freetown	  from	  May	  2000.261	  UNAMSIL	  soldiers	  were	  subjected	  to	  
internal	   training	   programs	   and	   given	   pocket-­‐sized	   cards	   with	   UNAMSIL’s	   ROE	   on	   them,	  
including	  the	  explicit	  authorization	  to	  use	  force	  to	  protect	  civilians.262	  This	  way,	  UNAMSIL	  
soldiers	  shared	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  mandate	  and	  the	  ROE,	  and	  much	  of	  the	  confusion	  
that	   led	   to	   the	   hostage	   crisis	   and	   civilian	   casualties	   was	   eliminated.	   The	   structure	   of	  
UNAMSIL	  was	  reorganized	  to	  improve	  coordination	  between	  its	  military	  and	  humanitarian	  
components.	   The	   SRSG	   served	   as	   the	   head	   Humanitarian	   Coordinator	   and	   the	   head	  
Resident	  Coordinator,	  which	  resulted	  in	  more	  cooperation	  and	  more	  successful	  POC.	  This	  
model	  worked	  well,	  and	  inspired	  the	  UN’s	  ‘integrated	  missions’	  approach.263	  Finally,	  the	  UN	  
Security	   Council	   authorized	   greater	   troop	   strength	   and	   eventually	   granted	   UNAMSIL	  
Chapter	  VII	   powers	   to	   pro-­‐actively	   counter	  RUF	   threats	   and	   to	   restore	   law	   and	   order	   to	  
Sierra	  Leone.264	  The	   implementation	  of	   this	  mandate	   took	   time,	  but	   eventually	  UNAMSIL	  
soldiers	  were	  able	   to	   conduct	   long	  patrols	   into	  RUF-­‐controlled	  areas	  and	   forcibly	  disarm	  
the	   rebels.	  The	   forced	  disarmament	  of	   the	   rebels	   resulted	   in	   the	   elimination	  of	   the	  main	  
threat	  to	  the	  civilian	  population.	  	  
Unfortunately,	  UNAMSIL	  was	  accused	  of	  physically	  and	  sexually	  abusing	  civilians	  in	  
Sierra	   Leone.	   There	   is	   evidence	   that	   a	   commercial	   sex	   trade	   involving	   child	   prostitutes	  
formed	   specifically	   to	   cater	   for	   UNAMSIL	   soldiers,265	   and	   a	   study	   commissioned	   by	   the	  
UNHCR	  and	  the	  UK-­‐based	  charity	  Save	  the	  Children	  released	  a	  study	  that	  UNAMSIL	  soldiers	  
had	   sexually	   exploited	   refugee	   children,	  most	   of	   them	   girls	   aged	   thirteen	   to	   eighteen	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260	  Olanisakin,	  Peacekeeping	  in	  Sierra	  Leone:	  The	  Story	  of	  UNAMSIL,	  67.	  
261	  Lamp	  and	  Trif,	  “United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping	  Forces	  and	  the	  Protection	  of	  Civilians	  in	  Armed	  Conflict,”	  12.	  
262	  Lamp	  and	  Trif,	  “United	  Nations	  Peacekeeping	  Forces	  and	  the	  Protection	  of	  Civilians	  in	  Armed	  Conflict,”	  11.	  
263	  Discussed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  	  
264	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/1313,	  4	  August	  2000.	  
265	  Malan,	  Rakate	  and	  McIntyre,	  Peacekeeping	  in	  Sierra	  Leone:	  UNAMSIL	  Hits	  the	  Home	  Straight,	  34.	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February	  2002.266	  These	   allegations	  were	   especially	  disturbing	   given	   the	   vulnerability	   of	  
Sierra	  Leonean	  children	  to	  abuse	  and	  abduction	  and	  the	  efforts	  made	  by	  the	  UN	  to	  counter	  
this	  vulnerability	  with	  Resolution	  1261	  and	  Resolution	  1314.267	  	  
Thus,	   large-­‐scale	   institutionalization	   of	   normative	   evolution	   occurred	   during	  
UNAMSIL	   in	   both	   rhetoric	   and	   organizational	   capacity.	   Demonstration,	   however,	   was	  
contingent	  upon	  military	  and	  diplomatic	   support	   from	   the	  UK.	  Without	   the	  UK’s	  military	  
support,	  UNAMSIL	  would	  not	  have	  been	  able	  to	  protect	  civilians	  around	  Freetown.	  Without	  
the	   UK’s	   diplomatic	   support,	   UNAMSIL	  may	   not	   have	   received	   the	   necessary	   troops	   and	  





	   To	  summarize,	  UNAMSIL	   saw	   the	  most	   significant	   contribution	   to	   the	  POC	  norm’s	  
evolution	   since	  UNOSOM	   II	  with	  Resolution	  1270.	   Starting	  with	  UNAMSIL,	   it	  has	  become	  
common-­‐practice	   for	   the	   Security	   Council	   to	   mandate	   UN	   peace	   missions	   to	   protect	  
civilians	  “under	  imminent	  threat	  of	  physical	  violence.”268	  	  
The	  inclusion	  of	  POC	  in	  Resolution	  1270	  stemmed	  from	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Secretariat	  
and	   NGOs,	   who	   defined	   and	   promoted	   normative	   change.	   However,	   without	   diplomatic	  
pressure	  from	  the	  UK	  on	  the	  Security	  Council	  and	  military	  assistance	  from	  the	  UK	  on	  the	  
ground,	   the	   UN	   would	   have	   been	   unable	   to	   demonstrate	   this	   expanded	   POC	   agenda	   in	  
Sierra	  Leone.	  
The	  UN	  Secretariat	  was	  motivated	  to	  enhance	  the	  UN’s	  POC	  agenda	  after	  its	  failures	  
to	  protect	  civilians	  during	  UN	  peace	  missions	  in	  Rwanda	  and	  former	  Yugoslavia	  attracted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266	  UNHCR	  and	  Save	  the	  Children-­‐UK,	  “Sexual	  Violence	  and	  Exploitation:	  The	  Experience	  of	  Refugee	  Children	  
in	  Guinea,	  Liberia	  and	  Sierra	  Leone,”	  February	  2002,	  Accessed	  25	  September	  2013,	  
http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/sexual_violence_and_exploitation_1.pdf.	  	  
267	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/1314,	  11	  August	  2000.	  
268	  Since	  Resolution	  1270,	  the	  UN	  has	  included	  POC	  in	  the	  mandates	  of	  at	  least	  eleven	  other	  UN-­‐led	  peace	  
missions:	  United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  the	  Central	  African	  Republic	  and	  Chad	  (MINURCAT),	  United	  Nations	  
Organization	  Mission	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  (MONUC),	  United	  Nations	  Operation	  in	  Burundi	  
(ONUB),	  United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  Cote	  d’Ivoire	  (UNOCI),	  AU/UN	  Hybrid	  Operation	  in	  Darfur	  (UNAMID),	  
United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  (UNAMSIL),	  United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  Liberia	  (UNMIL),	  and	  United	  
Nations	  Mission	  in	  Sudan	  (UNMIS),	  United	  Nations	  Mission	  in	  South	  Sudan	  (UNMISS)	  and	  United	  Nations	  
Interim	  Force	  for	  Abyei.	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harsh	   criticism	   to	   the	   organization.	  With	   the	   organization’s	   survival	   in	   jeopardy,	   the	   UN	  
expanded	   its	   functions	   in	   order	   to	   prove	   its	   relevance.	   Subsequently,	   the	   UN	   produced	  
multiple	  reports	  and	  resolutions	  on	  POC,	  which	  would	  ultimately	  tie	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  
organization	  to	  its	  ability	  to	  protect	  civilians	  from	  harm	  during	  armed	  conflict	  in	  the	  future,	  
including	   in	   Sierra	   Leone.	   Thus,	   the	   ultimate	   motives	   were	   not	   ideational	   influences	   or	  
praxis-­‐challenges,	  but	  rather	  organizational	  survival.	  	  	  
Initially,	   normative	   evolution	   during	   UNAMSIL	   was	   marked	   by	   a	   high	   degree	   of	  
institutionalization	   and	   a	   low	   degree	   of	   demonstration.	   After	   the	   hostage	   crisis	   in	   May	  
2000,	  however,	   the	   implementation	  of	   the	  POC	  norm	  on	   the	  ground	   improved	  under	   the	  
diplomatic	   and	  military	   direction	   of	   the	   UK.	  When	   UNAMSIL’s	  mandated	   POC	   objectives	  
were	  finally	  backed	  with	  the	  appropriate	  resources,	  the	  peace	  mission	  was	  able	  to	  disarm	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Chapter	  5	  






	   From	  March	   2005	   to	   July	   2011,	   the	  UN	   conducted	   a	   peace	  mission	   in	   Sudan.	   The	  
purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   explore	   how	   the	   POC	   norm	   evolved	   during	   the	   course	   of	  
UNMIS	  (March	  2005-­‐July	  2011)	  using	  the	  Constructivist	  framework	  outlined	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  
First,	  I	  provide	  background	  information	  that	  outlines	  the	  national	  and	  international	  context	  
and	  explains	  the	  state	  of	  the	  POC	  norm	  at	  the	  start	  of	  UNMIS.	  Then,	  I	  employ	  the	  following	  
questions	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  stated	  objective:	  	  
Who	  were	   the	  main	  actors	   that	  defined	  and	  promoted	  normative	  evolution	  within	  
the	   UN	   during	   UNMIS?	   Who	   were	   the	   main	   actors	   that	   were	   capable	   of	   demonstrating	  
normative	   evolution	   on	   the	   ground?	  Was	   normative	   evolution	   at	   the	   UN	   during	   UNMIS	  
motivated	  primarily	   by	   ideational	   influences	   or	  praxis-­‐challenges?	   Finally,	   did	  normative	  
evolution	  occur	  during	  UNMIS	  through	  institutionalization	  or	  demonstration?	  
	  
	  
5.2	  Background:	  The	  POC	  Norm	  Prior	  to	  UNMIS	  
	  
5.2.1	  National	  Context	  
	  
	   Sudan’s	   history	   since	   its	   independence	   from	   Britain	   in	   1956	   is	   one	   of	   intrastate	  
wars.	   From	   1956	   to	   1972,	   and	   again	   from	   1983	   to	   2005,	   civil	   war	   pitted	   tribes	   from	  
southern	  Sudan	  against	  the	  central	  government	  in	  the	  north.	  The	  government,	  along	  with	  
perpetuating	  the	  system	  of	  uneven	  development	  between	  the	  north	  and	  the	  south	  imposed	  
by	   the	   British,	   also	   instituted	   policies	   of	   forced	   Arabization	   and	   Islamization	   on	   the	  
southern	   tribes.	   The	   southern	   tribes,	   united	   under	   the	   Sudan	   People’s	   Liberation	   Army	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(SPLA),	  fought	  over	  a	  period	  of	  nearly	  five	  decades	  to	  create	  a	  multi-­‐ethnic,	  multi-­‐religious,	  
and	  secular	  Sudan;	   failing	  that,	   the	  tribes	  would	  fight	  to	  secede	  and	  form	  an	  independent	  
South	  Sudan.269	  In	  1987,	  the	  Sudanese	  state	  of	  Darfur	  launched	  its	  first	  of	  three	  rebellions.	  
Though	  Darfur	   is	   located	   in	  north	  Sudan,	   like	   the	  south	   it	   is	   impoverished	  and	  politically	  
marginalized,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  subject	  to	  drought	  and	  famine.	  The	  Darfuri	  tribes	  rebelled	  again	  
in	  1995	  and	  2003.	  	  
Thus,	   for	   many	   years,	   the	   Sudanese	   government	   had	   to	   fight	   a	   civil	   war	   against	  
southern	  tribes	  and	  quell	  rebellions	  in	  Darfur	  concurrently.	  While	  the	  main	  causes	  of	  these	  
conflicts	   are	   disputed,	   it	   is	   agreed	   that	   civilian	   casualties	   were	   high	   and	   the	   main	  
perpetrators	  of	  attacks	  against	  civilians	  were	  government-­‐backed	  militias.270	  By	  2005,	  the	  
civil	   wars	   had	   left	   2.5	   million	   dead	   and	   displaced	   4	   million	   more.271	   Roughly	   300,000	  
people	  died	  during	   the	   third	  Darfur	   rebellion	  alone	   (2003-­‐2010),272	  with	  such	  speed	  and	  
brutality	  that	  some	  observers	  called	  it	  genocide.273	  
	  
5.2.2	  International	  Context	  
	  
As	  the	  20th	  century	  came	  to	  an	  end,	  the	  UN	  brought	  world	  leaders	  together	  to	  reflect	  
upon	   global	   challenges	   and	   to	   affirm	   the	   role	   of	   the	   UN	   in	   correcting	   the	   disparities	   of	  
globalization.	  In	  anticipation	  of	  the	  Summit,	  Annan	  prepared	  his	  Millennium	  Report,	  where	  
he	  described	  the	  devastating	  effects	  of	  the	  internal	  wars	  of	  the	  1990s,	  which	  “violated,	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269	  Andrew	  Natsios,	  Sudan,	  South	  Sudan	  and	  Darfur:	  What	  Everyone	  Needs	  to	  Know	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  2012),	  13.	  	  
270	  Scott	  Straus,	  “Darfur	  and	  the	  Genocide	  Debate,”	  Foreign	  Affairs	  84,1	  (2005).	  	  
271	  Natsios,	  Sudan,	  South	  Sudan	  and	  Darfur:	  What	  Everyone	  Needs	  to	  Know,	  1.	  	  
272	  The	  number	  of	  civilian	  casualties	  accrued	  during	  the	  third	  Darfur	  rebellion	  is	  particularly	  contentious.	  The	  
lowest	  civilian	  casualty	  estimates	  come	  from	  the	  Sudanese	  national	  government,	  which	  claims	  that	  only	  
20,000	  civilians	  died	  (Natsios,	  Sudan,	  South	  Sudan	  and	  Darfur:	  What	  Everyone	  Needs	  to	  Know,	  150-­‐155).	  Some	  
of	  the	  highest	  estimates	  come	  from	  American	  journalists	  and	  advocacy	  groups,	  such	  as	  the	  Enough	  Campaign	  
and	  the	  Save	  Darfur	  Coalition.	  The	  inevitable	  truth	  is	  that	  the	  number	  of	  casualties	  was	  manipulated	  not	  only	  
by	  the	  Sudanese	  government,	  but	  also	  by	  those	  advocating	  for	  an	  external	  military	  intervention	  into	  Darfur.	  
For	  example,	  between	  2004	  and	  2006,	  journalist	  Nicholas	  Kristof’s	  mortality	  estimates	  fluctuated	  
considerably.	  In	  2004,	  he	  called	  what	  was	  going	  on	  in	  Darfur	  a	  genocide	  and	  estimated	  that	  up	  to	  1,000	  
people	  were	  dying	  a	  week.	  After	  a	  report	  by	  a	  UN	  Commission	  ruled	  that	  the	  killings	  in	  Darfur	  were	  not	  in	  fact	  
genocidal,	  Kristof	  admitted	  that	  the	  numbers	  were	  “fuzzy”	  (Mahmood	  Mamdani,	  “The	  Politics	  of	  Naming:	  
Genocide,	  Civil	  War	  and	  Insurgency,”	  The	  London	  Review	  of	  Books,	  8	  March	  2007).	  	  
273	  Nicholas	  Kristof,	  “Dare	  We	  Call	  it	  Genocide?”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  16	  June	  2004.	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so	  much	  borders,	  as	  people.”274	  He	  argued	  that,	   in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  these	   internal	  wars,	  a	  
new	   understanding	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   security	   was	   emerging,	   one	   that	   focused	   on	   the	  
protection	   of	   communities	   and	   individuals	   instead	   of	   the	   sanctity	   of	   international	  
borders.275	  In	  the	  subsequent	  United	  Nations	  Millennium	  Declaration,	  all	  member	  states	  of	  
the	   UN	   pledged	   to	   expand	   and	   strengthen	   the	   protection	   of	   civilians	   in	   complex	  
emergencies.276	  	  	  
Also	  in	  his	  Millennium	  Report,	  Annan	  wrote	  that	  existing	  international	  conventions	  
expected	   the	   nation-­‐state	   to	   be	   the	   primary	   guarantor	   of	   civilian	   security	   within	   its	  
borders,	   but	   national	   governments	   were	   too	   often	   the	   perpetrators	   of	   violence	   against	  
civilians	   throughout	   the	   20th	   century.	   Annan	   reminded	   his	   readers	   of	   his	   address	   to	   the	  
General	  Assembly	  in	  September	  1999,	  where	  he	  recommended	  that	  widespread	  violations	  
of	  IHL	  merited	  intervention	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter.277	  This	  recommendation	  
had	  provoked	  a	  backlash	  from	  nation-­‐states	  concerned	  that	  human	  rights	  would	  be	  used	  as	  
a	   guise	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	   affairs	   of	   smaller	   states.	   Annan	   said	   he	   understood	   concerns	  
about	  humanitarian	  intervention	  violating	  state	  sovereignty,	  
	  
But	  to	  the	  critics	  I	  would	  pose	  this	  question:	  if	  humanitarian	  intervention	  is,	  indeed,	  
an	   unacceptable	   assault	   on	   sovereignty,	   how	   should	  we	   respond	   to	   a	  Rwanda,	   to	   a	  
Srebrenica—to	   gross	   and	   systematic	   violations	   of	   human	   rights	   that	   offend	   every	  
precept	  of	  our	  common	  humanity.278	  
	  
In	  response,	  the	  Canadian	  government	  commissioned	  International	  Commission	  on	  
Intervention	   and	   State	   Sovereignty	   (ICISS)	   to	   mitigate	   the	   challenges	   presented	   to	  
humanitarian	   intervention	   by	   state	   sovereignty.	   The	   ICISS’	   subsequent	   report,	   The	  
Responsibility	   to	   Protect,	   established	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘the	   responsibility	   to	   protect’	   (R2P),	  
which	  built	  upon	  the	  POC	  agenda	  by	  overruling	  the	  need	  for	  state	  consent.279	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274	  Kofi	  Annan,	  We	  The	  Peoples:	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  the	  21st	  Century	  (New	  York:	  United	  Nations	  
Department	  of	  Public	  Information,	  2000),	  43.	  
275	  Ibid.	  
276	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly,	  S/RES/55/2,	  18	  September	  2000.	  
277	  United	  Nations	  Secretary-­‐General,	  S/1999/957,	  21.	  	  
278	  Kofi	  Annan,	  We	  The	  Peoples:	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  the	  21st	  Century	  (New	  York:	  United	  Nations	  
Department	  of	  Public	  Information,	  2000),	  47.	  
279	  The	  International	  Commission	  on	  Intervention	  and	  State	  Sovereignty	  (ICISS),	  The	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  
(Ottawa:	  The	  International	  Development	  Research	  Center,	  December	  2001).	  	  
	   78	  
Before	  the	  report	  could	  be	  published,	  the	  events	  of	  11	  September	  2001	  devastated	  
the	   US	   and	   brought	   terrorism	   to	   the	   fore	   of	   the	   international	   community’s	   concerns.	   In	  
response	   to	   the	   attacks,	   the	   US	   launched	  military	   campaigns	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   Iraq	   in	  
2001	  and	  2003,	   respectively.	  The	  UN	  responded	   to	   the	  upsurge	   in	  global	   terrorism	  as	   “a	  
new	  kind	  of	  threat	  to	  civilians,”	  and	  its	  work	  on	  expanding	  POC	  as	  a	  concept	  and	  improving	  
its	   implementation	  on	   the	   ground	   increased	   exponentially.280	   In	   the	   five	   years	  preceding	  
UNMIS,	   POC	   became	   and	   remained	   a	   significant	   issue	   at	   the	  UN,	   as	   indicated	   by	   the	   ten	  
Security	  Council	  meetings,	  four	  statements	  from	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  and	  





This	  section	  explores	  which	  actors	  were	  most	  responsible	   for	  normative	  evolution	  
during	  UNMIS.	  Who	  were	  the	  main	  actors	  that	  defined	  and	  promoted	  normative	  evolution	  
within	  the	  UN?	  Who	  were	  the	  main	  actors	  that	  were	  capable	  of	  demonstrating	  normative	  
evolution	  on	  the	  ground?	  
In	   2005,	   Sudan’s	   second	   civil	   war	   ended	   when	   the	   government	   and	   southern	  
factions	   signed	   the	   Comprehensive	   Peace	   Agreement	   (CPA).	   The	   CPA	   established	   an	  
autonomous	  government	  in	  South	  Sudan,	  and	  it	  stipulated	  that	  southerners	  would	  vote	  on	  
secession	  in	  2011.	  The	  UN	  created	  UNMIS	  to	  remain	  in	  Sudan	  from	  2005	  to	  2011,	  during	  
which	   time	   UNMIS’	   main	   focus	   would	   be	   facilitating	   “political	   progress	   towards	  
consolidation	  of	  the	  recently	  signed	  peace	  agreement	  through	  political	  support,	  monitoring	  
and	   verification,	   humanitarian	   and	   development	   assistance,	   and	   governance	   capacity	  
building.”281	   Because	   of	   UNMIS’	   broad	   agenda,	   the	   Secretary-­‐General	   stressed	   the	  
importance	  of	  making	  UNMIS	  an	  ‘integrated	  mission,’	  where	  the	  SRSG	  has	  authority	  over	  all	  
UN	  activities	   in	   the	  country	  and	  coordinates	   the	  work	  of	  development,	  humanitarian	  and	  
military	   actors.	   Resolution	   1590	   put	   the	   SRSG	   for	   Sudan,	   Jan	   Pronk,	   in	   charge	   of	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establishing	  the	  overall	  framework	  that	  would	  guide	  UNMIS’	  activities	  and	  ensuring	  that	  all	  
the	  components	  of	  the	  UN	  in	  Sudan	  pursued	  a	  coordinated	  and	  coherent	  approach.282	  
UNMIS’	  activities	  included	  POC	  tasks	  traditionally	  coordinated	  by	  humanitarian	  and	  
development	   agencies,	   such	   as	   mobilizing	   resources	   for	   short-­‐term	   humanitarian	  
assistance	  as	  well	  as	  long-­‐term	  economic	  development.	  Given	  the	  frequency	  and	  nature	  of	  
attacks	  against	  civilians	  during	  the	  Sudanese	  civil	  war,	  the	  Security	  Council	  also	  expressed	  
its	   concern	   for	   POC	   in	   Resolution	   1590	   and	   authorized	   UNMIS	   to	   protect	   humanitarian	  
workers	  and	  civilians	  under	  imminent	  threat	  of	  physical	  violence	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  
UN	   Charter.283	   However,	   POC	   was	   not	   one	   of	   UNMIS’	   main	   priorities;	   rather	   UNMIS’	  
primary	  purpose	  was	  to	  be	  “an	  observer	  and	  verification	  force	  to	  assist	  implementation	  of	  
the	  CPA.”284	   
Whereas	  previous	  UN	  peace	  missions	  generally	  addressed	  POC	  with	  three	  separate	  
strategies	   (development,	   humanitarian	   and	  military),	   POC	   became	   a	   coordinated	   activity	  
under	  UNMIS.	  UNMIS	  had	   its	   own	  Protection	   of	   Civilians	   section,	  whose	   responsibility	   it	  
was	  to	  coordinate	  all	  efforts	   towards	  the	  protection	  of	  civilians.285	  This	  was	  the	   first	  POC	  
section	   ever	   devised	   for	   a	   UN	   peace	  mission.	   However,	   UNMIS’	   POC	   strategy	  was	   never	  
fully	  integrated.	  Instead,	  reports	  from	  the	  POC	  section	  failed	  to	  mention	  any	  coordination	  
between	  civilian	  and	  military	  actors	  with	  regard	  to	  POC	  on	  the	  ground.286	  In	  2008,	  the	  UN’s	  
newest	  Secretary-­‐General,	  Ban	  Ki-­‐moon,	  suggested	  that	  UNMIS	  increase	  its	  military	  role	  in	  
POC,287	  but	  the	  mission’s	  ensuing	  CONOPS	  did	  not	  elaborate	  any	  further	  on	  UNMIS’	  role	  in	  
POC.	   Subsequent	   violence	   against	   civilians	   in	   Abyei,	   a	   disputed	   region	   in	   the	   middle	   of	  
Sudan,	  prompted	   the	  US	  Special	  Envoy	   to	  Sudan	   to	  criticize	  UNMIS.	  The	  Security	  Council	  
then	   passed	   Resolution	   1870,	   which	   extended	   the	   mandate	   of	   UNMIS	   and	   focused	   on	  
several	   POC	   issues,	   such	   as	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   LRA	   and	   the	   need	   to	   development	   a	  
comprehensive	   strategy	   on	   POC.288	  Despite	   this	   interest,	   POC	  would	   remain	   a	   secondary	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concern	   for	   UNMIS.	   The	   Security	   Council	   stressed	   that	   the	   Sudanese	   government	   bore	  
ultimate	  responsibility	  for	  its	  own	  citizens,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  the	  Sudanese	  government	  that	  
ultimately	   needed	   to	   take	   the	   steps	   to	   restore	   effective	   assistance	   to	   Sudan’s	   most	  
vulnerable	  civilians.289	  
In	  July	  2006,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  suggested	  that	  the	  UN	  lend	  short-­‐term	  support	  
to	   the	   African	   Union	   Mission	   in	   Sudan	   (AMIS)	   before	   expanding	   UNMIS	   into	   Darfur	   to	  
replace	  AMIS	  in	  early	  2007.290	  UNMIS’	  main	  tasks	  in	  Darfur	  would	  include	  supporting	  the	  
peace	  process	  and	  good	  offices;	  promoting	  the	  rule	  of	   law,	  governance	  and	  human	  rights;	  
coordinating	   humanitarian	   assistance;	   and	   providing	   security	   and	   physical	   protection,	  
including	   protection	   for	   civilians	   under	   imminent	   threat.291	   The	   Security	   Council’s	  
deliberations	  around	  Resolution	  1706,	  which	  authorized	  of	  UNMIS’	  expansion	  into	  Darfur	  
in	   Resolution	   1706,	   expressed	   “a	   strong	   understanding	   of	   and	   commitment	   to	   the	  
international	  community’s	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  civilians.”292	  
The	   Sudanese	   government,	   however,	   rejected	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   UN	   peace	  mission	   for	  
Darfur.	   Without	   consent	   from	   the	   Sudanese	   government,	   the	   UN	   would	   not	   deploy	   its	  
troops,	   despite	   pleas	   from	  many	   actors	   to	   enact	   R2P.	   As	   early	   as	  March	   2004,	   the	   UN’s	  
humanitarian	   coordinator	   in	   Sudan	   called	   the	   situation	   in	   Darfur	   genocide.	   Speaking	   to	  
reporters,	  he	  said,	   “The	  only	  difference	  between	  Rwanda	  and	  Darfur	  now	  is	   the	  numbers	  
involved.”293	  The	  US	  State	  Department	  supported	  that	  claim	  in	  July	  2004,	  after	  a	  mass	  civil	  
society	   campaign	   led	   two	   Congressmen	   to	   introduce	   resolutions	   in	   the	   House	   of	  
Representatives	   that	   called	   the	   violence	   in	   Darfur	   genocide.294	   During	   an	   address	   to	   the	  
General	   Assembly,	   Bush	   repeated	   this	   genocide	   charge.295	   At	   American	   behest,	   the	   UN	  
Security	   Council	   established	   the	   International	   Commission	   of	   Inquiry	   on	   Darfur	   (ICID),	  
which	  found	  no	  evidence	  of	  genocidal	  intent	  in	  Darfur,	  but	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  decided	  
to	   refer	  Darfur	   to	   the	   International	  Criminal	  Court	   (ICC)	  nonetheless.	  Darfur	  became	   the	  
first	   case	   the	  Security	  Council	   referred	   to	   the	   ICC,	   and	   its	   referral	   continued	   the	  Security	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Council’s	   trend	   of	   choosing	   post-­‐conflict	   justice	   to	   punish	   perpetrators	   of	   IHL	   over	  
intervention	  to	  halt	  abuses	  of	  IHL.	  	  
But	   instead	   of	   enacting	   R2P,	   the	   UN	   reached	   a	   compromise	   with	   the	   Sudanses	  
government	   in	   the	   first	   months	   of	   2007	   that	   resulted	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   joint	   AU/UN	  
peacekeeping	   operation,	   the	   first	   of	   its	   kind.	  On	  31	   July	   2007,	   the	   Sudanese	   government	  
finally	  accepted	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  African	  Union/United	  Nations	  Hybrid	  Operation	  in	  
Darfur	  (UNAMID),	  though	  it	  stated	  publicly	  that	  UNAMID	  would	  to	  be	  composed	  mainly	  of	  
African	   personnel.	   While	   UNAMID	   is	   still	   active	   in	   Darfur,	   UNMIS	   ended	   in	   July	   2011	  
following	  the	  six	  and	  half	  year	  interim	  period	  set	  up	  by	  the	  CPA	  and	  the	  secession	  of	  South	  
Sudan	  from	  Sudan.	  	  
In	  summation,	  the	  UN	  Secretariat	  and	  Security	  Council	  played	  a	  strong	  role	  defining	  
and	   promoting	   POC	   objectives	   throughout	   UNMIS.	   The	   Secretariat	   developed	   the	  
integrated	   mission,	   POC	   section	   and	   CPU	   in	   the	   hopes	   of	   better	   coordination	   and	  
demonstration	  by	  the	  many	  actors	  involved	  in	  POC	  the	  ground.	  However,	  these	  same	  actors	  






	   This	   section	   explores	   which	   motives	   best	   explain	   normative	   evolution	   during	  
UNMIS.	   Was	   normative	   evolution	   at	   the	   UN	   during	   UNMIS	   motivated	   primarily	   by	  
ideational	  influences	  or	  praxis-­‐challenges?	  
The	  Secretariat	  and	  Security	  Council	  were	  motivated	  by	  this	  ideational	  progress	  the	  
UN	  had	  made	   in	   the	   field	  of	  POC	   in	   the	   five	  years	  prior	   to	  UNMIS	   to	   create	   a	  broad	  POC	  
agenda	   for	   UNMIS.	   Between	   1999	   and	   2004,	   the	   Secretariat	   and	   Security	   Council	   had	  
considerably	  expanded	  POC	  as	  a	  concept	  beyond	  the	  protection	  of	  civilians	  from	  imminent	  
physical	   danger.	   The	   conceptual	   expansion	   of	   POC	   began	   with	   the	   Security	   Council’s	  
thematic	   resolutions.	   Resolution	   1265	   highlighted	   some	   key	   aspects	   of	   POC	   beyond	   the	  
protection	   of	   civilians	   from	   imminent	   physical	   danger,	   such	   as	   access	   to	   vulnerable	  
populations;	   combating	   impunity;	   restoring	   law	   and	   order;	   adequately	   disarming,	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demobilizing,	   reintegrating	   and	   rehabilitating	   ex-­‐combatants;	   addressing	   small	   arms	   and	  
mine	  action;	   training	  of	  security	  and	  peacekeeping	   forces;	  addressing	   the	  vulnerability	  of	  
women;	   addressing	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   children;	   and	   providing	   safety	   and	   security	   for	  
humanitarian	   and	   associated	   personnel.296	   In	  April	   2000,	   the	   Security	   Council	   passed	   its	  
third	   resolution	   on	   POC,	   which	   the	   UN’s	   “intention	   to	   ensure,	   where	   appropriate	   and	  
feasible,	   that	  peacekeeping	  missions	  are	  given	  suitable	  mandates	  and	  adequate	  resources	  
to	   protect	   civilians	   under	   imminent	   threat	   of	   physical	   danger.”297	   Resolution	   1296	   also	  
further	  expanded	  the	  POC	  agenda	  to	  include	  measures	  to	  address	  the	  impact	  of	  media	  and	  
the	  humanitarian	   impact	  of	  sanctions.	  Together,	  Resolutions	  1261,	  1265	  and	  1296	  would	  
form	   the	   core	  of	   the	  UN’s	  normative	   framework	  on	  POC,	  on	  which	   it	  would	  base	   its	  POC	  
agenda	  in	  future	  peace	  missions,	  including	  UNMIS.	  
UNMIS’	   POC	   agenda	  was	   also	   based	   on	   the	  OCHA’s	   2002	  Aide	  Memoire.	   The	  Aide	  
Memoire	  was	  created	  after	  a	  series	  of	  round	  tables	  with	  member	  states,	  UN	  agencies,	   the	  
ICRC,	   NGOs	   and	   academic	   experts,	   who	   identified	   the	   key	   areas	   of	   POC	   that	   had	   been	  
overlooked	   or	   poorly	   coordinated	   in	   past	   peace	   missions.	   It	   was	   designed	   to	   help	   the	  
Security	   Council	   diagnose	   the	   key	   protection	   issues	   in	   a	   given	   conflict	   situation.	   The	  
Security	  Council	  adopted	  the	  Aide	  Memoire	  developed	  by	  the	  OCHA	  as	  a	  practical	  tool	  on	  
POC	   “for	   the	   consideration	   of	   issues	   pertaining	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   civilians	   during	   the	  
Security	  Council’s	  deliberation	  of	  peacekeeping	  mandates.”298	  It	  consisted	  of	  thirteen	  core	  
POC	  objectives,	  eleven	  of	  which	  were	   listed	   in	  Resolutions	  1265	  and	  1296.	   In	  addition,	   it	  
listed	   the	   separation	   of	   civilians	   and	   armed	   elements	   and	   natural	   resources	   and	   armed	  
conflict.299	   The	   Aide	   Memoire	   was	   updated	   in	   2003	   and	   included	   one	   additional	   core	  
objective	  for	  POC,	  security	  for	  displaced	  persons	  and	  host	  communities.	  	  
	   The	  greatest	  addition	   to	  POC	  conceptually	  was	  R2P.300	  R2P	   framed	  sovereignty	  as	  
state	  responsibility,	  not	  state	  control.301	  Sovereignty	  as	  responsibility	  implies	  that	  it	  “state	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  Council,	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  September	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  Security	  Council,	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  19	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298	  United	  Nations	  Press	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  SC/7329,	  15	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299	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300	  One	  can	  argue	  that	  POC	  and	  R2P	  are	  both	  part	  of	  a	  greater	  protection	  agenda,	  but	  that	  R2P	  constitutes	  its	  
own	  norm	  or	  principle.	  One	  would	  argue	  that	  R2P	  distinguishes	  itself	  from	  POC	  because	  it	  is	  narrower	  in	  
scope	  (it	  deals	  exclusively	  with	  genocide,	  crimes	  against	  humanity,	  war	  crimes	  and	  ethnic	  cleansing),	  deeper	  
in	  response	  (advocating	  for	  prevention	  and	  rebuilding)	  and	  operational	  without	  host	  state	  consent.	  However,	  
POC	  activities	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  situations	  of	  armed	  conflict.	  They	  can	  also	  occur	  in	  pre-­‐conflict	  or	  post-­‐
	   83	  
authorities	   are	   responsible	   for	   the	   functions	  of	  protecting	   the	   safety	  and	   lives	  of	   citizens	  
and	   promotion	   of	   their	   welfare.”302	   When	   a	   state	   is	   unable	   or	   actively	   disregards	   the	  
welfare	  of	  its	  citizens,	  “it	  becomes	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  international	  community	  to	  act	  
in	  its	  place.”303	  In	  its	  entirety,	  the	  R2P	  encompasses	  a	  holistic	  approach	  to	  human	  security	  
that	   includes	  not	  only	   the	   responsibility	   to	  act	   in	   situations	  of	   “compelling	  human	  need,”	  
but	  also	   to	  address	   the	  root	  causes	  of	   internal	  conflict	  before	  conflict	  arises	   (prevention)	  
and	   after	   it	   occurs	   (rebuild).304	   This	   holistic	   approach	   to	   protection	   necessitates	  
coordination	  between	  development,	  humanitarian	  and	  security	  initiatives.	  	  
In	  2004,	  Annan	  endorsed	  “the	  emerging	  norm	  that	  there	  is	  a	  collective	  international	  
responsibility	  to	  protect”305	  when	  he	  commissioned	  a	  panel	  to	  report	  on	  the	  world’s	  most	  
pressing	   security	   needs	   before	   the	   2005	   World	   Summit.	   In	   the	   2005	   World	   Summit	  
Outcome	  Document,	  member	  states	  affirmed	  that	  the	  international	  community,	  through	  the	  
UN,	  has	  a	  responsibility	  to	  take	  collective	  action	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  Charter	  “should	  
peaceful	   means	   be	   inadequate	   and	   national	   authorities	   manifestly	   fail	   to	   protect	   their	  
populations	  from	  genocide,	  war	  crimes,	  ethnic	  cleansing	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity.”306	  
In	  2006,	  the	  Security	  Council	  adopted	  Resolution	  1674,	  which	  reaffirmed	  “the	  provisions	  of	  
paragraphs	   138	   and	   139	   of	   the	   2005	  World	   Summit	   Outcome	   Document	   regarding	   the	  
responsibility	   to	   protect	   populations	   from	   genocide,	   war	   crimes,	   ethnic	   cleansing	   and	  
crimes	  against	  humanity.”307	  	  Resolution	  1706	  also	  reaffirmed	  paragraphs	  138	  and	  139	  of	  
the	  World	  Summit	  Outcome	  Document.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conflict	  situations,	  as	  evident	  by	  POC	  activities	  carried	  out	  by	  UN	  peacekeepers	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  conflicts.	  
The	  Brahimi	  Report	  makes	  clear	  that	  peacekeepers	  are	  authorized	  to	  stop	  violence	  against	  civilians	  without	  
qualification,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  operating	  in	  the	  context	  of	  armed	  conflict.	  Moreover,	  since	  
1999,	  the	  Security	  Council	  has	  begun	  to	  authorize	  POC	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  meaning	  it	  is	  
operational	  without	  consent.	  Thus,	  the	  two	  concepts	  are	  not	  as	  distinct	  as	  it	  may	  appear.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  
this	  thesis,	  R2P	  is	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  POC	  norm	  (Hugh	  Breaky,	  “The	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  and	  the	  
Protection	  of	  Civilians	  in	  Armed	  Conflict:	  Overlap	  and	  Contrasts,”	  in	  Norms	  of	  Protection:	  Responsibility	  to	  
Protect,	  Protection	  of	  Civilians	  and	  their	  Interaction,	  62-­‐81).	  	  
301	  ICISS,	  The	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect,	  13.	  
302	  Ibid.	  
303	  ICISS,	  The	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect,	  17.	  	  
304	  ICISS,	  The	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect,	  XI.	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  United	  Nations,	  A	  More	  Secure	  World:	  Our	  Shared	  Responsibility,	  Report	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  High	  
Level	  Panel	  on	  Threats,	  Challenges	  and	  Change	  (New	  York:	  United	  Nations	  Department	  of	  Public	  Information	  
2004),	  201.	  
306	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly,	  A/60/L.1,	  “2005	  World	  Summit	  Outcome,”	  9	  September	  2005,	  31.	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  United	  Nations	  Security	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  2006.	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While	  the	  POC	  agenda	  for	  UNMIS	  reflected	  the	  normative	  framework	  outlined	  by	  the	  
Security	  Council’s	  thematic	  resolutions	  and	  the	  OHCA’s	  Aide	  Memoire,	  the	  Security	  Council	  
could	  not	  bring	  itself	   to	  act	  upon	  R2P	  in	  Darfur.	   In	  previous	  situations	  where	  the	  UN	  had	  
tried	  to	  implement	  POC	  objectives	  without	  consent	  from	  the	  host	  state	  or	  warring	  parties,	  
the	  peace	  mission	  had	  failed	  to	  meet	   its	  objectives	  and	  the	  UN	  faced	  harsh	  criticism	  from	  
the	   international	   community.	   Moreover,	   Darfur	   presented	   other	   operational	   difficulties	  
that	  made	   failure	   for	   a	  UN	  peace	  mission	   there	   seem	   likely.	   Some	  warring	   factions	  were	  
notoriously	   hostile	   towards	   peacekeepers.	   And,	   while	   some	   organizations	   like	   the	  
International	   Crisis	   Group	   (ICG)	   released	   their	   report	   “Getting	   the	   UN	   into	   Darfur,”308	  
others	  like	  MSF	  warned	  that	  an	  invasion	  of	  Darfur	  by	  the	  UN	  would	  end	  in	  a	  bloodbath	  for	  
peacekeepers,	   humanitarian	   workers	   and	   civilians	   alike.309	   Thus,	   the	   UN	   hesitated	   to	  
become	  enact	  R2P	  in	  Darfur,	  despite	  pressure	  from	  international	  civil	  society	  and	  Congress	  
to	  intervene,	  because	  it	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  the	  criticism	  that	  would	  stem	  from	  a	  failure	  there.	  	  
It	   is	  clear	  that	  the	  UN’s	  POC	  agenda	  was	  not	  motivated	  by	  praxis-­‐challenges.	   If	   the	  
UN	   had	   taken	   praxis-­‐challenges	   into	   consideration,	   UNMIS’	   POC	   agenda	  would	   not	   have	  
been	  as	  broad	  or	  ambitious.	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  believed	  that	  UN	  peace	  missions	  were	  ultimately	  
ill-­‐suited	  to	  carry	  out	  large	  enforcement	  operations	  or	  to	  perform	  complicated	  tasks	  such	  
as	   protecting	   civilians,	   especially	   when	   compared	   to	   troops	   from	   nations	   with	   strong	  
military	  capabilities,	  such	  as	  the	  US	  or	  the	  UK.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  ‘Enforcement	  Action’	  section	  of	  
his	  revised	  version	  of	  An	  Agenda	  for	  Peace	  (1995),	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  argued:	  	  
	  
“[N]either	  the	  Security	  Council	  nor	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  at	  present	  has	  the	  capacity	  
to	  deploy,	  direct,	  command	  and	  control	  operations	   for	   this	  purpose,	  except	  perhaps	  
on	  a	  very	  limited	  scale.	   I	  believe	  that	   it	   is	  desirable	  in	  the	  long	  term	  that	  the	  United	  
Nations	   develop	   such	   a	   capacity,	   but	   it	   would	   be	   folly	   to	   attempt	   to	   do	   so	   at	   the	  
present	  time	  when	  the	  Organization	  is	  resource-­‐starved	  and	  hard	  pressed	  to	  handle	  
the	   less	   demanding	   peacemaking	   and	   peace-­‐keeping	   responsibilities	   entrusted	   to	  
it.310	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   He	   also	   warned	   against	   authorizing	   peace	   missions	   under	   both	   Chapter	   VI	   and	  
Chapter	   VII	   of	   the	   UN	   Charter.	   He	   argued	   that	   blurring	   the	   distinction	   between	  
peacekeeping	   and	   peace	   enforcement	   duties	   could	   undermine	   the	   viability	   of	   the	   entire	  
mission,	  threaten	  political	  processes	  of	  peacemaking	  and	  endanger	  UN	  personnel.311	  
But,	   according	   to	   Constructivists,	   it	   is	   not	   uncommon	   for	   IOs	   to	   expand	   their	  
functions	   without	   taking	   into	   account	   “features	   of	   reality	   that	   threaten	   their	   ability	   to	  
accomplish	  these	  missions.”312	  Thus,	   the	  Security	  Council	  blurred	  the	  distinction	  between	  
peacekeeping	   and	   peace	   enforcement	   duties	   in	   both	   Sierra	   Leone	   and	   Sudan,	  where	   the	  
peace	   missions	   were	   authorized	   under	   Chapter	   VI	   but	   the	   peace	   soldiers	   were	   given	  
Chapter	   VII	   enforcement	   powers	   to	   protect	   civilians	   and	   humanitarian	   workers	   from	  
imminent	  threats	  of	  physical	  violence.	  	  
In	  summation,	  based	  on	  the	  incredible	  progress	  the	  UN	  had	  made	  in	  the	  field	  of	  POC	  
conceptually	   in	   the	   five	   years	   prior	   to	  UNMIS,	   the	   Secretariat	   and	   Security	   Council	  were	  
motivated	   by	   ideational	   influences	   to	   create	   a	   broad	   POC	   agenda	   for	   UNMIS.	   These	   POC	  
objectives,	  however,	  still	  operated	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  host	  state	  consent.	  When	  the	  






This	   section	   explores	   the	  mechanisms	   behind	   normative	   evolution	   during	  UNMIS.	  
Did	   normative	   evolution	   occur	   during	   UNMIS	   primarily	   through	   institutionalization	   or	  
demonstration?	  	  
Throughout	  UNMIS,	   institutionalization	  of	   the	  UN’s	  broad	  POC	  agenda	  occurred	   in	  
organizational	  capacity	  and	  rhetoric.	  One	  increase	  in	  organizational	  capacity	  for	  POC	  came	  
with	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   integrated	  mission.	   As	   peace	  missions	   became	   increasingly	  
more	   complex	   throughout	   the	   1990s,	   actors	   traditionally	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   peace	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  Peace:	  Position	  Paper	  of	  the	  Secretary-­General	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missions	  became	   involved	   in	   the	  processes	  of	   conflict	   resolution	  and	  peace-­‐building.	  The	  
need	  to	  coordinate	  the	  activities	  of	  these	  actors	  under	  a	  single	  country-­‐level	  management	  
structure	  was	  articulated	   in	   the	  Brahimi	  Report.	  The	  UN	  began	  to	  develop	  the	  concept	  of	  
the	  integrated	  mission,	  which	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  a	  mission	  “based	  on	  a	  common	  strategic	  
plan	  and	  a	   shared	  understanding	  of	   the	  priorities	  and	   types	  of	  programme	   interventions	  
that	  need	  to	  be	  undertaken	  at	  various	  stages	  of	  the	  recovery	  process”313	  that	  attempts	  “to	  
maximize	  the	  available	  UN	  resources	  and	  expertise	  to	  bring	  about	  an	  end	  to	  hostilities	  and	  
to	  promote	  long-­‐term	  stability	  and	  development.”314	  During	  integrated	  missions,	  the	  SRSG,	  
as	  the	  senior	  UN	  representative	  in	  the	  host	  nation,	  has	  authority	  over	  all	  UN	  activities	  in	  the	  
country.	   It	   is	   the	   SRSG	   who	   devises	   the	   “coordination	   mechanisms	   among	   the	   security,	  
political,	   human	   rights,	   rule	   of	   law,	   humanitarian	   and	   development	   components”	   of	   the	  
peace	  mission.315	  The	  SRSG	  works	  with	  two	  Deputies,	  one	  (the	  Resident	  Coordinator)	  who	  
reports	  back	  to	  the	  UNDP	  and	  one	  (the	  Humanitarian	  Coordinator)	  who	  reports	  back	  to	  the	  
OCHA.	  As	  an	  integrated	  mission,	  UNMIS	  was	  able	  to	  merge	  the	  development,	  humanitarian	  
and	  military	  aspects	  of	  POC	  under	  one	  managerial	  model.	  	  
Another	   increase	  in	  organizational	  capacity	  came	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  POC	  
section.	   As	   aforementioned,	   UNMIS	   became	   the	   UN’s	   first	   peace	   mission	   to	   have	   a	   POC	  
section. The	  POC	  section	  assisted	  with	  the	  development	  of	  the	  POC	  strategy,	  disseminated	  
information	   among	   all	   agencies	   involved	   with	   POC,	   coordinated	   responses	   to	   situations	  
where	  civilians	  were	  at	   risk	  of	  abuse.316	  Examples	  of	   these	   responses	   included	  providing	  
water	   to	   avert	   conflict	   between	   nomads	   and	   farmers,	   supporting	   justice	   mechanisms,	  
advocated	   for	   command	   and	   control	   of	   armed	   factions,	   supporting	   capacity	   building	   of	  
government	  authorities,	  and	  coordinating	  UNMIS	  patrols.317	  The	  POC	  section	  also	  included	  
a	  Child	  Protection	  Unit	  (CPU),	  which	  was	  part	  of	  the	  POC	  section	  but	  had	  its	  own	  mandate.	  
The	   CPU	   was	   mandated	   to	   support	   the	   implementation	   of	   those	   parts	   of	   the	   CPA	   that	  
required	   specific	  measures	   for	   children,	   advise	   UNMIS	   on	   the	   risks	   that	   children	   face	   in	  
Sudan,	   report	   violations	   of	   children’s	   rights	   “to	   ensure	   that	   the	   protection	   of	   children	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remains	   a	   priority	   throughout	   all	   UNMIS	   operations,”	   and	   to	   work	   with	   “relevant	   UN	  
agencies	  and	  international	  organizations	  to	  address	  grave	  violations	  of	  child’s	  rights.”318	  
Institutionalization	   of	   the	   UN’s	   broad	   POC	   agenda	   through	   rhetoric	   occurred	   in	  
during	   UNMIS	   in	   Security	   Council	   Resolutions.	   For	   instance,	   Resolution	   1590	   mandated	  
UNMIS	  troops	  to	  assist	  with	  many	  of	  the	  POC	  objectives	  outlined	  in	  Resolutions	  1265	  and	  
1296,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  2002	  Aide	  Memoire:	  disarmament,	  demobilization,	  reintegration	  and	  
rehabilitation;	  mitigating	  the	  effects	  of	  conflict	  on	  vulnerable	  populations,	  such	  as	  women	  
and	  children;	  contributing	  to	  order	  by	  restructuring	  and	  training	  the	  police;	  contributing	  to	  
law	  by	  developing	  a	  national	  legal	  framework,	  including	  an	  independent	  judiciary,	  in	  order	  
to	   combat	   impunity;	   establishing	   security	   for	   the	   safe	   return	   of	   refugees	   and	   internally	  
displaced	   persons;	   providing	   safe	   access	   for	   humanitarian	   relief	   and	   personnel	   to	  
vulnerable	  populations;	  and	  encouraging	  training	  of	  peace	  soldiers	  on	  human	  rights	  issues	  
to	  avoid	  sexual	  misconduct.	  	  
However,	   UNMIS’	   robust	   mandate	   and	   increased	   organizational	   capacity	   did	   not	  
equip	  the	  mission	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  adequately	  demonstrate	  POC	  for	  several	  reasons.	  First,	  
UNMIS	  struggled	  to	  demonstrate	  POC	  because	   failures	  at	   the	  political	   level	   in	  Sudan	  kept	  
reigniting	  violence	  on	  the	  ground.	  Slow	  implementation	  of	  the	  CPA	  led	  to	  conflict	  in	  certain	  
areas,	   such	   as	   Abyei.319	   One	   of	   the	  most	   serious	   breaches	   of	   the	   CPA	   occurred	   in	   Abyei	  
town,	   when	   a	   week	   of	   fighting	   resulted	   in	   the	   deaths	   of	   eighty-­‐nine	   people	   and	   the	  
displacement	  of	  over	  fifty	  thousand	  more.320	  UNMIS	  soldiers	  were	  subsequently	  criticized	  
for	   withdrawing	   their	   peacekeepers	   from	   the	   town	   and	   “not	   doing	   more	   to	   protect	   the	  
town	  and	  its	  inhabitants.”321	  	  
Second,	  as	  was	  typical	  of	  UN	  peace	  missions,	  the	  deployment	  of	  UNMIS	  was	  delayed.	  
By	   December	   2005,	   only	   forty	   percent	   of	   UNMIS	   had	   been	   deployed.	   The	   mission	   only	  
reached	   its	   full	   strength	   in	   September	   2006,	   almost	   two	   years	   after	   the	   Security	   Council	  
had	   approved	   UNMIS’	  mandate.322	  Without	   its	   full	   troop	   strength,	   UNMIS	   had	   a	   difficult	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time	   enforcing	   POC	   measures	   on	   the	   ground.	   For	   example,	   the	   Lord’s	   Resistance	   Army	  
(LRA),	   a	   rebel	   group	   from	   neighboring	   Uganda,	   wreaked	   havoc	   in	   South	   Sudan	   under	  
UNMIS’	   watch,	   pillaging	   villages,	   killing	   innocent	   civilians,	   and	   abducting	   women	   and	  
children.323	  By	  2010,	  over	  two	  thousand	  civilians	  were	  killed,	  2,600	  abducted	  and	  440,000	  
displaced	   by	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   LRA	   alone.324	   And	   as	   long	   as	  UNMIS	   failed	   to	   adequately	  
combat	  the	  LRA,	  the	  Sudanese	  communities	  were	  reluctant	  to	  disarm.325	  
But	  even	  with	  its	  authorized	  troop	  strength,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  UNMIS	  was	  not	  given	  
the	   resources	   it	   needed	   to	   accomplish	   such	   a	   broad	   POC	   agenda.	   While	   UNMIS	   was	  
authorized	  under	  Chapter	  VII	   of	   the	  Charter	   to	   protect	   civilians,	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  mandate	  
was	   authorized	  under	  Chapter	  VI.	  Therefore,	  UNMIS	   “was	  designed	  and	   resourced	   to	   act	  
more	  as	  a	  Chapter	  VI	  mission,	  monitoring	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  peace	  agreement	  and	  
facilitating	  the	  delivery	  of	  humanitarian	  assistance.”326	  	  
	   Moreover,	  while	  UNMIS	  made	  use	  of	  the	  UN’s	  integrated	  mission	  model,	  coordination	  
between	  the	  many	  actors	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  Sudan	  was	  still	  poor.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  POC	  section,	  
UNMIS	   had	   a	   Protection	  Working	   Group	   (PWG)	   in	   Juba,	   South	   Sudan,	   which	   comprised	  
most	   actors	   involved	   in	   POC.	   But	   without	   a	   shared	   conception	   or	   definition	   of	   POC,	  
coordination	   between	   members	   of	   the	   PWG	   became	   nearly	   impossible,	   and	   the	   PWG	  
became	  more	  of	  a	  “battlefield	  of	  knowledge	  than	  a	  coherent	  body	  for	  a	  concerted	  approach	  
to	   protection	   issues,”	   with	   actors	   fighting	   “turf	   battles”	   over	   their	   respective	   areas	   of	  
POC.327	   Thus,	   the	   PWG	   had	   “little	   practical	   and	   operational	   value	   aside	   information	  
sharing,”	   and	   some	   members	   stopped	   attended	   the	   meetings	   altogether.328 And,	   as	  
aforementioned,	  the	  POC	  section	  never	  coordinated	  with	  military	  actors.	  	  
Finally,	  even	  if	  UNMIS	  had	  been	  properly	  resourced	  and	  coordinated,	  it	   is	  doubtful	  
that	   it	   could	   have	   accomplished	   its	   POC	   objectives	   due	   to	   the	   sheer	   complexity	   of	   its	  
mandate.	   The	   UN	   Deputy	   Resident	   and	   Humanitarian	   Coordinator	   for	   Southern	   Sudan	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  The	  Security	  Council	  passed	  Resolution	  1663	  on	  24	  March	  2006	  condemning	  the	  attacks	  of	  the	  LRA	  on	  
civilians	  in	  Sudan.	  
324	  Adebajo,	  UN	  Peacekeeping	  in	  Africa:	  From	  the	  Suez	  Crisis	  to	  the	  Sudan	  Crisis,	  200.	  
325	  Arenas-­‐García,	  “The	  UNMIS	  in	  South	  Sudan:	  Challenges	  and	  Dilemmas,”	  11.	  
326	  Arenas-­‐García,	  “The	  UNMIS	  in	  South	  Sudan:	  Challenges	  and	  Dilemmas,”	  17.	  
327	  Jon	  Harald	  Sande	  Lie	  and	  Benjamin	  de	  Carvalho,	  “Between	  Culture	  and	  Concept:	  The	  Protection	  of	  
Civilians	  in	  Sudan	  (UNMIS),”	  Journal	  of	  International	  Peacekeeping	  14	  (2010),	  80.	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argued	  that	  UNMIS	  was	  given	  a	  mandate	  which	  was	  “so	  complex	  that	  even	  highly	  efficient	  
and	  really	  well	  organized	  and	  politically	  empowered	  colonial	  regimes	  wouldn’t	   figure	  out	  
how	  to	  do	   it,	   let	  alone	   the	  UN,	   ripped	  apart	  by	  political	   interests	  with	  very	  dysfunctional	  
administrative	   systems.”329	   Thus,	   UNMIS	   ultimately	   lacked	   the	   ability	   to	   translate	   its	  
mandated	  objectives	  into	  workable	  definitions	  at	  the	  strategic	  or	  operational	  level.	  	  
By	  this	  point,	  the	  gap	  between	  institutionalization	  and	  demonstration	  had	  become	  a	  
pattern	   for	   POC	   with	   regard	   to	   UN	   peace	   missions.	   Two	   main	   problems	   cause	   this	  
‘implementation	   gap.’	   First,	   problems	  with	   the	  UN’s	  military	   capabilities	  make	   it	   difficult	  
for	  UN	  peace	   soldiers	   to	   carry	   out	   enforcement	   activities	   on	   the	   ground,	   including	   using	  
force	   to	  protect	  civilians.	  As	  aforementioned,	   the	  UN	  has	  no	  standing	  military	   force	  of	   its	  
own.	   It	   relies	   upon	   the	   contributions	   of	   member	   states	   for	   troops	   and	   equipment.	   But	  
member	   states	  with	   stronger	  military	   capabilities	   prefer	   to	   lead	   unilateral	   interventions	  
under	   their	   own	   command,	   and	   thus	   troops	   contributed	   to	  UN	  peace	  missions	   are	   often	  
poorly	  trained	  and	  poorly	  equipped.	  Troop	  deployment	   is	  often	  delayed,	  and	  once	  troops	  
are	   on	   the	   ground	   they	   generally	   have	   problems	   communicating	   and	   coordinating.	   UN	  
peace	  missions	  are	  also	  often	  under-­‐resourced,	  especially	  when	  the	  mission	  is	  authorized	  
under	  Chapter	  VI	  but	  given	  Chapter	  VII	  enforcement	  duties.	  	  
Second,	   lack	  of	   a	   coherent	  definition	   for	  POC	  at	   the	  UN	  means	   that	  peace	   soldiers	  
often	  lack	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  their	  POC	  duties	  on	  the	  ground.	  As	  it	  exists	  at	  the	  UN,	  
the	   concept	   of	   POC	   is	   so	   broad	   it	   is	   considered	   a	   “culture.”330	   The	   term	   ‘protection	   of	  
civilians’	   may	   refer	   to	   a	   full	   range	   of	   humanitarian	   and	   peace-­‐building	   activities	   or	   the	  
narrower	   concept	   of	   physical	   protection.	   But	   the	   Security	   Council	   often	   uses	   the	   term	  
‘protection	  of	  civilians’	   in	  the	  mandates	  of	  peace	  missions	  without	  clarifying	  the	  activities	  
to	  which	  it	  is	  referring.331 This	  lack	  of	  clarity	  leads	  to	  poor	  demonstration	  by	  peace	  soldiers	  
on	   the	   ground.	   Precisely	   because	   the	   actors	  who	   develop	   POC	   objectives	   and	   those	  who	  
demonstrate	   them	   on	   the	   ground	   are	   different,	   institutionalization	   does	   not	   necessarily	  
lead	  to	  demonstration.	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  Lecture	  by	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  Grande,	  UN	  Deputy	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  and	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  for	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  “How	  to	  
be	  Humanitarian?	  UN	  Intervention	  in	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Societies,”	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  School	  of	  Economics,	  7	  October	  2009,	  
in	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  Lie	  and	  de	  Carvalho,	  “Between	  Culture	  and	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  in	  Sudan	  (UNMIS),”	  63.	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Demonstration	   requires	   strong	   military	   capabilities	   and	   a	   clear,	   operational	  
definition	  of	  POC.	  While	  peace	  soldiers	  are	  able	  achieve	  a	  modicum	  of	  success	  against	  weak	  
non-­‐state	  actors,	  such	  as	  the	  warlords	  in	  Somalia	  or	  the	  militias	  in	  Sierra	  Leone,	  achieving	  
POC	  objectives	  becomes	  much	  more	  difficult	  against	  state-­‐sponsored	  actors.	  As	  Chapter	  3	  
and	  Chapter	  5	  of	  this	  thesis	  have	  revealed,	  state-­‐sponsored	  violence	  against	  civilians	  is	  well	  
organized	   and	   efficient.	   In	   these	   situations,	   effective	   POC	   campaigns	   also	   require	   a	   large	  
number	  of	  troops	  on	  the	  ground	  with	  enforcement	  powers	  or	  air	  power.	  But	  it	   is	  difficult	  
for	  the	  UN	  to	  procure	  soldiers	  from	  member	  states	  for	  peace	  missions,	  especially	  complex	  
peace	  missions	  requiring	  the	  use	  of	  force.	  Air	  power	  is	  an	  attractive	  option	  because	  it	  leads	  
to	  low	  numbers	  of	  casualties	  among	  soldiers,	  but	  the	  UN	  has	  no	  air	  capabilities	  of	  its	  own.	  
Moreover,	  as	  the	  NATO	  air	  strikes	   in	  Kosovo	   illustrated,	  air	  power	  unfortunately	   leads	  to	  
civilian	   casualties	   on	   the	   ground.332	   Thus,	   protecting	   civilians	   in	   situations	   of	   state-­‐
sponsored	  violence	  will	  always	  be	  extremely	  difficult	  for	  the	  UN	  and	  a	  task	  better	  suited	  for	  
nation-­‐states	  with	  strong	  military	  capabilities.	  Nonetheless,	  evolution	  of	   the	  POC	  norm	  at	  
the	  UN	  continues.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  POC	  is	  just	  as	  important	  to	  
the	  UN	  as	  demonstration	  of	  POC.	  
Thus,	   while	   there	   was	   large-­‐scale	   institutionalization	   of	   the	   UN’s	   enhanced	   POC	  
agenda	   during	   UNMIS,	   there	   was	   also	   a	   large	   gap	   between	   this	   institutionalization	   and	  
demonstration	  on	  the	  ground.	  While	  this	  gap	  was	  partially	  the	  result	  of	  political	  resistance	  
by	  Sudanese	  actors,	   it	  was	  also	  the	  result	  of	  the	  delayed	  deployment	  of	  troops,	  a	  complex	  
mandate,	  a	   lack	  of	  workable	  definitions	   for	  POC	   in	  the	   field	  and	  a	   lack	  of	  political	  will	  on	  





	   To	  summarize,	  during	  UNMIS,	  the	  POC	  norm	  evolved	  from	  the	  physical	  protection	  of	  
humanitarian	  workers	  and	  civilians	  into	  the	  broad	  normative	  framework	  that	  informs	  the	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  more	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  drones	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  the	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  on	  terror’	  has	  also	  led	  to	  unintended	  civilian	  casualties	  
on	  the	  ground.	  Organizations	  like	  Amnesty	  International	  and	  HRW	  have	  accused	  the	  US	  of	  violating	  IHL	  
(Declan	  Walsh,	  “Civilian	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  Report,”	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  Times,	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‘culture’	  of	  protection	  at	  the	  UN	  today.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Security	  Council	  adopted	  Resolution	  
1674	   in	   2006,	   which	   expanded	   the	   POC	   norm	   even	   further	   by	   reaffirming	   the	   UN’s	  
“responsibility	   to	   protect	   populations	   from	   genocide,	   war	   crimes,	   ethnic	   cleansing	   and	  
crimes	  against	  humanity.”333	  	  
The	  main	   actors	   responsible	   for	   normative	   evolution	   during	   UNMIS	  were	   the	   UN	  
Secretariat	  and	  Security	  Council,	  which	  both	  played	  a	  strong	  role	  defining	  and	  promoting	  
POC	   objectives	   throughout	   UNMIS.	   Between	   1999	   and	   2004,	   both	   added	   to	   the	  
proliferation	   of	  work	   on	   POC	   conceptually	   at	   the	   UN,	  which	   led	   to	   the	   broad	   normative	  
framework	   that	   informed	   UNMIS’	   POC	   objectives.	   The	   Secretariat	   helped	   create	   more	  
organizational	  capacity	   for	  POC	   in	  UNMIS	  with	   the	  concept	  of	   the	   integrated	  mission,	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  POC	  section	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  CPU.	  However,	  these	  same	  actors	  
were	  unwilling	  to	  act	  upon	  R2P	  in	  Darfur,	  despite	  pressure	  from	  international	  civil	  society	  
and	  Congress.	  
Based	  on	  the	  incredible	  progress	  the	  UN	  had	  made	  in	  the	  field	  of	  POC	  conceptually	  
in	   the	   five	  years	  prior	   to	  UNMIS,	   the	  Secretariat	   and	  Security	  Council	  were	  motivated	  by	  
ideational	  influences	  to	  create	  a	  broad	  POC	  agenda	  for	  UNMIS.	  If	  the	  UN	  had	  taken	  praxis-­‐
challenges	   into	   consideration,	   UNMIS’	   POC	   agenda	   would	   not	   have	   been	   as	   broad	   or	  
ambitious	  
	   Finally,	  there	  was	  large-­‐scale	  institutionalization	  of	  the	  UN’s	  enhanced	  POC	  agenda	  
during	  UNMIS,	  namely	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  POC	  and	  CPU,	  along	  with	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  POC	  
objectives	  outlined	  in	  Resolutions	  1265,	  1296	  and	  the	  2002	  Aide	  Memoire	  in	  the	  mandate	  
of	   UNMIS.	   However,	   there	   was	   also	   a	   large	   gap	   between	   this	   institutionalization	   and	  
demonstration	  on	  the	  ground.	  This	  ‘implementation	  gap’	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  pattern	  for	  POC	  
with	   regard	   to	   UN	   peace	   operations.	   It	   occurs	   in	   part	   because	   the	   actors	   who	  
institutionalize	  the	  POC	  norm	  are	  different	  from	  the	  actors	  who	  ultimately	  demonstrate	  the	  
norm.	   Though	  UN	  member	   states	  with	   strong	  military	   capabilities	   are	   arguably	   the	   only	  
actors	  with	   the	  ability	   to	   successfully	  demonstrate	  POC	  objectives,	  UN	  actors	  continue	   to	  
promote	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   POC	   norm.	   This	   behavior	   suggests	   that,	   for	   the	   UN,	  
institutionalization	  is	  just	  as	  important	  as	  demonstration.	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  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  S/RES/1674.	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Chapter	  6	  
Conclusion:	  Normative	  Evolution	  and	  Constructivist	  Theory	  
	  
	  
6.1	  Introduction	  	  
	  
	   Between	   1992	   and	   2011,	   the	   UN	   launched	   forty-­‐three	   peace	   missions	   across	   the	  
globe.334	  This	  thesis	  analyzed	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  POC	  norm	  in	  four	  of	  those	  peace	  missions	  
(UNOSOM,	   UNAMIR,	   UNAMSIL	   and	   UNMIS)	   using	   a	   Constructivist	   framework.	   This	  
concluding	   chapter	   presents	   the	   cumulative	   findings	   on	   the	   research	   undertaken.	   It	  
addresses	   how,	   beginning	   in	   1992	   with	   the	   UN	   peace	   mission	   in	   Somalia,	   the	   norm	   of	  
civilian	   protection	   during	   conflict	   evolved	   at	   the	   UN.	   It	   also	   builds	   upon	   existing	  
Constructivist	  theory.	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  recommendations	  for	  further	  research.	  	  
	  
	  
6.2	  Evolution	  of	  the	  POC	  Norm	  at	  the	  UN	  (1992-­2011)	  
	  
Beginning	   in	   1992	   with	   the	   UN	   peace	   mission	   in	   Somalia,	   how	   has	   the	   norm	   of	  
civilian	   protection	   during	   conflict	   evolved	   at	   the	   UN?	   Who	   were	   the	   main	   actors	   that	  
defined	  and	  promoted	  normative	  evolution	  within	  the	  UN?	  Who	  were	  the	  main	  actors	  that	  
were	   capable	   of	   demonstrating	   normative	   evolution	   on	   the	   ground?	   Was	   normative	  
evolution	  at	  the	  UN	  motivated	  by	  ideational	  influences	  or	  in	  response	  to	  praxis-­‐challenges?	  
Finally,	   did	   normative	   evolution	   occur	   primarily	   through	   institutionalization	   or	  
demonstration?	  
The	  two	  decades	  between	  1992	  and	  2011	  witnessed	  significant	  normative	  evolution	  
with	   regard	   to	   the	   POC	   norm.	   In	   the	   Cold	  War-­‐era,	   the	   POC	   norm	  was	   akin	   to	   the	   non-­‐
combatant	   immunity	   norm,	   which	   stipulates	   that	   non-­‐combatants,	   or	   civilians,	   have	  
immunity	  from	  direct	  military	  attack	  because	  they	  do	  not	  directly	  participate	  in	  hostilities	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  “List	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Operations:	  1945-­‐2013,”	  United	  Nations	  website,	  
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf.	  	  
	   93	  
or	   have	   a	   continuous	   combat	   function.	   For	   peace	   soldiers,	   complying	   with	   the	   non-­‐
combatant	   immunity	  norm	  entailed	   the	   avoidance	  of	   targeting	   civilians.	   Since	   the	   end	  of	  
the	  Cold	  War-­‐era,	  the	  POC	  norm	  has	  evolved	  into	  a	  comprehensive	  normative	  framework	  
that	  includes	  not	  only	  the	  active	  protection	  of	  civilians	  under	  imminent	  threat	  of	  physical	  
violence,	   but	   also	   the	   protection	   of	   civilians	   through	   broad	   goals	   generally	   adopted	   by	  
humanitarian	   and	   development	   actors.335	   With	   the	   adoption	   of	   Resolution	   1764	   by	   the	  
Security	   Council	   in	   2006,	   POC	   now	   includes	   the	   concept	   of	   R2P,	   which	   is	   the	   most	  
controversial	  addition	  to	  the	  POC	  norm.	  
Using	  a	  Constructivist	  framework,	  this	  thesis	  revealed	  that	  the	  greatest	  impetus	  for	  
normative	   evolution	   came	   from	   the	   UN	   Secretary-­‐Generals,	   specifically	   Annan.	   Annan’s	  
report,	   The	   Causes	   of	   Conflict	   and	   the	   Promotion	   of	   Durable	   Peace	   and	   Sustainable	  
Development	   in	   Africa,	   defined	   the	   protection	   of	   civilians	   as	   a	   humanitarian	   imperative.	  
During	  Annan’s	  first	  term	  as	  Secretary-­‐General,	  the	  Security	  Council	  affirmed	  that	  POC	  was	  
an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  UN’s	  promise	  to	  maintain	  international	  peace	  and	  security,336	  and	  it	  
became	   standard	   practice	   for	   peace	   soldiers	  who	  witnessed	   violence	   against	   civilians	   to	  
presume	  that	  they	  had	  the	  authority	  to	  stop	  it.337	  During	  Annan’s	  second	  term,	  POC	  evolved	  
from	  the	  physical	  protection	  of	  civilians	  and	  humanitarian	  workers	  into	  the	  broad	  ‘culture’	  
of	   protection	   that	   exists	   that	   the	   UN	   today,	   and	   the	   DPKO’s	   organizational	   capacity	  was	  
increased	   so	   that	   the	   additional	   duties	   of	   peace	   soldiers	   could	   be	   better	   managed	   and	  
coordinated.	  Thus,	  Annan	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  normative	  intermediary.	  
It	  must	  be	  stated	  that	  NGOs	  and	  other	  non-­‐UN	  actors	  also	  played	  a	  strong	  role	  in	  the	  
evolution	  of	  the	  POC	  norm.	  Intelligence	  gathered	  from	  NGOs	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  conflict	  areas	  
and	  presented	  to	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  or	  Security	  Council	  by	  these	  same	  NGOs,	  or	  by	  the	  
OCHA,	   ultimately	   informed	   the	   Secretary-­‐General’s	   reports	   on	   POC.	   NGOs,	   through	   the	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  Goals	  such	  as:	  securing	  safe	  access	  to	  vulnerable	  populations;	  combating	  impunity;	  restoring	  law	  and	  
order;	  adequately	  disarming,	  demobilizing,	  reintegrating	  and	  rehabilitating	  ex-­‐combatants;	  addressing	  small	  
arms	  and	  mine	  action;	  training	  of	  security	  and	  peacekeeping	  forces;	  addressing	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  women;	  
addressing	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  children;	  providing	  safety	  and	  security	  for	  humanitarian	  and	  associated	  
personnel;	  mitigating	  hate	  media;	  being	  mindful	  of	  the	  humanitarian	  impact	  of	  sanctions;	  separating	  civilians	  
and	  armed	  elements;	  and	  addressing	  the	  effects	  of	  natural	  resources	  on	  armed	  conflict.	  
336	  Brooks,	  “The	  UN	  Security	  Council	  and	  Civilian	  Protection,”	  18.	  
337	  Brahimi,	  Report	  of	  the	  Panel	  on	  United	  Nations	  Peace	  Operations,	  x.	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OCHA,	  helped	  create	  the	  UN’s	  2002	  Aide	  Memoire	  on	  POC	  by	   identifying	  the	  key	  areas	  of	  
POC	  that	  had	  been	  overlooked	  or	  poorly	  coordinated	  in	  past	  peace	  missions.	  	  
The	   actors	   most	   responsible	   for	   defining	   and	   promoting	   normative	   evolution	  
ultimately	   differed	   from	   the	   actors	   most	   responsible	   for	   demonstrating	   normative	  
evolution:	   the	  states	  on	   the	  Security	  Council	  with	  strong	  military	  capabilities.	   In	  Somalia,	  
before	   the	   arrival	   of	  UNITAF,	  UNOSOM	   troops	  were	   unable	   to	  move	  past	   the	  Mogadishu	  
airport.	   In	   contrast,	   UNITAF	   troops	   were	   able	   to	   save	   at	   least	   250,000	   Somalis	   from	  
starvation.338	   In	  Rwanda,	   the	  French	  were	   the	   only	   actors	  willing	   to	  use	   force	   to	  protect	  
civilians,	   though	   the	   French’s	   motivations	   became	   suspect	   when	   they	   were	   accused	   to	  
harboring	  war	  criminals	  and	  withholding	  information	  regarding	  the	  genocidaires	  from	  the	  
UN.	  In	  Sierra	  Leone,	  UNAMSIL	  soldiers	  initially	  struggled	  to	  fulfill	  their	  POC	  mandate,	  and	  
the	  delayed	  deployment	  of	  and	  poor	  communication	  between	  UNAMSIL	  forces	  resulted	  in	  
an	  embarrassing	  hostage	  crisis.	  The	  deployment	  of	  UK	  troops,	  coupled	  with	  the	  UK’s	  efforts	  
on	   the	   UNSC	   to	   secure	   enforcement	   powers	   for	   UNAMSIL,	   resulted	   in	   the	   forced	  
disarmament	  of	  the	  rebels	  and	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  main	  threat	  to	  the	  civilian	  population.	  
In	  Sudan,	  the	  Sudanese	  President,	  Omar	  al-­‐Bashir	  insisted	  that	  the	  UN’s	  peace	  missions	  in	  
Sudan	  retain	  a	  predominantly	  African	  character	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  an	  infusion	  of	  better-­‐
equipped,	  better-­‐trained	  Western	  soldiers	  into	  his	  country.	  
Ideational	   influences	  and	  praxis-­‐challenges	  did	  not	  prove	   to	  be	  mutually	  exclusive	  
motives.	   However,	   ideational	   influences	   served	   primarily	   as	   a	   motivator	   for	   normative	  
evolution,	   while	   praxis-­‐challenges	   served	   primarily	   as	   a	   motivator	   for	   the	   stalling	   of	  
normative	  evolution.	  More	  importantly,	  neither	  ideational	  influences	  nor	  praxis-­‐challenges	  
proved	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  motive	  behind	  normative	  evolution.	  Instead,	  the	  primary	  motive	  
was	   organizational	   survival.	   Organizational	   survival	   motivated	   the	   UN	   to	   continue	   to	  
promote	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  POC	  norm	  and	  to	  institutionalize	  that	  growth,	  despite	  the	  fact	  
that	  praxis-­‐challenges	  would	  make	  implementation	  difficult	  and	  make	  other	  actors	  weary	  
of	  demonstrating	  the	  POC	  norm	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  
The	   primary	   mechanism	   of	   normative	   evolution	   in	   the	   case	   study	   was	  
institutionalization.	  Between	  1992	  and	  2011,	  all	   changes	   in	   the	  content	  of	   the	  POC	  norm	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  Boutros-­‐Ghali,	  The	  United	  Nations	  and	  Somalia	  1992-­1996,	  6.	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were	   institutionalized.	   Generally,	   changes	   made	   to	   the	   POC	   norm	   would	   first	   be	  
institutionalized	  in	  UN	  reports,	  and	  the	  Security	  Council	  would	  subsequently	  include	  new	  
POC	   objectives	   in	   the	   mandates	   of	   peace	   missions	   or	   in	   its	   thematic	   Resolutions.	   Then,	  
organizational	  capacity	  would	  be	  expanded	  so	  that	  the	  UN	  could	  better	  handle	  the	  broader,	  
more	  demanding	  POC	  objectives.	  	  
The	   demonstration	   of	   normative	   evolution	   by	   the	  UN	  was	   less	   consistent,	   in	   part	  
because	   the	   actors	   who	   institutionalized	   the	   norm	   differed	   from	   those	   ultimately	   most	  
responsible	   for	   demonstrating	   normative	   evolution	   (non-­‐UN	   actors,	   specifically	   nation-­‐
states	   with	   strong	   military	   capabilities).	   This	   dichotomy	   has	   produced	   a	   widening	   gap	  
between	  the	  UN’s	  ambitions	  and	  abilities	  regarding	  POC.	  	  
	  
	  
6.3	  Building	  Constructivist	  Theory:	  Normative	  Evolution	  during	  the	  Second	  Stage	  of	  
the	  Norm	  Life-­Cycle	  
	  
	   How	   does	   the	   evidence	   from	   this	   thesis’	   case	   study	   help	   build	   upon	   existing	  
Constructivist	  theory?	  	  Do	  the	  norm	  dynamics	  in	  the	  case	  study	  confirm	  or	  contradict	  those	  
put	  forth	  by	  Finnemore’s	  and	  Sikkink’s	  Constructivist	  framework,	  specifically	  with	  regard	  
to	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  norm	  life-­‐cycle?	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Finnemore’s	  and	  Sikkink’s	  Second	  Stage	  of	  the	  Norm	  Life-­‐Cycle339	  
	   Stage	  2:	  Norm	  Cascade	  
Actors	   States,	  international	  organizations,	  
networks	  
Motives	   Legitimacy,	  reputation,	  esteem	  
Dominant	  Mechanisms	   Socialization,	  institutionalization,	  
demonstration	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  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink,	  “International	  Norm	  Dynamics	  and	  Political	  Change,”	  898.	  
	   96	  
The	  evidence	  from	  the	  case	  study	  produced	  five	  conclusions	  about	  the	  second	  stage	  
of	   the	   normative	   life-­‐cycle	   that	   are	   not	   adequately	   addressed	   by	   existing	   Constructivist	  
theory.	   First,	   while	   existing	   Constructivist	   literature	   identifies	   the	   norm	   cascade	   as	   the	  
primary	   process	   of	   the	   second	   stage	   of	   the	   norm	   life-­‐cycle,	   this	   thesis	   revealed	   that	  
normative	   evolution	   also	  occurs	  during	   the	   second	   stage	  of	   the	   life-­‐cycle.	   It	   is	   clear	   that,	  
after	   norms	   emerge,	   they	   undergo	   processes	   of	   redefinition	   or	   revision	   before	   they	   are	  
internalized.	  	  
Second,	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink	  correctly	   identified	  states,	   IOs	  and	  TANs	  as	  actors	  
involved	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  norm	  life-­‐cycle.	  However,	  their	  methodological	  choice	  to	  
treat	   IOs	   as	   single	   actors	   prevented	   them	   from	   adequately	   addressing	   which	   organs,	  
agencies,	   nation-­‐states	   or	   individuals	  within	   IOs	   play	   important	   roles	   in	   norm	   evolution.	  
This	   thesis	   revealed	   that	   the	   greatest	   impetus	   for	   normative	   evolution	   at	   IOs	  may	   come	  
from	  within	  IOs.	  	  
Third,	   this	   thesis	   confirmed	   that	   motives	   of	   legitimacy,	   reputation	   and	   esteem	  
emerge	   during	   the	   second	   state	   of	   the	   norm	   life-­‐cycle.	   Within	   an	   IO,	   these	   motives	   are	  
encompassed	  in	  the	  ultimate	  motive,	  organizational	  survival.	  	  Organizational	  survival	  helps	  
explain	  why	  IOs	  take	  on	  tasks	  for	  which	  they	  are	  ultimately	  ill-­‐prepared.	  
Fourth,	   the	   thesis	   revealed	   that	   institutionalization	   is	   the	   primary	   mechanism	   of	  
normative	   evolution	   because	   demonstration	   of	   normative	   evolution	   is	   ultimately	   more	  
difficult	   than	   institutionalization.	   It	   is	   also	   because	   institutionalization	   serves	   many	  
functions.	   For	   the	   UN,	   institutionalization	   serves	   to	   solidify	   institutional	   goals	   and	  make	  
organizational	   commitments.	   Moreover,	   by	   introducing	   POC	   issues	   to	   the	   international	  
community	  with	  lofty	  rhetoric,	  institutionalization	  aims	  to	  socialize	  other	  actors	  to	  comply	  
with	   the	   POC	   norm.	   Thus,	   one	   of	   the	   ultimate	   goals	   of	   institutionalization	   is	   actually	  
socialization,	  or	  the	  spreading	  of	  the	  norm.	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  because,	  innately,	  
the	  UN	  is	  unable	  to	  carry	  out	  any	  militarized	  POC	  objective	  without	  contributions	  of	  troops	  
and	  equipment	  from	  member	  states.	  	  
Finally,	   the	  thesis	  revealed	  that	  the	   institutionalization	  and	  socialization	  of	  a	  norm	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  demonstration	  or	  behavioral	  change	  on	  the	  ground.	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6.4	  Further	  Research	  
	  
	   The	  research	  and	  findings	  of	  this	  thesis	  are	  ultimately	  narrow	  in	  scope,	  and	  further	  
research	  will	  yield	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  norm	  dynamics	  affect	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  
POC	  norm	  and	  its	  implementation	  on	  the	  ground.	  One	  particular	  area	  for	  further	  research	  
includes	   the	  growing	  gap	  between	   the	  UN’s	  proclaimed	  ambitions	  and	  actual	   capabilities	  
regarding	   POC,	  which	   is	  most	   conspicuous	   in	   Africa.	  While	   the	   plight	   of	   civilians	   during	  
conflict	   is	   not	   an	   issue	   that	   is	   specific	   to	   Africa,	   African	   conflicts	   were	   influential	   in	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  POC	  norm	  and	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  UN	  peace	  missions	  with	  mandates	  
to	   protect	   civilians	   have	   occurred	   in	   Africa.	   In	   Africa,	   the	   UN	   experiences	   difficulties	  
protecting	  civilians	  due	  to	  problems	  with	  its	  military	  capabilities	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  coherent	  
definition	  for	  POC.	  However,	  the	  UN’s	  greatest	  challenge	  in	  Africa	  may	  be	  the	  prevalence	  of	  
state-­‐sponsored	  violence	  against	  civilians.	  Unfortunately,	  this	  is	  the	  type	  of	  violence	  against	  
which	  the	  UN	  is	  most	  ineffectual,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  gap	  between	  ambitions	  and	  abilities	  
may	   only	   grow	   larger.	   How	   can	   the	   UN	   close	   the	   gap	   between	   institutionalization	   and	  
demonstration?	   How	   can	   the	   UN	   persuade	   states	   with	   strong	   military	   capabilities	   to	  
demonstrate	  POC	  in	  Africa?	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